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Abstract 
Tallinn, Estonia features one of the best-preserved old towns in Europe.  The central 
part of the city, which dates in part back to the 13th century, has drawn millions 
of tourists each year since the 1990s.  In 2004, 6.7 million passengers passed 
through Tallinn’s ports.1  A short (80-km) ferry ride from Helsinki, Tallinn’s location 
-- at the crossroads of east-west and north-south trading routes -- has made it highly 
contested territory since the Crusades.
During the twentieth century, Tallinn was subject to interludes of Russian/Soviet and 
German rule.  Since the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991, economic 
and political changes have been rapid.  A parliamentary democracy, Estonia in 1998 
earned the title of “Europe’s purest free market economy”.2  Estonia joined the 
European Union on 1 May 2004, and, in the words of one official, now aspires to 
be “just another boring Nordic country.”  Estonia identifies strongly with Scandinavia 
because of close cultural, linguistic, and economic ties with Finland, and historical 
links with Sweden and Denmark.  
The Finnish architect Eliel Saarinen proposed a city plan for 1913 Tallinn, which 
exerted a hidden influence during the 50 years of Soviet occupation.  Soviet-era 
migrants were accommodated in housing blocks which appear austere today. 
Estonians, in contrast, found it difficult to find housing, which may have contributed 
to the rapid decline of their birth rate.  Russian and Estonian districts still remain 
largely separated, in effect making Tallinn “one city, two towns.”3  With a population 
of 430,000, the city continues to confront the problem of integrating its Russian 
population, along with challenges of intense tourism, privatization of property, 
increased demands for housing, and the restructuring of open-space planning.
Rapid economic and cultural changes have shaped planning priorities and progress 
in Tallinn, and have left the city with a physical imprint of its history -- and likely future. 
1  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
2  Financial Times
3  Personal communication, Landscape Architecture Professor   































Tallinn’s latitude is approximately 
equivalent to Stockholm. 
Isotherms show lines of constant 
temperature in Europe.  Most 
cities fall where the average 
January temperature is between 
0 and -5 C.
Figure 1:
Estonia’s closest neighbors are 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and 


















































Tallinn is located in Harjuu 
County in northern Estonia 
(above), 80 km from Helsinki.  
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View of Tallinn from across the bay at the 
Vabaõhumuuseum (Open Air Museum), which 
features traditional Estonian architecture.
Watercolor painting by Vaike Haas
Introduction 
Very little has been written about Tallinn’s city 
planning in English.  Even the city’s masterplan 
documents from 2000-2005 are only available in 
Estonian.  In order to acquaint English-speakers 
with a sense of the range of issues that Tallinn’s 
planners have to tackle, this paper will:
find marks on the city from almost seven 
centuries of occupation,
compare today’s progress toward 
multiculturalism with historic ethnic 
relations, 
identify the major problems and progress 
in post-Soviet planning, and
suggest ways to promote integration 
through urban planning and design.
Methods
I collected material from sources not readily 
accessible to English-speakers, in addition to 
reviewing the literature (in both Estonian and 
English).  I interviewed several city experts and 
officials, including: the Mayor, the Head of the 
City Planning Office, the City Landscape Architect, 
and the former Minister of the Environment. 
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Old Town remains very well 
preserved today.
Figure 4
Toompea’s north slope is raised 
and isolated by a wall.  At the 
turn of the century, only the 
Lutheran Cathedral of St. Mary, 
or Dome Church, claimed the 
summit.
2
materials with the permission of Tallinn’s Linna 
Arhiiv (City Archives).
Historic Approach
Estonian culture is a crossroads of East meets 
West meets Scandinavia, and Tallinn’s struggles 
to achieve ethnic integration today reflect a 
long history of multiculturalism and colonization. 
This analysis begins with a sampling of Tallinn’s 
significant historic epochs in order to set the 
city’s urban planning into context.  As urbanists 
Jean-Luc Pinol and Richard Roger explained, 
few contemporary concerns can be understood 
without reference to the historical development 
of towns and cities.4  
In a tiny country little-known to the outside 
world before 1991, taking an historic–cultural–
geographical approach to assessing urban 
planning was especially relevant.  Tallinn, like all 
cities, is part of a larger narrative.  
Tallinn is a town that will never be finished.  Legend 
holds that at midnight in autumn once each year, 
a small gray old man asks the guards at the town 
gate whether Tallinn is done being built.  The old 
man wants to open the floodgates restraining 
the nearby Lake Ülemiste and destroy the city 
once it is complete; but, each year, the guards 
tell him construction is ongoing.  
This legend has poignant relevance in the post-
Soviet era, as Estonians seek to erase Soviet 
traces and ‘reclaim’ Tallinn’s history.  According 
to conflict resolution specialist David Smith:
The restoration of statehood according to the 
principle of legal continuity could not efface the 
factual legacies – political, economic, social, 
cultural, environmental and demographic – left 
behind by fifty years of sovietisation.  In this 
sense, the use of the term ‘post-Soviet’ with 
regard to Estonia is not only valid, but makes 
the subsequent progress in domestic reform 
and European integration appear all the more 
remarkable.5  
Tallinn is a city still in the process of rising from the 
sea, and where lost histories continually come to 
4  Clark 2006: xi







Patrull Stairs connect Toompea’s 
north slope to the city below.
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Figure 7
Toompea (circled) was an island 








light.  Tallinn’s layers of history and 700 years of 
foreign rule have left marks on the city that are 
all the more apparent because of the ongoing, 
successional emersion of land.  To ground this 
report’s analysis of post-Soviet transitions and 
ethnic relations, I first present Tallinn in its 
historic context of occupation and conflict.
Context and Location
Estonia, the northernmost of three Baltic nations 
(see Figure 1), was restored to independence in 
1991 after 51 years of Soviet occupation.  The 
USSR’s unlawful annexation of the Baltic States 
was arranged through a clandestine clause of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. 
The Baltic States secured their independence 
through what became known as the Singing 
Revolution, between 1986-1991, and in the 
years since have experienced sweeping political 
and economic transformations.
The Baltic countries ‘returned to Europe’ with 
enthusiasm, shedding the shroud of Sovietization6 
more efficiently and effectively than many other 
former Soviet Republics.  Estonia has achieved 
the highest standard of living of any former 
USSR republic.  While Estonia has the closest 
ties with Scandinavia and the most stable 
market economy, all three Baltic States were 
able to join the European Union in 2004.  While 
a number of diverse cultures and nationalities 
have been variously considered “Baltic” since the 
11th century, after World War I the Baltic region 
was more firmly defined as referring exclusively 
to Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.7
Climate
Estonia is a small country (350 by 240 km), 
with an area of 45,215 km2, roughly the size of 
Denmark.  Tallinn’s latitude, at 59°26’, is roughly 
as far north as Oslo, Stockholm, or the Alaska 
Peninsula.  Tallinn’s winters are slightly colder 
than Helsinki’s (see Figure 2).    Estonia’s climate 
is moderated by its proximity to the Baltic Sea. 
Estonia’s mainland has 1254 km of coastline.8  
6  Also known as Russification
7  Hackmann and Schweitzer 2002: 362












Half of Estonia is forested.  
Estonia has many natural 
reserves and protected areas.
Figure 9
Two rough-hewn planks make a 
boardwalk through Aabla Bog in 
Lahemaa Park, east of Tallinn.  
W




Estonia is divided into 15 counties, which are in 
turn divided into local government areas, or vald 
districts.9  As of January 2005, Estonia’s capital 
city Tallinn, in Harju County (see Figures 3a-b) 
housed 401,821 people, or almost one third of 
the nation’s population (1,347,000).10  There 
are around one million ethnic Estonians living in 
Estonia, and roughly another 100,000 Estonians 
living abroad (see Appendix for population data). 
Most of the country’s population (71.5%) is 
urban.11  Tallinn’s population density (in 2005) 
was 2,524 people per square km.9  The overall 
population density of Estonia was 34.9 people 
per square km in 1989.8
Tourism
Tallinn increasingly emphasizes its links with 
Helsinki, which manifest both in the form of 
strong and growing competition (for tourists 
and residents) and cooperation (investment 
and services).12  Located on the Baltic Sea, 80 
km from Helsinki, Tallinn is a popular tourist 
destination, attracting 6 million visitors to its 
port each year.13   In Estonia, with a population of 
1.32 million,14 this level of tourism is significant. 
Tallinn derives much of its tourist appeal from 
its Old Town (Vanalinn), which is one of the best-
preserved medieval town centers in Europe.  Old 
Town escaped much of the wartime bombing 
that affected other European towns.  There are 
two distinct areas within Old Town: a general 
enclosed downtown area, and the former fortress 
Toompea, which is raised 20-30 meters above 
the city15 by a limestone outcrop (see Figures 
4-7). 
Environment
Estonians were among the last pagans in Europe, 
and a devotion to nature continues to shape 
city structure and urban planning in Estonia. 
Estonians have always been closely tied to their 
9  Peterson 1994: 6
10  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
11   Raukas 1996: 21
12  Tallinn City Enterprise Board 2004: 9
13  Statistikaamet 2004: 133
14  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia
























































The Estonian language is related 

























Tallinn’s ice-free port marked 
the northernmost range of early 
medieval trade routes.
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land and forests; in fact, nature conservation in 
Estonia dates back the 13th century, when sacred 
groves and trees were protected. Even a few 
hundred years ago, felling hay was still forbidden 
within the reach of the canopy of sacred trees. 
The earliest known state act regulating the 
conservation of natural resources in Estonia was 
an order to protect trees issued by the Danish 
monarch in 1297. Even with increased cultivation 
under Swedish rule in the 16th-17th centuries, 
when the overall amount of forest declined, oak, 
apple, rowan, and cherry tree species remained 
protected: “in some cases two trees were to be 
planted for each tree cut.”16  In fact, conservation 
was so culturally important that a person caught 
cutting trees illegally was declared an outlaw. 
Today, almost one half of the republic remains 
forested, mostly with temperate mixed forest 
(see Figure 8, sidebar following page).17 
A forested buffer of 106 meters was established 
along the Baltic shoreline in 1764, and in 
some areas was as wide as 2 km.  This buffer 
protected the region’s topsoil.  While the buffer 
was introduced to serve the ship-building industry, 
ship-builders were forbidden from cutting oak, 
maple, elm or pine trees for ship masts.18
The Baltic’s first nature preserve was established 
in 1910 on the Vaika Islands in Western 
Saaremaa.  By 1940, 17 preserves and 90 
parks were protected.  The 1992 constitution 
declared:
Everyone shall be obliged to preserve the human 
and natural environment and to compensate 
for damages caused by him or her to the 
environment.19
By 1994, 5 reserves and 479 protected areas 
had been designated (see Figure 9).20  A respect 
for nature permeates Estonian culture and the 
contemporary urban planning process.
Although Estonia averages a mere 50 m above 
sea level,21 the northwest part of Estonia, like 
much of Scandinavia, has been rising at a rate 
of 2.5 – 3 mm per year since the last glacial 
16  Ratas 1994: 4
17  Peterson 1994: 8
18  Ratas 1994: 5
19  Quoted in Peterson 1994: 6
20  Ratas 1994: 5








Tallinn’s Raekoja Plats (Town Hall 
Square) is centrally located in Old 
Town.
Figure 14
Tallinn’s Town Hall is one of few 
Gothic town halls preserved in 

















retreat.22  New islands are constantly emerging, 
and erratic rocks remain scattered across the 
landscape.   Less than one tenth of Estonia is 
more than 100 m above sea level.  Slight runoff 
and abundant precipitation (50-70 cm per year) 
also contribute to Estonia’s wetlands (see Figure 
10).  Estonia has over 1400 lakes.23  About 
one quarter of the country (22-30%) is covered 
by wetlands, most of which are fens with an 
average peat thickness of 3.2 m.24  Peat-lands 
as thick as 16.7 m and as old as 10,000 years 
give archeologists insightful clues to the region’s 
early history.
Early Estonian History and Language
Estonia was first inhabited during the glacial 
retreat of the Mesolithic period, and its earliest 
settlements, at Sindi and Kunda, date to back the 
7th millennium BC25.  Long history of settlement 
has contributed to Estonians’ strong tie to their 
land.26  The predominant theory is that Estonia’s 
first settlers were Finno-Ugric tribes, possibly 
from the Ural Mountains or the Ukrainian Ice 
Age refuge.
Language
The ‘Ests’ separated from the Livonians in the 
first millennium BC, completing the last division 
of Baltic-Finnic tribes.27 While Livonian today is a 
dying language, with only around a dozen fluent 
speakers remaining, Estonian is spoken by more 
than one million people and staunchly defended 
as the official national language.  The Lithuanian 
and Latvian languages are in the Indo-European 
language family, which is not related to Estonian.
As a result of early tribal affiliations, the Estonian 
language is most closely related to Finnish, 
Hungarian, Saami (Lapplandish), and several 
Volga River and Western Siberian tongues.  These 
languages stand out in Europe as the Ural-Altaic, 
or Finno-Ugric, language family28 (see Figure 
22  Raukas 1996: 7, Peterson 1994: 8
23  Peterson 1994: 8
24  Peterson 1994: 8
25  Tarand 1980: 6  
26  Laar 2002: 27  
27  Tarand 1980: 9  
28  Clemens 2003: 25  
Dominant tree species 
in Estonia’s forests 
include:







Betula pubescens  
Downy birch
Sookask
Picea abies  
Norway spruce
Harilik kuusk
Alnus incana  
Speckled alder
Hall lepp
Alnus glutinosa  
European alder
Sanglepp (must lepp)
Populus tremula  
European aspen
Harilik haab (hall lepp)
Figure 15
The Town Hall is the terminal 
view for Viru Street. 
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11).  Estonian language and genetic identity have 
been “shaped by all the peoples and cultures 
that swept through a vital crossroads of trade 
and war.”29 Certain linguistic peculiarities have 
led to further speculation of cultural contact with 
Japan, although similarities between Estonia and 
Japan’s medieval architecture are hypothesized 
to be the result of commonalities of climate.30 
The separateness of the Estonian language from 
Russian, spoken through the rest of the USSR, 
helped Estonia maintain its culture through Soviet 
occupation.
Cultural Ties to Scandinavia
Estonia’s cultural ties to Scandinavia have been 
more definitely established, leading one Estonian 
geographer to propose the idea of Baltoscandia.31 
Estonia’s link to Scandinavia dates back to the 6th 
– 7th centuries AD, when periodic raids by Swedes 
encouraged the development of district town 
strongholds.   Estonians were able to develop 
friendly relations with the Goths of Gotland.  In 
more recent years, Estonia has looked towards 
Scandinavia for a model of modern culture that 
also respects historic tradition.
Medieval Tallinn
In the northern Estonian district of Rävala, the 
Toompea stronghold was built on a hill overlooking 
what is now Tallinn’s lower town.  The first 
written mention of the city of  Tallinn occurred 
in 1154, and was recorded by the Arabian 
geographer Abu Allah Mohhammed Idrisi.32  The 
Chronicle of Henricus de Lettis and the Liber 
Census Daniae concur that Tallinn was located 
at the intersection of several major highways.33 
With its desirable location and superior natural 
harbor, Tallinn soon became an important, and 
hotly contested, trading center on the Baltic Sea 
within the Rävala district.  Tallinn’s importance 
as a long-range trading center predated its 13th-
century membership in the Hanseatic League 
(see Figure 12).34
29  Clemens 2003: 27  
30  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
31  Edgar Kant, quoted in Lehti 2002: 432
32  Tarand 1980: 15
33  Pullat 1998: 17
34  Hackmann & Schweitzer 2002: 364
Figure 16
The tower Kiek-in-de-Kök is now 
a museum.   
Figure 17
Tallinn’s small coat of arms 


























Early Tallinn was inhabited by craftsmen and 
tradesmen.  The town market place was 
situated in what is now the Town Hall Square, 
and its historic importance is reflected by this 
central location (see Figures 13-15).  The main 
roads to the marketplace still exist in Old Town 
Tallinn today, along with many of the town’s early 
defensive towers.  Parts of the town wall date 
back to the 13th century; some of the towers 
built before 1413 have preserved their medieval 
German names, for instance Kiek-in-de-Kök (see 
Figure 16).                               
As an important trading center, Tallinn in the 
Middle Ages was already rich in ethnic diversity. 
While Estonians and Germans were the most 
represented, Swedes, Finns and Russians 
contributed to the diversity of the city.  Trade 
with Finland was brisk, as coastal Finns got most 
of their goods from Tallinn. Tallinn’s privileged 
trading relationship with Finland dates back to 
a 1326 peace treaty, foreshadowing economic 
relations today.35
In the early 13th century, the Baltic peoples 
were among the last pagans in Europe.  A papal 
decree led to a crusade against pagan Estonia 
from 1208-1227.  Tallinn and northern Estonia 
were conquered by Danish troops in 1219-
1220, despite the reinforcing support of military 
forces from the Russian towns of Novgorod and 
Pskov.  Legend has it that Estonian troops were 
away from Tallinn at the time, but were able to 
liberate the city upon their return.  Nevertheless, 
the city fell in turn to Germany, to the German 
military organization the Order of the Knights 
35  Pullat 1998: 65-68
Figure 20
Müürivahe Street blends 
medieval character with plate 
glass window-shopping. 
Figure 19
Despite heavy tourism, the Town 
Hall marketplace retains its 
medieval character. 
Figure 21
The Estonian History Museum, 
at 17 Pikk Street, was the Great 














of the Sword, and to Denmark over the next 
few decades. The following centuries brought 
Swedish, Tsarist Russian and Soviet colonists; 
even Scottish mercenaries looted the outskirts 
of the city in 1573.36
The town wall that surrounds Old Town dates 
to the late 1200s, and is still visible as a trace 
of Danish conquest. Danish occupation led 
Estonians to rename the town known to the 
Germans as Reval (from the old Estonian names 
of Rävala or Revala) as taan(i) linn, or “Danish 
town.”  The separation of Old Town’s raised 
fortress on Toompea dates back either to the 
Danish stronghold or to an earlier, pre-conquest 
fort that occupied the same site. Tallinn’s small 
coat of arms (see Figure 17), a white cross 
on red ground, was modeled after the Danish 
national flag.  Legend has it that the Danes rallied 
to conquer northern Estonia in 1219-1220 after 
this flag miraculously fell from the heavens in 
response to the Archbishop’s prayers.37
Membership in the Hanseatic League
In 1285, Tallinn joined the Hanseatic League, 
a union of trading cities centered on northern 
Germany.  As a result, Tallinn enjoyed considerable 
autonomy as a center of trade between Europe 
and Russia for the next 200 years.38  The most 
prized architecture in Tallinn’s Old town dates 
back to the 14th-16th centuries, and attests to 
close economic and cultural ties with Germany 
of the period. 
Medieval Tallinn was a medium-sized city, by 
European standards, with a population of 
4000 (according to the 1372 tax list).39  The 
Tallinn Town Hall, which still stands today, was 
constructed from 1371-1404.  Tallinn’s streets 
in the 14th century were narrow and lined with 
plastered limestone houses40 (see Figures 18-
20).
In 1347, a subsidiary of the Teutonic Order 
purchased the central and southern parts 
of Estonia, inaugurating 200 years of feudal 
disunion.  Bishops of Saare-Läänemaa and Tartu 
36  Pullat 1998: 77
37  Pullat 1998: 22
38  Pullat 1998: 21
39  Pullat 1998: 67
40  Tarand 1980: 26
Figure 22


















Several town wall towers are 
visible from the spire of Oleviste 
Church. 
Figure 24
Snell Pond, the zig-zagging 
centerpiece of Toompark, 
separates Old Town from the 
Central Railway Station.
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controlled the west and southeast, respectively.41 
Tallinn and northern Estonia remained part of 
the German-centered Hanseatic League for two 
centuries.  Tallinn during this time dominated the 
connection to Russian trade centers such as 
Novgorod.  
German merchants dominated the city through 
the privileges of class.  Conflicts between native 
Estonians and the German nobility were ongoing 
during this period, as Germans attempted to 
subjugate Estonians.  Ethnic Estonians were 
subjected to increasing restrictions: losing the 
right to work in preferred professions and even, 
eventually, to trade with gold.  Estonians were 
not allowed to participate in certain trades, 
and restrictions were placed on inter-ethnic 
marriages.42  However, German merchants 
needed to speak Estonian in order to conduct 
business, and took courses to learn the language. 
Furthermore, feudal law specified that, after a 
year and a day, landlord nobles lost their claim 
on serfs who fled to Tallinn – leading to the adage, 
“City air makes free.”43 
A guild system emerged in the mid-14th century, 
associated with German merchant trades. 
Goldsmiths, butchers and tailors formed the 
first trade guilds; later guilds were founded 
for: stonemasons, blacksmiths, brewers, 
shoemakers, carpenters, carters, coopers, and 
even hemp-twisters.44  Several of the original 
guild buildings remain (see Figure 21), and the 
medieval character of these surviving buildings 
contributes to the contemporary tourist appeal 
of Old Town.
The most conspicuous relic of Germanic/Danish 
rule is, of course, Tallinn’s city wall.   Of the 
2.35 km of wall built around the city during 
this period, almost 80% remains today.  Tallinn 
was one of the most fortified towns of medieval 
Europe,45 with 35 towers along a wall up to 3 
meters thick.  Of the city’s six original gates, the 
only ones remaining today are Viru Gate and the 
Great Coast Gate, but 25 towers remain (see 
Figures 22-26). Snell Pond is all that remains 
of the town’s 16th century protective moat (see 
Figure 27).  Buildings in medieval Tallinn were 
41  Tarand 1980: 17
42  Pullat 1998: 72-73
43  Pullat 1998: 72
44  Pullat 1998: 54
45  Tallinn: A Medieval Pearl on the Baltic Sea 2005: 48
Figures 25a-b
Viru Gate, renovated before 
1907, remains the main 
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The Russian Market formerly 
occupied the space just outside 
Viru Gate. Viru Gate now links 
Town Hall Square to modern 
















The Great Coast Gate connected 
Pikk Street to the harbor in 














The oldest of the Three Sisters 
at 71 Pikk Street, dates to 
1415 (right). Typical of medieval 
merchants’ homes are the front 
beams used to hoist cargo from 
the street.
constructed of local limestone, in a heavy and 
massive Gothic style.  Many medieval buildings 
remain today which demonstrate medieval 
German and Danish influences, including: the 
Dome Church, Tallinn’s Town Hall, and the row of 
buildings known as the Three Sisters (see Figure 
28).  
Although many medieval buildings remain in Tallinn 
(see Figures 29-34), UNESCO designated Old 
Town as a World Heritage Site mostly because 
the street layout has been preserved (see Figure 
32).46  Pikk Street used to be the main street of 
the town, where the most important buildings 
were located.  Pikk Jalg (Long Leg) and Lühike 
Jalg (Short Leg) streets connected Toompea to 
the lower town in the 13th and 14th centuries 
(see Figures 36-37).
The Lutheran Reformation
The Lutheran Reformation swept through Estonia 
on 14 September 1524, when approximately 
500 people plundered the monasteries and 
churches in Tallinn.  The Pirita convent and Tallinn 
monastery were destroyed by fire, for instance, 
although parts of these structures remain today 
(see Figures 38-39).  Tallinn’s main Lutheran 
Church, the Cathedral of Saint Mary the Virgin, 
was restored after a 1684 fire to reflect its 
original 13th century shape, and therefore does 
not reflect the usual minimal-Calvinist aesthetic 
(see Figure 40).
Tension between Estonians and Germans 
increased as a result of the Lutheran Reformation. 
The guild system in Tallinn declined in the late 
1500s.  During the Livonian War (1558-1583), 
Tallinn attempted to block trade with Russia, 
effectively breaking from Germany and the 
Hanseatic League in 1559. Finally, Tallinn swore 
allegiance to Sweden in 1561 (see Figure 41). 
Under Swedish rule, Tallinn lost importance as a 
trade city but became Sweden’s center of colonial 
power in the Baltic.
The democratic ideals of Lutheranism contributed 
to Estonia’s growing sense of national 
identity, and also led to mass literacy once 
the Bible was published in Estonian.  However, 
46  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
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Christianity began to rout pagan customs only 
in the 1700s.47  Largely due to the influence 
of Lutheran Protestantism, the literacy rate in 
Estonia reached 97% in the 1890s.48  In 1726, 
only about 10% of peasants could read.49 
Swedish Rule
Under Swedish rule, Tallinn’s trade declined. 
The city became less cosmopolitan and more 
provincial. The population of Tallinn, however, 
continued to grow, reaching 10,000 in 1688. 
Tallinn’s suburbs swelled with an influx of 
Estonians from rural areas, Germans, Swedes, 
Finns, Dutch sailors, Russians, and Jews.  Many 
unmarried Scandinavian men, particularly from 
the Åland Islands, Finland and northern Sweden, 
immigrated illegally to Tallinn to escape crop 
failure.50  While plague and famine contributed to 
general economic decline, the period of Swedish 
Rule was afterwards nostalgically referred to as 
the Hea Vana Rootsi Aeg (Good Old Swedish Time). 
Swedish rule took steps to eradicate feudalism 
and to improve living conditions for peasants.51 
The three lions on Tallinn’s large coat of arms 
and the Estonian national crest (see Figures 42a-
b) were adopted from the Swedes, specifically 
from King Erik XIV, most likely as an anti-Danish 
statement.52  The Kristiine district was planned 
by the Swedish queen of the same name.  Micro-
variations in the environment makes Kristiine 2-
3° C warmer than the rest of Tallinn, and the 
Swedish monarch introduced canals to drain this 
area and to create fishponds, as she intended 
to use the area as a summer home (see 
Figures 43-47).  The square canal in romanticist 
Löwenruh Park and Kristiine’s street grid of 
long, rectangular blocks were Tallinn’s Swedish 
inheritance.  Also during this period, the village 
green surrounding Old Town was formalized as a 
park; the streets that ring Old Town today were 
derived from Baroque promenades.53 
The war between Sweden and Poland (1600-
1629) imposed a new duty on Tallinn, that of 
billeting Swedish soldiers.  Soldiers housed 
47  Smith 2002: 4
48  Laar 2002: 30
49  Statistikaamet 2004: 19
50  Pullat 1998: 88
51  Smith 2002: 4
52  Pullat 1998: 23
53  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
Figure 29
The Church of the Holy Ghost 
was built no later than the first 
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The patron saint of the 
bachelor’s guild, the African 
Mauritius, protects this 1597 
doorway.
Figure 30
The house of the Brotherhood of 
the Blackheads (center) is one 
of few remaining Renaissance 
buildings in Tallinn and occupies 
26 Pikk Street.
by local residents were sometimes arbitrarily 
violent.  Quarrels between the Tallinn City 
Council and the Swedish state increased, and 
townspeople were burdened by the additional 
requirement to participate in the construction of 
more fortifications around the city.  Furthermore, 
plague broke out in the Baltics in 1710, as the 
Tsarist Russian army of Peter the Great besieged 
Tallinn – bringing an end to Swedish rule in 
Estonia.
 Estonia under Tsarist Russia: 
1710-1917
The “expansionary zeal” of the Tsars was so 
great that from 1550-1800, Russia conquered 
land at an average rate of 35,000 km2 per 
year.54  The Russian tsars’ appetite for land was 
largely driven by “difficulties of conducting large-
scale cultivation around Moscow.”55   Moscow 
needed a broader agricultural base to propel its 
economic development and population growth.
Peter the Great
Weakened by plague and siege, Tallinn 
surrendered to Russian armies in 1710. 
Swedes planned to retake the city the following 
summer, and did not give up their attempts until 
1715.56   Peter the Great coveted the Baltic’s ice-
free ports as a “western window to the world.”57 
The port in Tallinn is deep enough for even the 
largest passenger ferries to dock there today 
(see Figures 48-49).  The only larger port on the 
Baltic is St. Petersburg, Russia.
Peter started building in Tallinn before his 
Great Northern War with Sweden was over 
(see Figures 50-53).  Construction for Kadriorg 
Palace started in 1719, while the Treaty of 
Nystad incorporated Estonia and Livonia into 
Tsarist Russia in 1721.  Plague, famine and war 
reduced Tallinn’s population to 3,000 by 1718; 
thirty years earlier the population had been over 
10,000.58 
54  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 59
55  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 61
56  Pullat 1998: 82
57  Moscow 1962: 73
58  Pullat 1998: 88
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Figure 35
A figure-ground study shows Old 










The Gothic steeple of Oleviste 
Church was built to facilitate 
navigation. At 159 m, Oleviste 
Church was one of the world’s 
tallest buildings of the 15th-16th 
centuries.  The spire was later 
reduced to a height of 123 m, 















Oleviste Church still dominates 
the skyline today.
The Baltic German nobility wielded considerable 
influence even in the Russian court,59 and living 
conditions for peasants deteriorated rapidly 
under Tsarist rule.  Serfs, directly owned by 
landlords, were even worse off than peasants, 
but both groups were “eventually bound to 
the land that they farmed and subsisted on.”60 
Serfs were no better off than farm animals, and 
“could be traded for dogs.”61  Uprisings in 1805 
and 1858 resulted in the public punishment 
of peasants in Tallinn squares (see Figure 54), 
and contributed to general dissatisfaction with 
the Tsarist regime.  Serfdom was abolished in 
Estonia in 1816-1819, but peasants still held 
many unresolved grievances.
During Tsarist rule, the Russian Orthodox 
Alexander Nevsky Cathedral (see Figures 5, 55-
56) was positioned on Toompea to dominate the 
silhouette of the city, and to replace a monument 
to Martin Luther.  The cathedral’s bulbous spires 
were added later, reflecting a Historicist style.  
Kadriorg Palace
Other traces of Tsarist rule on the city include 
the Kadriorg Palace complex and grounds (see 
Figures 57-62), and expansions in Tallinn’s rail 
and industry.  Kadriorg remains one of Tallinn’s 
most treasured parks, and the palace’s ‘birthday’ 
is a city holiday each year.  The recent installation 
of 500,000 roses was a diplomatic endeavor by 
the city, as Russians are particularly drawn to 
Kadriorg.  Tsar Peter built Kadriorg Palace for 
his wife; although Catherine never set foot in 
Tallinn, the Baroque site remains a sort of Tsarist 
botanical museum.  Many (especially Russian) 
couples visit it on their wedding day, as part of 
the traditional photographic tour to produce a 
thick album of wedding pictures.  
The head architects and engineer for the project 
were Italians, and the estate shows a strong 
Baroque influence.  The grounds, for instance, 
were divided into an Upper and Lower Garden, 
and featured pools, fountains and cascades 
in a rigidly symmetrical layout (see Figure 63). 
Kadriorg’s grounds were developed before the 
palace, and hundreds of trees were planted from 
59  Smith 2002: 5
60  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 105
61  Moscow 1962: 94
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Figure 35
Oleviste Church was named after 
its master builder, Olev, who fell 
as he was placing a cross to 
finish the spire.  The Oleviste 
spire is open to the public, but 
entails a 259-step climb and a 
precariously narrow catwalk.
Figure 34b
Oleviste Church is visible from 
many points in the city.
1717-1718.62  Construction came secondary to 
parks.63
The location of Kadriorg was a strategic decision 
in the war with Sweden.  From his second-floor 
corner office in the Kadriorg palace, Peter the 
Great had axial views of both Tallinn’s port and Old 
Town.  The center axis of the Kadriorg grounds 
and the perpendicular road to the port reflect 
the palace’s defensive location (see Figures 64-
66).  The port view was later modified by the 
1902 addition of a statue commemorating a lost 
Tsarist ship, the “Russalka” (see Figures 67-69).
 
Tsarist Planning
Top-down Tsarist regional planning continually 
ignored social and economic ties at the local 
level.  In the 1850s, summer homes and 
resort buildings sprung up around Kadriorg (see 
Figure 70).  The radially arranged neighborhood 
of Kadriorg became a Tsarist mark on the city 
(see Figures 71-72).64  Tallinn briefly enjoyed 
the status of a holiday resort, foreshadowing its 
popularity as a tourist destination almost 150 
years later.  The Nõmme district was originally 
constructed as a summer resort of Tallinn (see 
Figures 73-76).65
Industrialization and the foundation of the Central 
Baltic Railway Works, however, rapidly turned 
Tallinn into an industrial city.  Tsarist Russia built 
thousands of kilometers of rail lines from 1866-
1876, and the expansion of industry provided 
new jobs for peasants.66  The location of the 
industrial rail-yard in the Põhja-Tallinn district 
was a Tsarist inheritance.  While it made sense 
to locate industry in this area from the 1870s-
1900s, because of Tallinn’s second deep port in 
Kopli Bay, the rail-yard is perilously close to Old 
Town and the center city (see Figures 77-79). 
The rail transport of hazardous and flammable 
substances near the city center worries city 
officials today.
62  Tamm et al 1988: 175
63  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
64  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
65  Kink & Raukas 1997: 21
66  Moscow 1962: 103
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Figures 37a-c
Short Leg has been a pedestrian 
link between Toompea and lower 
town since the 1230s.
The shortcut has scarcely 
changed; the gatehouse, built 
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The Long Leg gate tower was 
first built in 1380 and was rebuilt 
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Industrialization in Tallinn occurred at the end 
of the period of Tsarist rule, and was most 
rapid in the second half of the 1880s.  The 
town’s medieval gates were demolished in the 
1870s-1890s,67 as Russia’s tsars decided the 
locations of Tallinn’s industry.  The opening of rail 
communication with St. Petersburg increased 
Tallinn’s export trade tenfold,68 and medieval 
craft guilds were abolished. In 1883, the city 
forbade the construction of wooden houses 
near major roads, due to fire hazard concerns.69 
Construction exploded in the 1890s, leading 
the city to commission a town plan in 1894. 
Plans from 1828-1897, however, covered only 
portions of the city, and even August Mickwitz’s 
survey of 1909 was incomplete. 
The number of workers increased rapidly (see 
Figure 80), from 9,800 laborers in 1871 to 
30,000 factory workers in 1917.70  From 1913-
1917, Tallinn’s shipyards attracted skilled laborers 
from Russia’s interior, and consequently Tallinn 
housed 30,000 industrial workers in 1917.71 
The Russian Revolution (1917) and the Estonian 
War of Independence (or Estonian Liberation 
War, 1918-1920) interrupted industrialization. 
According to a Tallinn historian: 
Antagonisms inherent in the industrial system 
were.… aggravated in Tallinn by the survival of 
strong feudal tendencies interlocked, as a local 
peculiarity, with national conflicts.72  
A coalition of Estonians and Russians beat Baltic 
Germans out of the Tallinn town council for the 
first time in 1904.  Finally empowered to shift 
the focus of municipal attention away from the 
German-centered Old Town, the city council 
made rapid infrastructure improvements in the 
suburbs.  A second building boom emerged in 
1908-1909.73  While paving roads and installing 
sewage lines, gas pipes and street lamps, the 
city commissioned a survey of the city in 1910 
(see Figure 81) and a plan for a new town hall 
to reflect the emerging spirit of democracy (see 
Figure 82).  The city also entertained proposals 
67  Hallas-Murula 2005: 50
68  Pullat 1998: 109
69  Hallas-Murula 2005: 80
70  Pullat 1998: 128
71  Pullatt 1998: 127-128
72  Pullat 1998: 121
73  Hallas-Murula 2005: 78
Figure 38
Monks from the Dominican 
Monastery founded in 1246 
were expelled in 1525.  The 
Monastery was destroyed by fire 
in 1531 but parts of the original 
structure and walls remain.  
The Monastery is now used as 














The Pirita Monastery was 
destroyed in 1577, but its stone 
walls and cemetery remain.
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Figures 40a-b
Estonia’s main Lutheran church, 
the Dome Church, is one of 
three functioning medieval 
churches in Tallinn.
for development of the former police yard, 
Politseiaed (see Figures 83-84).
While Tallinn rapidly evolved from a provincial town 
to an industrial city, the idea of an independent 
Estonian republic entered political discourse.74  A 
Baltic German society was founded to investigate 
local folklore in 1838,75 and in the 1850s, a small 
elite coined the term Eesti (Estonia). The period 
from 1860-1917 is known as Ärkämiseaeg76 
(the Time of Awakening).  Before then, Estonian 
peasants had referred to themselves simply 
as maarahvas (country people).77 While today 
independence is often hailed as the fulfillment of 
Estonian destiny, the poet Juhan Liiv’s claim that 
‘one day there will be an Estonian state’ sounded 
fanciful when first proclaimed in 1910.78
The Rise of Estonian Nationalism
The publication of Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald’s 
epic poem Kalevipoeg (The Son of Kalev) in 1861 
helped promote a sense of national identity, and 
synthesized traditional Estonian folk poetry into 
a nationalist mythology. Disseminated widely 
only in the 1920s-1930s, the epic embodied 
prominent Estonian themes of the 20th century, 
including: devotion to nature, distrust of imported 
Christianity, and “a central place for song in the 
maintenance and protection of the nation”.79 
While the hero Kalevipoeg is somewhat flawed 
and awkward, even managing at one point to 
cut off his legs with his own sword, he protects 
Estonia by blocking the Gate to Hades with his 
legless body and fighting off devils.  The metaphor 
of resistance to foreign rule is clear.
The first Song Festival in Tallinn (1869, ostensibly 
in honor of the tsar’s birthday) followed the 
publication of Kalevipoeg, drew 10,000,80 and 
foreshadowed the so-called ‘Singing Revolution’ 
that helped Estonia regain its independence in 
the late Soviet period.  Over a hundred years 
after the inaugural 1869 event, the song festivals 
in the post-Soviet period drew hordes of singers 
(34,000 in 2004)81 and spectators (100,000). 
74  Smithi 2002: xii
75  Smith 2002: 5
76  Smith 2002: 2
77  Smith 2002: 3
78  Smith 2002: xii  
79  Clemens 2003: 33
80  Smith 2002: 7
81  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
20
Figure 41
Swedes colonized the Baltic and 
transformed Tallinn (Reval) into a 









The Estonian crest and Tallinn’s 











Under Tsarist rule, such demonstrations were 
not tolerated.  In a 1905 demonstration, the 
Russian military opened fire on labor movement 
demonstrators in Tallinn; 90 people were killed 
and over 200 wounded (see Figure 85).  
Civil war broke out in Tsarist Russia from 1918-
1920.  With popular sentiment firmly entrenched 
against Tsarist rule, however, the February 
Revolution triumphed early in Estonia on 15 
March 1917 (see Figures 86a-b).  Like the 
other Baltic countries, Estonia first demanded 
autonomy then declared (and fought for) its 
independence.   The left-wing cultural movement 
Noor Eesti (Young Estonia) urged its proponents 
to “remain Estonians but become Europeans.”82
Saarinen’s Plan for Tallinn: 1913
Shaking off seven centuries of foreign rule was 
not easy for the tiny, formative country of Estonia. 
In the tumultuous years preceding 1918, Estonia 
respected and wanted to emulate Finland’s more 
rapidly increasing independence from Russia. 
(As an administratively separate Grand Duchy of 
the Russian Empire, Finland had enjoyed greater 
autonomy for over a century; Finland declared 
full independence a year before Estonia, in 
1917.)  For instance, the national anthems for 
Estonia and Finland share a common source.  In 
a second strategic move designed to emphasize 
Tallinn’s connection with Helsinki, the city 
awarded Eliel Saarinen the commission to draft 
a masterplan for the Tallinn town center and City 
Port in 1913.83  Officially, Saarinen received his 
commission as the result of a design competition. 
The city decided in November of 1911 that a 
design competition would be the best way to 
produce a comprehensive plan for Tallinn, and 
chose Saarinen to serve as their consultant from 
1911-1913.  Saarinen’s design competition entry 
seal, a crest with three gold lions, reflected his 
insider status (see Figure 87).  
Design Competition Terms
82  Smith 2002: 11
83  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
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Figure 43
Alle Christenen Thale, shown on 
a 1689 map, preceded modern 
Tallinn’s Kristiine district.  (Note: 












Property division in 1699 






The city set the terms for the competition in 
February of 1912, and received five entries on 
the 8 April 1913 deadline.  Three of these were 
immediately discarded as not conforming to the 
competition requirements; in the end, Saarinen’s 
plan had to compete with only one other entry. 
Apparently few firms were able to compete 
because of the “rather inadequate organisation” 
of the competition; even procuring a base map 
(see Figure 88) required several volleys of 
correspondence.84   
Saarinen’s Influence
Saarinen’s work was pivotal in Tallinn’s city 
planning.  According to the present City 
Landscape Architect, “All plans for Tallinn followed 
Saarinen’s plan, even if that was later hidden 
from sight.”  The written portion of Saarinen’s 
plan went ‘missing’ during the Soviet occupation, 
which supposedly explained why the plan was not 
very well known in Estonia or abroad.85  In reality, 
Saarinen’s 51-page explanatory letter had already 
been published in German (1921) and in Russian 
(1916) before Soviet planners ‘misplaced’ the 
written portion of the plan.  
 
Saarinen offered some explanation of the plan 
for Greater Tallinn in his 1961 (English) text, The 
City: Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future.  Djomkin 
(1977) and Hallas-Murula (2005) published the 
plan’s 23 color illustrations, but Hallas-Murula 
was the first to translate the written portion 
of Saarinen’s plan from German into Estonian, 
Finnish and English.
Saarinen’s plan for Tallinn closely resembles 
plans that he drafted for other cities.   Saarinen’s 
career in urban planning had begun only in 1910, 
working for the Helsinki firm that planned the new 
housing district of Mukkiniemi, which resembles 
the Tallinn plan in parts (see Figure 89). 
Saarinen began work on the Tallinn plan in 1911, 
followed by plans for Canberra (1912), Helsinki 
(1918) and Perth (1922).86  The Canberra plan is 
an outlier in this group, as it was heavily influenced 
by Daniel Burnham’s plan for Chicago (see Figure 
90).  Saarinen produced the Canberra plan 
84  Hallas-Murula 2005: 87
85  Djomkin 1977
86  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
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Figure 47
An aerial view of Löwenruh Park 










The 17th-century canal remains 
the focus of Löwenruh Park. 
under a tight competition deadline; afterwards, 
he was careful to address the plan for Tallinn in 
more detail.  Saarinen chose to work with many 
of the existing features of Tallinn, preserving Old 
Town and the greenbelt at the foot of Toompea in 
accordance with the 1906 city plan.
Even though it came early in his career, the 
Tallinn plan (see Figure 91) embodies Saarinen’s 
main planning motifs.  Saarinen repeated 
features of his Tallinn plan in Helsinki and Perth. 
Common characteristics of the three port city 
plans include: satellite centers, focal traffic 
arteries, linear greenways, and a formal, axial 
arrangement of streets focusing attention at 
genius loci.  All three plans also use occasionally 
forceful architecture to punctuate space against 
a backdrop of neutral buildings.  
Saarinen’s Plans for Growth
Saarinen planned for almost exactly the right 
amount of growth in Tallinn.  Unable to anticipate 
the setbacks of war, he predicted that the city’s 
population would reach 500,000 in the year 
2000.  Tallinn’s population flirted with that number 
in 1989 before shrinking in the post-Soviet era 
due to Russian emigration in the early 1990s 
(see Figure 92).  Saarinen estimated that Tallinn 
had the capacity to house 665,000,87 and that 
Old Town could accommodate 50,000; in 2004, 
there were 42,196 residents in Old Town.88
One of Saarinen’s primary concerns was the 
density of wooden housing around the center 
city (see Figures 93-94).  Several new wooden 
row-house neighborhoods were constructed 
from 1900-1920, despite the city’s attempt to 
force developers to use more fire-safe materials. 
Construction was particularly fast from 1911-
1913, as developers feared the city council 
would prohibit wooden housing in the center city 
altogether.89 To accommodate population growth, 
Saarinen targeted new areas for development 
outside the center city area.  Specifically, he 
proposed to house 52,000 residents in 25 years 
and 143,000 in 2000 in a new suburb, Lasnamäe. 
The Parisian Boulevards of the 1850s visibly 
influenced Saarinen, along with all of European 
87  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
88  Hallas-Murula 2005: 103
89  Hallas-Murula 2005: 80
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planning at the time; before 1918, there were 
only a few multi-story, stone apartment buildings 
in Tallinn.  The idea of Garden Suburbs entered 
into planning discourse in Estonia in 1911-1912, 
and was popular with the Tallinn press.
A second major issue that Saarinen addressed 
was the constriction of shipping and traffic in 
the center city area.  While in 1908 there were 
only six cars in Tallinn, Saarinen expected that 
traffic, in one form or another, would increase.94 
He proposed a network of tram and train lines 
throughout the city (see Figure 95), and specified 
that road corridors be left generously wide in 
order to accommodate future transportation. 
Saarinen felt that electric trams best met the 
city’s transportation needs, and suggested an 
express tram to Pirita.  Saarinen’s most radical 
proposal, which the city was unfortunately not 
able to implement, was to move the industrial 
rail station south, between Old Town and Lake 
Ülemiste.
Saarinen divided his plan into two phases: short 
and long term.  By separating goals into 25- 
and 100- year periods, he meant to make the 
plan’s implementation as practicable as possible. 
While the proposed road network was essentially 
formal, Saarinen left his plan still somewhat open-
ended.  He had no intention, for instance, that 
the city should construct the completely uniform 
6-story buildings exactly as planned (see Figures 
96-97); rather, Saarinen was more interested in 
identifying important nodes and zones for growth. 
Saarinen afterwards explained that he wanted 
his plan to remain flexible, dynamic, and able 
to be implemented in a number of ways.90  He 
achieved this through zoning.  The only building 
that was built exactly as Saarinen proposed is 
the Estonian Opera and Theater (see Figures 98-
100).  Saarinen’s plan, with some modifications, 
was incorporated into Tallinn’s masterplan of 
1914.
90  Djomkin 1977: 12   
Figure 48
Huge passenger ships access 
Tallinn with ease, demonstrating 
why Peter the Great coveted 




Tallinn’s port is visible from 
the shore near the monument 










One node that Saarinen identified as important 
was the Russian Market (see Figures 101a-b). 
He proposed a new town hall for the site, with 
a high-rise tower that would attract attention 
to the new urban node.   One indication that 
Soviet planners made use of the 1913 plan is 
the fact that the only downtown high-rise built 
during the occupation made use of precisely this 
spot.  In recent years, the Viru Hotel complex 
has attracted a rapidly expanding maze of 
interconnected shopping, and is a virtual beehive 
of commerce (see Figures 102-105).
The most obvious indications that Soviet planners 
relied heavily on Saarinen’s ‘lost’ plan can be 
found in the district of Lasnamäe.   Saarinen 
planned Lasnamäe to house the city’s upper 
middle-class residents.  Lasnamäe, where 
intense development began in 1977, housed 
a working-class population of 109,516 as of 
2004.91  Lasnamäe is not the utopian suburb 
that Saarinen imagined; when construction 
plans for the high-rise housing district were 
publicly revealed, one journalist commented, 
“Tallinn is building a chest of drawers.”92  Soviet 
planners allocated new housing to Lasnamäe and 
Mustamäe to compensate for historic wooden 
housing that burned during World War II.
Tarand’s 1980 Reader on the History of Estonian 
Urban Architecture proudly describes the 
innovative Soviet proposal to channel high-speed 
through-roads below slower traffic in these new 
housing districts.  Sunken corridors would avoid 
awkward intersections of traffic at different 
speeds.  The Soviet-attributed illustrations 
in Tarand 1980 were suspiciously similar to 
Saarinen’s traffic sections (see Figure 106). 
Lagna Road through Lasnamäe was indeed built 
as a channel, and at such an immense scale 
that the city had to later label each bridge to give 
residents their bearings (see Figure 107). The 
1972 plan also considered moving the railroad 
station south.
Similar to the case of the Russian Market and 
Viru Square, the node that Saarinen identified as 
a focal point in Lasnamäe was also emphasized 
91  Hallas-Murula 2005: 103




1773 map shows fortifications 





1808 map shows pre-industrial 









1856 map shows the preserved 














In 1858, 51 peasants were 
forced to run the gauntlet in the 
Russian Market after protesting 
their treatment in the provinces 
of Kurisoo and Anija.
by Soviet planners.  In Lasnamäe, the regimented 
regularity of the street grid suddenly breaks into 
a haphazard axial arrangement (see Figure 108-
109).
Other Soviet-built housing districts also show 
Saarinen’s influence. Väike—Õismäe and 
Mustamäe have street layouts that look as if 
their Soviet planners tried to imitate Saarinen’s 
approach without being obvious about it (see 
Figures 110-112).  Of course, it’s a distinct 
possibility that an influential Estonian or two in 
the planning office might have drawn in Saarinen 
motifs deliberately, as references to Tallinn’s lost 
independence.   
Saarinen’s Plans for Greenspace
More faithfully reproduced, however, were 
Saarinen’s plans for open space.  A number of 
the proposed green belts were re-introduced 
by the 1972 plan.  These repeating ‘waves of 
green’ were considered again by the post-Soviet 
2005 plan.  Even if the actual structure of 
each individual park differs from what Saarinen 
planned, the locations are quite consistent (see 
Figures 113-114).  Because of the designation 
of large park areas like the Botanic Gardens, the 
borders of Saarinen’s plan closely resemble the 
city’s limits today.
The First Period of Estonian 
Independence: 1918-1940
World War I delayed the implementation of 
Saarinen’s 1913 plan.  One day before German 
occupation forces entered Tallinn on 24 February 
1918, Estonia became officially independent (see 
Figure 115).   The German occupation, which 
followed on the heels of this proclamation, failed 
to resolve conflicts with Russia and halted large-













Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas 
II built Nevsky Cathedral in the 
late 1800s.
Figure 56
The 1930s removal of the gold 
plate from the onion cupolas 
makes the principal difference in 
Nevsky Cathedral’s appearance 
today.
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The Estonian War of Independence 
During the Estonian War of Independence (1918-
1920), Estonia fought successfully against 
Bolshevik Russia’s new Red Army, and neutralized 
other threats (from counterrevolutionary White 
Russian, Baltic German, and Reich German 
forces). 
Military and indirect aid from Finland, Britain, 
France and Poland helped the new Baltic 
states repel the Red Army, and Soviet Russia 
acknowledged Baltic independence in 1920.93 
However, the USSR felt “special enmity and 
aversion” to Finnish and Baltic independence, 
considering it to be a “temporary phenomenon.”94 
A 1928 secret Red Army report entitled “The 
Future War” explicitly stated that continuing 
Baltic independence was an obstacle to Soviet 
access to key ports.  According to the General 
Staff of the Red Army, independence:
Would generate significant obstructions to 
economic development in the Soviet Union.… 
From the economic point of view, the independent 
existence of those dwarf states is not justified.95
Formation of the Estonian Parliament
Estonians meanwhile went about setting up their 
sovereign state filled with hope for the future. 
All adult residents of Estonian could participate 
in the election of the Riigikogu (Parliament). 
Furthermore, as an independent republic, Estonia 
took immediate steps to protect the civil rights 
and cultural autonomy of its ethnic minorities, 
who formed 12% of the population.96  The first 
Estonian Congress of Jewish congregations 
had proposed the idea of cultural autonomy in 
1919.  The 1918 declaration of independence 
included a clause guaranteeing ‘national-cultural 
autonomous rights’ of the minorities living in the 
republic.   
93  Clemens 2003: 22  
94  Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 81
95  Quoted in Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 82
96  Alenius 2004: 34
Figure 57
The Baroque Kadriorg Palace 
and park were begun in 1718 
for Tsar Peter I as a summer 
residence.  
Figure 58
Kadriorg was named for Peter’s 
wife Catherine, who declined to 
set foot in Tallinn, despite such 
allurements as Swan Pond.
Figure 59
The continuing popularity of the 
Kadriorg grounds is probably 
rooted in its established trees 
and naturalistic grounds.   
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Ethnic Relations
Ethnic relations in Estonia were relatively peaceful 
and tolerant.97  Although different groups 
occasionally resorted to verbal aggression, there 
were few incidents physical ethnic violence while 
Germans and Russians were displaced from 
positions of political power.  The closest the 
country came to ethnic unrest accompanied land 
reform in 1919.  Baltic Germans were resented 
for their privileged status as the land-owning elite. 
Their manorial estates were confiscated by the 
new Estonian government and redistributed to 
veterans of the War of Independence.  In a 1919 
anti-German Labor Party speech, Aleksander 
Veilar proclaimed:
When you want to slaughter an animal you start 
by breaking the backbone.  The [German] manors 
have been the backbone of the barons.98
Relations with Jews were also intermittently 
tense.  However, the arrest of a radical anti-
Semitic group between 1923-1924 contributed 
to Estonia’s position as one of the least anti-
Semitic nations in the 1920s.99  
Similar to Sweden’s contemporary Hemspråk 
(Home Language) educational policy, the 1920 
Estonian constitution legislated the right of ethnic 
minorities to receive education in their native 
language.100 A signed contract guaranteeing 
minority rights was conditional to Estonia’s 
admittance to the League of Nations in 1922. 
In districts where minorities formed the majority, 
two official languages were promised. Estonia 
acknowledged the need for minority support 
to secure its position against Soviet Russia 
and Estonian Bolsheviks.101  According to one 
historian,
A people of barely one million members just 
could not afford to be arrogantly egotistic.102
A failed Communist coup-d’état in December 
1924 further underscored the need for the 
political support of minorities;103 on February 
5 of the next year, Estonia “adopted the most 
97  Alenius 2004: 32
98  Alenius 2004: 36
99  Alenius 2004: 43-44
100  Smith 2002: 14
101  Alenius 2004: 33-35
102  Alenius 2004: 33
103  Alenius 2004: 38
Figure 60
Water is intricately manipulated 
at Kadriorg.
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liberal ethnic minorities law in Europe.”104  This 
law allowed any minority group of over 3000 to 
form a self-administering public-legal corporation, 
entitled to run its own cultural affairs without 
government interference.105  
Essentially, the cultural autonomy law gave 
minorities “a share of state sovereignty,”106 and 
facilitated the provision of schools in minorities’ 
native languages.  While Swedish and Russian 
factions never chose to organize themselves 
under this principle of cultural autonomy, 
German and Jewish minorities took advantage of 
the policy to form their own schools.  Also, 20 
German lecturers were appointed to positions 
within Tartu University.107  
Twenty years after its introduction, the cultural 
autonomy law was considered “a model which 
should guide the post-war reconstruction 
of Central and Eastern Europe.”108  Ethnic 
integration was emphasized as important to 
the political security of the tiny nation of Estonia, 
where, in 1934, 14.4% of Tallinn’s population 
was composed of minorities.109 
Keren Kajamet, the Jewish National Endowment, 
honored the Estonian government with a certifi-
cate of gratitude for introducing its cultural 
autonomy law. In 1926, the Jewish Cultural 
Council was elected to represent 3045 members. 
By 1934, the number of Jews living in Estonia 
had reached 4381.110
Industrialization and Rapid Expansion
Despite such forward-thinking cultural policies, 
the first period of Estonian independence was 
fraught with post-war economic hardship and 
political instability.  Progress, however, was rapid, 
and industry revived through the expansion 
of home markets. By the 1930s, industry 
generated nearly a third of Estonian national 
income, remaining, however, less important than 
agriculture and holding a smaller proportion of 
employment.111  Industry remained focused in the 
104  Laar 2002: 34
105  Housden 2004: 231
106  Housden 2004: 231
107  Housden 2004: 233
108  Housden 2004: 232
109  Pullat 1998: 8
110  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Jews_in_Estonia
111  Mertelsmann 2003: 153
Figure 62
A few outlying buildings on the 
Kadriorg grounds have fallen into 
disrepair.
Figure 61
Kadriorg’s oak savanna offers 
the balance of ‘prospect’ and 
‘refuge’ that studies indicate may 
be an instinctual preference.
Figure 63
1828 map of Kadriorg grounds 
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same areas designated by the tsars, particularly 
Paljassaare, Põhja-Tallinn and Kopli, due to the 
location of the industrial port and rail-yard (see 
Figures 116-117).112  
Rapid expansion, however, was not conducive to 
careful town planning.  Baltic Germans, who had 
founded Estonia’s ‘Garden Schools,’ controlled 
Tallinn’s parks through the 1930s as the city’s 
wealthiest citizens.113  Elsewhere in Tallinn, the 
lack of a city plan contributed to haphazard 
growth.  The most rapid growth occurred in 
districts near Old Town, leading the city to impose 
more regular streets on the city’s outskirts to 
try to shape expansion (see Figures 118-119).114 
The residential area that Saarinen and the city’s 
planners had identified as problematic in the 
1910s continued to proliferate.  Residential 
development quickly surrounded the industrial 
rail-yard built in the Tsarist era, partly because 
factories provided housing for their workers, just 
as the tsars had done.115  The residential areas 
of Põhja-Tallinn and Kopli expanded in rapid blocks 
of identical wooden row houses, many of which 
remain today (see Figures 120-121).
112  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
113  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
114  Tarand 1980: 66
115  Personal communication, Oksana Ovtsinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
Figure 64
The strong axis to the harbor 
remains a popular pedestrian 
route, although its terminal view 
is now blocked by “Russalka.”
Figure 65
New woods have blocked the 
view of Old Town from Peter’s 
office.  Some think these trees 
should be removed to restore 
the historic design of the palace 
grounds, as at Toompea’s Patrull 
Stairs.
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The Era of Silence
A spirit of democracy flourished in Estonia until 
the early 1930s, but was then undermined by 
economic depression and the progressively 
authoritarian rule of President Konstantin Päts. 
The years from 1934-1940 have been dubbed 
Vaikiv Ajastu (The Era of Silence).116  Consolidated 
authoritarian rule emerged under Päts in 1938, 
and the motives for his actions remain ethically 
questionable.  While Päts dealt with the threat of 
a right wing coup, he has been criticized since as 
a self-serving politician, thirsty for power at any 
cost, even as a puppet head of a Nazi or Soviet 
state.117  Despite his heavy promotion of German 
investment, Päts was not able to deter 5,200 
Germans from leaving Tallinn in 1938.  Sensing 
trouble, other foreign citizens soon followed.
In August 1939, Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin 
negotiated a secret agreement, as part of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, to divide Eastern Europe 
between their two dictatorial regimes.  The 
northern boundary of Lithuania was to divide the 
Baltic states (defined as Finland, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania) between Germany and the USSR.118 
This secret initiative became known to Estonia 
within three days.  There was a massive exodus, 
under Hitler’s orders, of the Baltic Germans from 
the ‘Soviet sphere of influence.’  Many German 
families had forged strong cultural and historic 
ties to the Baltic, and most were both wealthy 
and well educated.  The departure of 20,000 
Germans from Estonia within a few months was, 
socially and politically, problematic.119  
The USSR massed 437,235 troops against 
the Estonian and Latvian borders between 
September and October of 1939.120  President 
Päts failed to mobilize a standing army larger 
than 8,000, deciding it was preferable to face 
an uncertain fate under Soviet control than 
certain decimation.130  The “silent submission” 
of Estonia’s government contrasted sharply with 
the attitude of the majority, which was “prepared 
to fight, ready to defend the independence.”121 
In September, the Baltic States were forced to 
allow basing rights to 25,000 Soviet troops, 
116  Smith 2002: 20
117  Smith 2002: 25-26
118  Smith 2002: 22
119  Rahi-Tamm 2005: 38
120  Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 84
121  Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 87
Figure 68
In 1907, Old Town could still be 













The 1905 setting of the statue 






 photo by R









although it was claimed that the Red Army would 
not interfere in domestic policy.   By the summer 
of 1940, 66,946 Soviet troops were based in 
the Baltic.
The Annexation of the Baltics
Finland resisted a similar imposition when the 
USSR demanded part of the Karelian Isthmus, 
leading to Stalin’s reluctant invasion on November 
30, 1939 and heavy Soviet casualties in the 
Talvisota (Winter War) that followed.   Stalin’s 
attack was ruled as illegal and Russia was 
expelled from the League of Nations two weeks 
later; Allied forces threatened to intervene. 
Outnumbered four to one, Finland ceded 10% 
of its territory and 20% of its industry to Russia 
for 30 years beginning in March of 1940.122 
Hostilities between Russia and Finland resumed 
the next year in the form of the Continuation War. 
According to one specialist,
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest the 
Soviet dictator feared the possible international 
repercussions of an all-out attack on Estonia in 
September 1939.  Indeed, had this not been 
the case, it seems doubtful that he [Stalin] 
would have been so scrupulous in attempting to 
give a legal veneer to the subsequent forcible 
annexation of the Baltics.  It is thus intriguing to 
speculate whether a more robust response on 
the part of the Estonian leadership would have 
given the Soviets pause for thought.”123
Estonia deposited 11 tons of its gold reserve 
abroad in the first half of 1940.124  Lithuania was 
targeted for the first Soviet invasion, under the 
May pretext that Soviet troops had gone missing 
in Lithuania.  In early June, Soviet troops were 
made combat-ready, and in mid-June the People’s 
Commissariat of the Interior of the Soviet Union 
announced it was ready to accept 65,500 Baltic 
prisoners of war.125  On 21 June 1940, 90,000 
additional Soviet troops marched into Estonia to 
complete the coup (see Figure 122).
  
122  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winter_War
123  Smith 2002: 25
124  Smith 2002: 27
125  Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 86
Figure 69a
The statue Russalka is a popular 
place for Russian couples to take 
wedding pictures. 
Figure 69b
Russalka holds tsarist and 
Orthodox associations and offers 
sweeping views of the harbor. 
Figure 70
This house on Weizenbergi 
Street is typical of the spread of 
residential growth near Kadriorg 









1865 map shows growth in 
Põhja-Tallinn east of the center 
city, as well as Lake Ülemiste 
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Early Soviet Occupation: 1940-1941
During the Soviet occupation that followed, 
Estonia’s borders were closed, trade was 
restricted, and a puppet government was ‘elected’ 
to add a veneer of legitimacy to the ‘genuine 
revolution.’   The USSR (and, in recent years, 
Russian Federation President Putin) claimed 
that the Baltic countries voluntarily petitioned 
for membership in the Soviet Union.   In fact, 
labor demonstrations and press releases were 
staged, and President Päts was used to draft an 
application for membership in the USSR before 
being forced to resign.  The public statue of 
President Päts was destroyed on 8 November 
1940, after which Päts was deported to Russia 
with other political and military leaders of the 
Baltic countries.126
Guerrilla Resistance
An Estonian resistance movement formed 
immediately, once it was clear that legal opposition 
had failed.  When the national volunteer defense 
organization Kaitseliit was disbanded, individual 
members hid their weapons and proposed armed 
resistance.   Cell leaders were arrested and 
deported, but ordinary members hid in the forests. 
Their ranks swelled with Soviet repression, and 
more people went into hiding.  According an 
Estonian national archive specialist,
In spite of the systematic Soviet security service 
operations, they could not halt the growth of 
the resistance movement.  By the summer of 
1941 underground groups of like-minded people 
had grown up all over Estonia...  The main goal 
of the civilian resistance movement was to 
join forces, and its main method was counter-
propaganda.127 
On 14 June 1941, more than 10,000 Estonians 
were deported to prison camps or exile in 
Siberia.  This unprecedented action surprised 
and terrorized the populace, and resulted in 
mass flight.  “The widespread underground 
population was born, hiding mostly in forests, 
looking for arms, and preparing for action.”128 
The Metsavennad (Forest Brothers) began their 
126  Smith 2002: 29
127  Noormets 1999: 188
128  Noormets 1999: 190
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Figure 73
Baron Nikolai von Glehn built this 
eclectic residence in Nõmme 
in 1886.  The Glehn castle 
grounds have been designated 
as Nõmme-Mustamäe 
Maastikukaitseala (Nõmme-
Mustamäe Landscape Reserve).  
Figure 74
Geotextile fabrics anchor steep 
slopes on the grounds.
guerrilla war in the summer of 1941.129 They 
succeeded in liberating Tartu and organized 
attacks on district offices and communications.  
Population Loss
During the Soviet occupation of 1940-1941, 
8000 Estonians were arrested, 10,000 deported, 
34,000 mobilized into the Soviet Army, 25,000 
evacuated to the USSR, 1,100 went missing, 
and 500 fled abroad.  Soviet occupation ended 
cultural autonomy in Estonia, and 400 Jews 
were deported to prison camps in 1941.130  The 
irreversible population loss from the first Soviet 
occupation totaled 44,400131 (see Figures 123-
126).
Nazi German Occupation:         1941-1944
On 22 June 1941, the Soviet-German War broke 
out.  The German army “had expected a quick 
summer victory, [but] became bogged down and 
overextended in the winter.”132  Retreating Soviet 
and German armies destroyed or ‘evacuated’ 
industrial equipment,133 leaving behind them a 
trail of destruction.  World War II “destroyed the 
normal development of Tallinn as well as that of 
entire Estonia.”134
Half of Tallinn and a tenth of Old Town were 
destroyed during World War II.135 Furthermore, 
Soviet hit squads were given a free hand in 
suppressing Estonian ‘bandit battalions,’ and 
were authorized to shoot ‘bandits’ on sight without 
trial or conviction.136  From 1940-1941, Soviet 
troops caused the death of 4% of the Estonian 
population.  Nevertheless, the Metsavennad 
were able to liberate most of Southern Estonia 
before German troops arrived.137
Isolated from the West, Estonia relied on the 
Germans as the only military force that could 
realistically oppose the Soviet Union (see Figure 
129  Noormets 1999: 189
130  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Jews_in_Estonia
131  Rahi-Tamm 2005: 38
132  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 27
133  Mertelsmann 2003: 153
134  Pullat 1998: 155
135  Pullat 1998: 8
136  Noormets 1999: 191
137  Laar 1999: 210
Figures 75a-b
The Baron’s quirky collection of 
Kalevipoeg and other statues 
recalls the grotesque statuary of 
the Italian Baroque. 
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127).  Furthermore, Germans claimed the destiny 
of Estonia would depend on their contribution 
to the war effort.  Altogether, 33,000 men 
from northern Estonia joined the German army, 
and 10,000 died in German service.  Some 
volunteered, hoping to help prevent another wave 
of Red Terror; most were drafted. Estonians 
hoped to maintain independence, pending the 
expected restoration of sovereignty at the end 
of the war. 
The Holocaust in Estonia
Nazi Germany occupied Estonia from 1941-
1944.  Estonians were refused their demands for 
restored independence, and continued destruc-
tion and devastation followed. The irreversible 
population loss during German occupation was 
102,740: 81,900 fled the country (including 
7,900 ethnic Swedes), 8,800 were executed, 
1240 died in labor or prison camps and 800 
in Soviet air raids.138  More than1000 Estonian 
Jews fell victim to the Holocaust, especially at the 
concentration camps of Kalevi-Liiva, Klooga, and 
Vaivara  (see Figures 128a-d). About 20,000 
foreign Jews entered the gates of the camp at 
Vaivara.  Thousands of foreign Jews were killed 
at Kalevi-Liiva, and 2000 died at Klooga (a sub-
camp of Vaivara).  Fewer than a dozen Jews 
survived the Holocaust in Estonia; around 3000 
escaped to Soviet Russia.139  
By the end of 1941, the Estonian Police and 
Home Guard Authority had taken 20,989 Red 
Army soldiers and 5,646 Soviet partisans 
prisoner.140  Some prisoners of war were allowed 
to work on Estonian farms, where they were 
treated more humanely than by the Germans.  In 
a paradox typical of Soviet logic, many of the Red 
Army prisoners who survived German camps 
were later incarcerated in Soviet ones, for letting 
themselves be taken prisoner by the enemy. 
Estonians who had harbored Russian prisoners 
of war on their farms were later arrested for 
exploiting prisoner labor.141
138  Rahi-Tamm 2005: 38
139  The Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
   Crimes Against Humanity
140  Noormets 1999: 206  
141   Kõll 2003 
Figure 76
A 1920s photograph along Big 
Pärnu Road capture the relaxed 
summer resort of Nõmme.   The 
wooden houses burned and were 
replaced with apartment blocks 















Because of the German occupation, the Soviet 
army bombed Tallinn on the night of March 9, 
1944.  Soviet bombers destroyed 10% of the 
buildings in Old Town, killed 634 people, and 
wounded another 659.  As a result of bombing, 
20,000 Tallinners lost their homes.  This was 
one of the most visible traces of Soviet impact on 
the old city142 (see Figures 129-135).  
German forces withdrew from Estonia after 
the Aster Plan was approved by Hitler’s central 
command on 16 September 1944.  In all, 
70,000 Estonian civilians fled the country under 
German military escort, and another 6500 were 
killed by the German army.
Population Loss
On the front line, Estonian troops were sacrificed 
to cover the German retreat.  More than 
60,000 Estonians fled the country, mostly to 
Sweden and Germany (see Figures 136--138). 
In Tallinn, independent Estonian government was 
reestablished for three days “before the invading 
Red Army drowned all endeavors for freedom 
in blood.”143  Altogether, Estonia lost 25% of its 
population from 1939-1945144 (see Figure 139). 
This loss of population left irrevocable marks on 
Tallinn, and the shadowy history of WWII can be 
still felt today in many parts of the city.
Later Soviet Occupation: 1945-1991
The Baltic Sea became no longer a simple 
geographical divide with the Nordic states of 
Finland and Sweden; it was what constituted the 
iron curtain in northern Europe.
   - Political scientist Vello Pettai145
During the retreat from the Soviet army, Nazi 
German intelligence left behind files on the 
leaders of the Estonian resistance movement, 
complete with names and addresses.  The people 
142  http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee
143  Laar 1999: 211  
144  Rahi-Tamm 2005
145  Pettai 2003: 3
Figure 78
Kopli has been an industrial 










Disciplined expansion was 





The location of industry and the 
rail-yard (*) in Põhja-Tallinn date 
















The number of factory workers in Tallinn grew rapidly in the 
late 1880s, and again from 1913-1917.








































The city council commissioned 










on these lists were systematically arrested 
and interrogated once the Soviets assumed 
power  (see Figure 140).  Until the 1950s, the 
‘Vyshinskii doctrine’ placed the burden of proof 
on arrestees, who were presumed guilty until 
proven innocent.146  
Soviet Repression
Altogether, 30,000 Estonians were arrested 
by the Soviet security apparatus, which used 
methods of interrogation that were quite 
persuasive.  One in three arrestees did not 
survive the experience.  According to Russian 
author and historian Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn:
Interrogators were allowed to use violence and 
torture on an unlimited basis, at their own 
discretion, and in accordance with the demands 
of their work quotas and the amount of time 
they were given.  The types of torture used were 
not regulated and every kind of ingenuity was 
permitted, no matter what.147
At their headquarters at 1 Pagari Street in 
Tallinn (see Figures 141a-b), the KGB blocked 
the basement windows with concrete to prevent 
prisoners’ screams from reaching the street. 
When the KGB Headquarters was converted to 
an Estonian police station, the Minister of the 
Interior Lagle Parek reportedly arranged for an 
exorcism.  Parek, a former religious dissident 
who had suffered in the Soviet gulag system, felt 
it would otherwise be impossible for anyone to 
work in the building peacefully.148  
The Germans also left behind entire arsenals, 
which the Metsavennad used to fight Soviets 
(see Figure 142).  As a result, the activity of the 
Estonian resistance movement peaked in 1945-
1949.  The total number of Estonians involved 
with the Metsavennad approached 30,000-
40,000.  The Red Army was brutal in attempting 
to disassemble the guerrilla movement.  For 
instance, in a small village near Pärnu, Soviets 
hanged the family of a known Forest Brother and, 
as a warning, forbade anyone from taking the 
bodies down.  One witness remembered how 
fragile the bodies of three children seemed, and 
146  Noor 2005: 81
147  Solzhenitsyn 1973: 99










In 1912, the city announced a 
design competition for a new 
town hall, to be located near 
the Russian Market (compare 
to Figures 54, 101-102). This 











The initial 1923 proposal for 
Politseiaed extended the existing 









how their tongues turned black.149
By 1947, 8,478 members of the resistance 
movement had been killed or imprisoned.  About 
3,000 were legalized or neutralized each year 
until 1950.150  The last known Forest Brother 
was killed resisting the KGB in 1978.  As Forest 
Brother Alfred Käärmann explained:
And what was this drive that forced us, the last 
Forest Brothers, to stay in hiding?  I’ll tell you. 
We knew that as long as we were still breathing, 
holding a gun and feeling Estonia’s soil beneath 
our feet, everything was all right.  We knew that 
it was much worse for our captured comrades. 
We knew that there was a one-way ticket to 
Siberia booked for us.  We knew that a bullet 
from our own gun would save us from enemy 
torture.151
The stubbornness with which the Metsavennad 
clung to their resistance movement manifested 
also at a civilian scale, in the careful protection 
of Estonian cultural traditions and symbols 
throughout Soviet occupation.  The KGB’s brutal 
treatment of the resistance movement did little to 
win over Baltic loyalties, and rather only repelled 
the general populace further.  Estonians became 
more circumspect in expressing their dissidence, 
and found increasing grounds for distrust 
through exposure to the KGB’s mechanisms of 
repression.
The KGB was known for appropriating prominent 
city buildings, even including churches and 
schools.  In Tallinn, these scars on the city’s 
landscape are well known, but little talked about. 
For instance, the gun tower known as Paks 
Margareta (Fat Margaret, see Figures 143a-b) 
was used as by the KGB as a prison because 
of its thick walls.  The KGB used the spire of 
Oleviste Church to send radio transmissions, 
and also bugged every room in the Viru Hotel. 
Despite new Scandinavian management, the 
KGB monitoring station on the 23rd floor of the 
Viru Hotel has been left untouched.  
149  Unpublished memoirs of Elly Haas
150  Laar 1999: 217
151  Laar 1999: 231
Figure 84
The neighborhood surrounding 
Politseiaed seems to preserve 
a portion of its 1923 plan, for 
instance in its park path layout.
Figure 85
On October 16,1905, 90 
people were killed during a 
labor movement demonstration 
commemorated today by 
a Soviet monument near 












Liquidation of the Kulaks
Altogether, Estonia lost 25-30% of its population 
in 1940-1955.152  Estonians, like their Baltic 
neighbors to the south, were targeted as being 
anti-Soviet.  From 25-26 March 1949, Soviets 
deported another 20,000 Estonians to Siberia in 
the ‘liquidation of the kulaks as a class.’  Kulaks, 
an impediment to the “blood-soaked forced 
collectivisation of agriculture”,153 were peasants 
who had prospered under reformations at the 
end of Tsarist rule.  Most of the deported kulaks 
were women and children.  A sudden, violent 
surge of resistance activity followed, which 
targeted collaborators and their families. “The 
nation’s pain was at its peak; its anguish had 
reached its limits.”154  
Cultural Tenacity
In Tallinn and other urban areas, the so-called 
Linnavennad (City Brothers) helped obtain 
forged documents and provided medical 
supplies for the resistance movement.  This 
urban counterpart of the Metsavennad also 
considered it a duty to hoist the Estonian flag on 
national holidays in prominent public places.  In 
particular, the persistent appearance of the flag 
on Independence Day, February 24, continued to 
annoy Soviet authorities.  While the possession 
alone of a blue, black and white flag was grounds 
for deportation, the flag continued to appear 
publicly during the entire Soviet occupation with 
fierce persistence.155  In Tallinn, the flag was often 
found topping Pikk Herman  (Tall Herman), a feat 
which remains inexplicable today, considering the 
steepness of the tower’s walls (see Figure 144). 
During the Soviet occupation, Estonia and the 
other Baltic republics clung to their cultural 
symbols tenaciously.  Finnish TV was widely pirated 
in northern Estonia,156 so the Estonian capital 
was never completely isolated from Western 
(particularly Scandinavian) fashions and trends.
Finns from Helsinki could visit Tallinn rather 
152  Laar 2002: 37 
153  Freeland 2005: 65
154  Laar 1999: 230
155  Laar 1999: 221
156  http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/tallinn-making-it-






This statue of Peter was 
removed  from its plaza after 
Tsarist rule ended in Estonia.
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easily.  From Radio Free Europe broadcasts and 
relatives in the West, the population knew that the 
majority of Western countries never recognized 
the Soviet Union’s claim to Estonia, and also that 
Estonian traditions thrived in exile communities. 
Song festivals became enormously popular, as 
expressions of national pride that did not directly 
challenge Soviet authority.  As a form of protest, 
many locals learned only passable Russian and 
tried to avoid settings where Russian would 
be required as the primary language.  Despite 
centuries of occupation, Estonian, Latvian 
and Lithuanian cultures persisted because of 
strong national identities, high literacy rates, 
the preservation of languages and consistent 
‘habitat.’  According to historian and former 
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar, across the 
rest of the USSR: 
the homogeneity of state symbols, political 
institutions, educations, physical structures, 
household goods, forms of entertainment, and 
language…. engendered a sense of shared 
experience and of belonging to a common, 
unified Soviet state.157













The base map for the Greater 
Tallinn design competition must 
have been similar to this 1913 
map of Tallinn.
Figure 87
Saarinen’s seal for the 1913 
competition anticipated Estonia’s 
national crest.
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In the Baltic countries, however, distinctively 
national characteristics helped Estonia and 
its neighbors preserve local culture and later 
reassert their sovereignty: “Culture does not 
determine what happens, but opens doors 
and sets limits.”158  Stalin emphasized what he 
called the ‘history of friendship and cooperation’ 
between Russia and Estonia;159 while, locally, the 
rift between ethnic groups only increased.
Model Republics
After Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet repression 
eased somewhat.  Most of the deported kulaks 
returned to Estonia, and the number of political 
arrests from 1953-1989 was reduced to 500.160 
In 1988, the first Jewish Cultural Society in the 
Soviet Union was established in Tallinn.161
Because of their superior economic performance 
in the Soviet context, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were deemed “model republics,”162 
and as such were allowed special economic 
privileges.  Estonia became a testing ground for 
economic policy, and free market elements were 
included in its planned economy.163  Russians 
dubbed the Baltic ‘The Soviet West’ and ‘Our 
Abroad.’  In Tallinn, this special treatment led to 
few differences from other Soviet cities, however. 
Soviets built huge blocks of housing, districized 
heating, prioritized industry and military interests 
over environmental and cultural concerns, and 
systematically imposed a pro-Soviet agenda on 
public space (see Figure 145).  Soviet planners 
also nationalized Tallinn’s infrastructure of 
highways, harbors, and airports. 
The City in the Green
Soviet planners emphasized urbanization in a 
way that the tsars had not, and the early USSR 
launched “a virtual war of the city against the 
countryside.”164  From Moscow, a uniform 
housing model was imposed on cities across 
the USSR.  Many of Estonia’s Soviet housing 
158  Clemens 2003: 27
159  Occupation Museum video
160  Rahi-Tamm 2005: 39
161  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Jews_in_Estonia
162  Mertelsmann 2003: 13
163  Laar 2002: 45
164  Hill and Gaddy 2003: 68
Figure 90
Saarinen carried curves to 
extremes in his 1912 plan for 
Canberra.
Figure 89
Saarinen’s 1915 plan for 
Mukkiniemi-Haaga shares the 




















The illustrations for Saarinen’s 
1913 plan are housed in 
Tallinn’s Museum of Estonian 
Architecture.  Saarinen’s first 
































Saarinen’s prediction for 
Tallinn’s growth (500,000 in 
2000) closely resembles actual 
population patterns, with the 
exception of population losses 
from war.
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developments were influenced by Le Corbusier’s 
idea of ‘the city in the green.’  His notions were 
implemented swiftly in countries like England 
and Sweden, filtering through the Iron Curtain 
somewhat later.  Hill and Gaddy (2003) describe 
Soviet-era high-rise developments as:
artificial, formalized, functional, and ultimately 
utilitarian…. Heating, electricity, and water 
supplies were all generated or processed to 
serve entire districts or blocks of buildings. 
Likewise, food and clothing stores, public 
services, and amenities (kindergartens, schools, 
cinemas, sport facilities, even parks and other 
green space) were all assigned proportionately 
to new city districts to accompany large blocks 
of housing.  If you saw one Soviet city, you had 
seen them all.165
In the allocation of new housing, migrants from 
throughout the Soviet Union enjoyed preferential 
treatment under centralized rule.  Migration to 
Estonia was officially supported: (1) to replace the 
industrial labor force lost by deportation, death 
and emigration, and (2) as a means to dilute 
Estonian cultural identity and resistance.  Even 
in the 1960s, for instance, it was a requirement 
of employment that Estonians speak Russian in 
the presence of any non-Estonian speaker;  “The 
system was designed to create a hodgepodge of 
peoples.”166
Attempted Sovietization
Immigrants from the USSR streamed into the 
Baltic republics in “an unprecedented influx”,167 
finding jobs in industry, administration and the 
military.  Soviet-era immigrants assumed social 
positions of power by replacing the Baltic ‘elite’ 
and others who had escaped to the West or been 
deported to Siberia.  Net immigration into Estonia 
from 1945-1950 alone totaled 240,000.168 
Russian-speaking immigrants served as a kind 
of ‘civilian garrison,’169 for the most part not 
bothering to learn the native language of their 
host country.  Feeling themselves part of a great 
nation, most immigrants “just did not give a 
damn” about learning even the simplest phrases 
165  Hill and Gaddy 2003: 108
166  Occupation Museum video, viewed 15 June 2006
167  Pettai 2003: 3
168  Laar 2002: 37
169  Laar 2002: 37
Figure 93
Wooden rowhouses were 
common in Tallinn in 1900, but 
Saarinen treated some wooden 










This house on Laulupeo Street 
is typical of the rowhouses built 
between 1911-1913 in the rush 
to make a profit.  Construction 
mostly surrounded Politseiaed, 
along Kreutzwaldi, Raua, and 
Laulupeo Streets. Houses along 
Süda Street were also built at 
this time. 
Figure 95
Saarinen’s fifth plan drawing for 
Tallinn was a Traffic Plan.  His 
axial treatment of Lasnamäe 











in Estonian.170  Because of the emphasis on 
Russian in schools, 80-90% of the Estonian 
population was conversant in Russian by the 
late 1980s.  By that time, only 12% of the non-
Estonian population was fluent in Estonian.171  
By 1965, over 1 million Russians had immigrated 
to the Baltic republics (see Figure 146).  There 
were 577,000 Russian-speakers in Estonia in 
1989.172  By means of comparison, the Nazi 
General Plan Ost had called for 520,000 German 
colonists to settle the entire Baltic.173  According 
to a Soviet historian: 
Whether or not the Kremlin intended to drown 
the Balts in a sea of non-Balts, the outcome was 
clear.  By the late 1980s, nearly half of Latvia’s 
population was non-Latvian; 38 percent of 
Estonia’s; and nearly 20 percent of Lithuania’s.… 
the Baltic peoples were inexorably advancing 
toward their ‘annihilation.’174
The Irrationality of Soviet Planning
Whole suburbs of state-subsidized, concrete-
block apartments were built quickly and cheaply 
to house immigrants, while ethnic Estonians 
found it increasingly difficult to secure adequate 
accommodations.   Immigrants from the USSR 
were, quite literally, “given keys to new housing 
at the railway station”175 -- after all, communism 
was the ‘vanguard of the toiling masses.’ 
Discrimination in the distribution of housing 
helped Soviets keep the Estonian birthrate low.176 
Bombing in World War II had created a housing 
shortage in Tallinn, which remained unchanged 
for native Estonians even after the accelerated 
construction of housing in the 1970s and 1980s. 
While Soviets rebuilt residential neighborhoods, 
the focus remained on accommodating new 
industrial workers: i.e., Soviet ones.
The isolation and anonymity of the housing 
developments built for Soviet colonists recall the 
problems of post-WWII housing in the US.  The 
separateness of these developments caused 
170  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
171  Smith 2002: xxiii
172  Sarv & Varju 2005: 21
173  Laar 2002: 37
174  Mertelsmann 2003: 13
175  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
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Parts of Tallinn’s center city 
resemble the dense, 4- to 6-








Buildings surrounding Saarinen’s 
proposal for Central Railway 











problems of lack of integration that persist 
today.177  The issue is not access to employment, 
as in US project neighborhoods; unemployed 
residents would happily commute across the city 
for a job.  Instead, the lack of social integration 
is a direct inheritance of the USSR.  Soviet 
housing blocks were “designed to facilitate their 
residents’ service to the state, not to foster 
social connections.”178  
Surrounded by unused ‘green space’ and built 
in epic proportions with inferior construction 
materials, today these housing blocks are for the 
most part crumbling wrecks.  Soviet-era housing 
construction can often be distinguished from 
modernist construction of the 1920s-1940s by 
a taller individual story height,179 typical of the 
central planning urge to make everything as big as 
possible.  The “irrationality of central planning”180 
left a huge mark on Tallinn in the form of the 
Mustamäe and Lasnamäe districts (see Figures 
147-150).  According to an Estonian architect,
A political aspect accompanied the migration of 
the working class in the former socialist countries, 
becoming a powerful means for Russification 
within the boundaries of the Soviet Union – the 
mixing of the population in a centralised manner. 
Lasnamäe is a clear example of this.  The 
mother tongue of 60% of its population is not 
Estonian.181
Massive housing blocks were characteristic of a 
command (vs. market) economy, and provided 
very little space for retail and other services. 
The lack of services reflected the Marxist-Leninist 
view that service is less economically important 
than production.182  This model of development 
contrasts with Sweden’s more successful satellite 
housing communities of the 1960s, each of 
which was required to provide a broader swath 
of basic services: including access by tram to the 
center city, some places of employment, shops, 
groceries, schools, and day care.  Lasnamäe 
only sports a few stores and schools, and one 
tram connection to the central city.
177  Levy 2000: 319
178  Hill and Gaddy 2003: 108 
179  Personal communication, Urve Ratas
180  Hill and Gaddy 2003: 2
181  Tõnu Laigu, www.ehituskunst.ee
182  Levy 2000: 319
Figure 98
Saarinen designed the Estonian 











Opera Square was quite busy 





Today, the Square blends into the 
surrounding cityscape.
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Environmental Damage from Soviet Activity
Like housing, Soviet industrial projects were 
subject to what Gorbachev’s economic advisor 
termed “gigantomania.”183 The plume of industrial 
waste from industrial plants at Maardu, for 
instance, reached Finland.184  By the 1980s, 90% 
of Estonian industry was under the administration 
of all-Union ministries in Moscow.  Delocalized 
administrations prioritized military and industry 
needs over local landscape considerations.  
Pollution was particularly high in Soviet military 
encampments,185  which in Tallinn covered 863 
hectares.186  The dumping of airplane and rocket 
fuel in military areas contaminated Estonia’s 
groundwater. Near Keila-Joa, Soviets poured 10-
15 tonnes (11-16.5 US tons) of samine, a liquid 
fuel used in ballistic missiles, directly onto the 
ground; halting its spread through groundwater 
cost 4.6 million EEK ($372,000).187  Leaking oil, 
silage, and sewer storages polluted groundwater 
in upper aquifers, as did dumping, ash and spoil 
heaps.188  The estimated cost to decontaminate 
Estonia’s former Soviet military areas alone is 
60-65 billion Euros ($76-83 billion).   
The Soviet military also set up roadside 
checkpoints, which remain today as a visible 
reminder of how people were tied to cities as 
administrative centers.  For the most part now 
boarded up and abandoned (see Figure 151), 
these military outposts were placed along major 
routes to check whether travelers had the proper 
papers to cross jurisdiction boundaries.  One of 
these military checkpoints, on Pärnu Mantee, 
has been converted to a fast food restaurant.
Soviet planning was highly centralized and 
lacked civil or local participation. During Soviet 
occupation, the role of Tallinn’s city council was 
reduced along with private property ownership. 
The effect of centralized planning had dire long-
term consequences in Estonia. 
Collectivized agriculture contributed to the 
contamination of surface and ground water. 
183  Abel Aganbegyan, quoted in Hill & Gaddy 2003: 94
184  Ratas 2005
185  Raukas 1996: 18
186  Raukas 2005: 135
187  Raukas 2005: 137










Aerial photos show Russian 

















The Russian Market was 
transformed into Viru Square by 
the construction of Viru Hotel in 
1972.
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Soviet official guidelines recommended using up 
to 180 kg per hectare of nitrogen, for instance, 
to boost production: a level which would have 
resulted in the pollution of all of Estonia’s 
drinkable groundwater (to a depth of 40 m), had 
it continued.189  Groundwater and coastal waters 
were further contaminated by inadequate sewage 
treatment: only 52% of sewage in 1982 was 
processed, and that without chemical treatment. 
The E. coli index on Pärnu’s beach was 5000 
times the permissible level in 1989.  In addition, 
Soviet mining operations “deformed” 200 km2 of 
Estonian land.  Air pollution in Tallinn remains 
staggering: 7, 12, and 20 times the limit for 
sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen 
oxides, respectively (as of 2005). Industrial air 
pollution reduced Estonia’s forest growth by up 
to 50%.190 
Orphaned Parks
The Soviet indifference to local landscapes also 
meant that Estonia’s parks were orphaned when 
the Baltic Germans left Estonia. The last “really 
detailed” book on Tallinn’s parks, for instance, 
was written in the 1930s; since then, “It’s been 
hard to tell what parks are still green space and 
which ones are full of trash,” the City Landscape 
Architect, Tiina Tallinn, admitted.  “The Soviets 
got rid of landscape architecture because it 
didn’t bring them production, and the emphasis 
was completely on industry.”  Tiina Tallinn added, 
“That’s also why there are so few really qualified 
landscape architecture instructors in Estonia.”
In the 1960s, Tallinn’s discredited landscape 
architects and coalesced to form a coffee club 
which they called the Haljastajate Klubi (Green 
Space Maker’s Club).  Its members met once 
or twice a month in Tallinn cafés to share their 
knowledge of landscape architecture, botany, and 
other related fields.  Their most influential member 
was the last landscape architecture ‘diplomat’ 
to the USSR, Alexander Niine.  Niine’s life’s 
work was the Tallinn Botanic Gardens, although 
he continued to teach at the ENSV Teaduste 
Akadeemia (ESSR Academy of Sciences) until his 
death in 1975. Other well-known members of the 
Haljastajate Klubi included H. Tamm and Andres 
189  Ratas 2005
190  Ratas 2005
Figures 103a-b
Viru Square today concentrates 
cars and shopping.
Figure 104
Saarinen pictured a new town 








In the early 1980s, the Viru 










Tarand,191 who later served as Environmental 
Minister and Prime Minister.
While many parks were planned during the 
Soviet era, few were actually built; there were 
already more than 600 parks in Estonia.192 
There were two central planning organizations 
in charge of parks: the Haljasalade Trust 
(Green Space Consignment) and the Haljastur 
REV (Remont, Ehitus, Valitsus -- Green Space 
Repair and Construction Administration).  Both 
organizations controlled parks throughout the 
entire USSR. The Eesti Metsamajanduse ja 
Looduskaitse Ministeerium (Estonian Ministry of 
Forestry and the Environment) was the steward 
of natural preserves during this time. 
In Tallinn, the emphasis on industry and new 
housing meant that Soviet planners treated parks 
largely as marks on paper.  The persistence of 
parks marked on Saarinen’s 1913 plan through 
the Soviet occupation can be explained by central 
planning’s essential disinterest in landscape 
architecture; these areas were protected from 
development essentially by default.
Soviet parks planners instead focused on 
constructing monuments celebrating Soviet 
occupation.  The hulking, concrete Marjamägi 
Memorial was built in 1975 to commemorate 
Soviet soldiers who died in 1941.  The obelisk 
(1960) commemorates Red Army soldiers 
who died in the Estonian War of Independence 
in 1918-1920.  Unsurprisingly, the Memorial 
remains unpopular today and Pirita commuters 
blatantly ignore it (see Figures 152-153).  
Soviet Marks on the City
The one Soviet contribution to Tallinn’s parks was 
the greenway along Pirita’s shore (see Figures 
154a-c), known at the time as Rahvastesõprus 
Park (The Peoples’ Fellowship Park).  The 
creativity behind this act of planning should not be 
over-estimated; however, an emerging shoreline, 
occasionally buffeted by storms, probably quite 
simply could not be built as either industry or 
housing. 
191  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
192  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
Figure 106
Saarinen proposed to channel 
faster traffic through the new 
suburb of Lasnamäe by sinking 
it below ground level; Soviets 











Laagna Road cuts through 









Other Soviet marks on Tallinn include a 314-m 
Teletorn (TV Tower) built for the 1980 Olympic 
games, and the 1960 Song Festival Grounds 
(see Figures 155-156).  One Soviet mark on 
Tallinn’s blue space (public space that features 
visual or physical access to water) is Linnahall, 
a concrete hulk that looms over the harbor 
near the passenger ferry terminal.  Built as 
an ice-skating rink and public town hall around 
the 1980s, the concrete structure is already in 
visible disrepair.  Its endless steps have proven 
hopelessly inappropriate during Tallinn’s long 
winters (see Figures 157a-c).  Paradoxically, the 
outside of the structure is protected as a historic 
site and cannot be removed.  Linnahall is typical 
of central planning projects imposed on Tallinn’s 
landscape: huge in scale, poorly built, requiring 
difficult and frequent renovation, and failing to 
consider local factors.
The Singing Revolution: 1986-1991
Economic restructuring after the 1980s led to 
“more flexible, fragmented and entrepreneurial 
forms of governance.”193  During the Singing 
Revolution (1986-1991), the Baltic States 
regained independence through non-violent 
methods.  Spontaneous youth protests pre-
cipitated the movement (see Figure 158), 
averting the danger of violent conflict.  Acts 
of resistance included graffiti, singing national 
songs, and rewriting prayers.  
The Independence Movement
Public protests from August 1987 – February 
1988 resulted in rapid change.194  The most 
significant protests occurred in 1988.  On 15 
April, 10,000 demonstrators gathered around 
a display of blue, black and white bolts of fabric 
covering the façade of the University Students’ 
Union Building in Tallinn.  On 4 June, a group of 
young people with flags congregated in Old Town, 
singing patriotic songs, and then marched to 
the song festival grounds.  Along the way, about 
100,000 people gathered.  The march happened 
193  Feldman 1999: 7  
194  Laar 2002: 75   
Figures 108
A curiously axial arrangement 
of worker’s housing explodes at 
the node Saarinen identified for 
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nightly for weeks, and the ‘Singing Revolution’ 
was born.195   Song became a strong symbol of 
cultural resistance.  The 1990 Estonian Song and 
Dance Festival in Tallinn drew half the Estonian 
population.  Non-violent demonstrations set a 
precedent for integration of the mostly Russian 
ethnic minority in the post-Soviet period.  
While Estonia’s nationalist movement initially 
only hoped for increased autonomy through  “a 
restructuring of the Soviet Union along more 
democratic, federalist lines”,196 in November 
1988 the Estonian parliament proclaimed that 
it was prepared to secede if its demands were 
not met.  On 23 August 1989, several million 
people formed the Baltic Chain linking the three 
Baltic capital cities (see Figure 159) to draw 
international media attention, much to the Soviet 
General Secretary Gorbachev’s chagrin.  As one 
historian explained,
It would be harmful to the image of perestroika in 
the West if tanks were sent to silence thousands 
of singing people.  Moscow had to look for an 
alternative.197
Estonians’ long-standing tie to their land, and 
sense that the Soviet occupation was temporary, 
helped keep the transition to independence non-
violent.  The sense of an interim occupation 
was echoed internationally in the persistence of 
Estonian embassies in other countries, including 
the US, and an exiled Estonian government that 
met in Scandinavia.
The Singing Revolution achieved independence 
at the cost of fewer than 50 Baltic lives, and 
ultimately helped undermine the USSR.198  The 
Soviet bloc had started to crumble in 1989, 
and was dissolved in December of 1991 by an 
agreement among the presidents of Ukraine, 
Belarus and Russia.199  When Soviet police killed 
13 Lithuanian democracy demonstrators in 
Vilnius in January 1991, the public outcry “cost 
Gorbachev his constituency and cleared the way 
for Yeltsin.”200  The USSR let the Baltic States go 
quietly to save face, but in 1995-1996 launched 
a bloody struggle to keep Chechnya that cost 
tens of thousands of lives.
195  Laar 2002: 80
196  Pettai 2003: 3
197  Laar 2002: 80
198  Clemens 2003: 24  
199  Freeland 2005: 198
200  Freeland 2005: 205
Figure 110
Saarinen’s plan for Lasnamäe 
Square may have also influenced 
Väike-Õismäe, where the circular 
road layout and central focal 
point sticks out as incongruous 
with other Soviet housing 




























On 21 August 1991, after 54 years and 75 
days of Soviet-Nazi-Soviet occupation, Estonian 
independence was reestablished on the premise 
of legal continuity.  The Supreme Council re-
solved unanimously to uphold the continuity of 
the 1918 Republic as a matter of international 
law.201   This provided the legal framework for 
disengaging from Moscow.202  Estonia joined the 
United Nations on 17 September 1991, and in 
the summer of 1992 replaced the ruble with the 
kroon, pegged first to the German mark and later 
to the Euro.203  Two small corners of Estonia, 
with predominantly Russian-speakers, were 
ceded to Russia (see Figure 160) as sovereignty 
was restored.  Stalin had annexed the town of 
Petseri/Pechory and the territory behind the 
Narva River to Russia in 1944.  This seemed a 
small price to pay for independence, particularly 
compared to the Russian Federation’s violent 
refusal to release Chechnya.
Reverse Migration
The mostly Russian districts of Narva and Sillamäe 
attempted to secede from Estonia in mid-1993, 
falsely expecting the Aliens Act to revoke the 
right to residency.  The secessionist referenda 
were rejected as unconstitutional, however, and 
Narva and Sillamäe remain Estonian territory.204
Estonian independence caused a portion of 
the country’s Russian-speaking population to 
panic.  Political leaders, agitators in charge of 
boosting morale and production at the Soviet 
factories, informed their employees that Estonian 
independence would be bad for Russian workers. 
One Ukrainian-Estonian remembers hearing,
’They will massacre you.  You need the protection 
of the Soviet Regime.’ … Soviets purposely 
terrified the Russian-speakers to try to keep 
control.  The whole thing was miscalculated.205
In 1991, there were 25 million ethnic Russians 
living outside the borders of the Russian 
201  Smith 2002: xx
202  Smith 2002: xxiv
203  Peterson 1994: 6
204  Pettai 2003: 89
205  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
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Figure 112
Saarinen proposed an obelisk 
monument to celebrate Estonia 
at Three Lions Square. Soviets 
built an obelisk at Marjamäe to 
commemorate their soldiers 
who died in Estonia’s war for 
independence in1918 (see 












Proposed green space in 
Saarinen’s 1913 plan (Figure 
91) is largely preserved by the 
2000 plan.  The difference 
in shape of the Paljassaare 
preserve resulted from 
emergent land area.  Note 
particularly Kopli Poolsaare, 
Merimets, the Tallinn Zoo, 
Järvemets, and  the two waves 









Federation, of which 3 million returned to Russia. 
The wave of reverse migration peaked in 1994.206 
The net emigration of non-Estonian workers 
and military families between 1992-1994 was 
substantial, at 54,900.207  At the critical junction, 
the Ukrainian-Estonian recalled:
Russians had it bad from both sides.  There was 
this sense of deep, emotional panic…. Many 
Russians left their houses and apartments to 
seek the protection of Mother Russia.  It turned 
out to be a catastrophic mistake. 
Recalling the fate of one Ukrainian-Estonian family 
that returned to Ukraine, she continued: 
The father was absolutely heartbroken over the 
lost opportunities that his sons would’ve had 
here in Estonia.208  
The Russian-speakers who chose to stay in 
Estonia seemed to be those who were less 
206  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 178
207  Raukas 1996: 21
208  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
    International Relations
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vulnerable to Soviet propaganda, less dependent 
on Soviet industry, or more connected to Estonia 
through private social networks.  The last Soviet 
troops withdrew from Estonian soil in August 
1994 (see Figure 161).  Tallinn was restored 
as the capital city of a sovereign state, and as 
such was eager to shrug off the legacy of Soviet 
central planning.209 
The Second Period of Independence: 
1991-Present
The world was quick to recognize the restored 
Baltic republics.  Although the rest of the world 
generally viewed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as 
a single block, historically the three countries 
had “little in common except their Soviet past.”210 
Throughout history, Estonia was culturally drawn 
to Scandinavian culture and policy, while Latvia 
and especially Lithuania were more closely linked 
with central Europe.   Estonia tried to distance 
itself from its neighbors in the early post-Soviet 
period, fearing that slower political and economic 
transformations in Latvia and Lithuania could 
slow down Estonia’s ascendancy to the EU.211 
Latvia and Lithuania, for instance, allocated 4- 
and 6-year transition periods to the free market.
‘Shock Therapy’
In Estonia, the most rapid change occurred in 
1990-1994.212  In the first years of independence, 
Estonian politics were volatile and unstable. 
Several key officials were forced to resign after 
votes of no confidence.   According to a political 
scientist,
… a number of the specific legacies from 
the communist era – such as the lack of a 
genuine civil service tradition, fragmented 
personnel management, and underdeveloped 
foreign relations skills -- … constituted the real 
substance of administrative incapacity during 
the mid 1990s.213
209  Feldman 1999: 4
210  Feldman 1994: 104
211  Pettai 2003: 6
212  Laar 2002: 17  
213  Pettai 2003: 9
Figures 114a-b
When President Päts 
established the Botanic Gardens 
at the edge of Saarinen’s plan, 
he helped contain Pirita’s future 
growth.
Figure 115
Three lions guard a courtyard 
connecting to the building where 
Estonia declared independence in 
1918. 
Figure 116
The focus of industry never 
shifted away from northern 
central Tallinn.   
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1920 map of Tallinn shows 
regular, rectangular blocks, 
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Kopli’s road layout betrays 
a dependence on adjacent 
industry, which is largely defunct 
today. 
“Very high levels of uncertainty, ambiguity and 
fluidity”214 similarly plagued urban development. 
From 1993-1998, however, Estonia earned 
its title ‘the little country that could,’ as a set 
of radical measures known as ‘shock therapy’ 
was introduced to stabilize and privatize the 
economy.215  Progress, however, was bought 
at a long-term social price, according to one 
specialist:
The ability to initiate and sustain [economic] 
‘shock therapy’ can be attributed at least partly 
to the political marginalisation of the Russian-
speaking settler community, the group which 
had the most to lose from the transition to a 
market economy.216
The prevalent fear at the time was that a 
conservative Russian constituency could block 
a rapid economic transition, because it was 
Russian-speakers that stood to lose in the shift to 
an Estonian-centered state.217  Poland pioneered 
‘shock therapy’ in 1990, and several post-Soviet 
economies also sought to “first to demolish the 
communist structure and then to erect a market 
economy on the cleared site.”218  Massive 
economic and political restructuring allowed 
Estonia to make the transition to a free market 
quickly.  Estonians were able to cope with the 
economic transition with the same mechanisms 
that had gotten them through the bread lines 
and shortages of the Soviet occupation, including 
household plots and social networks.
Russia, burdened by its much greater 
geographical expanse, population of 147 million, 
and a more stubborn adherence to the legacy 
of central planning, found the transition to 
capitalism difficult.  In 1994, Russia was subject 
to $10-20 billion in capital flight219 and remained 
burdened by a business culture that “tended to 
automatically discriminate against outsiders.”220 
In contrast, the economic situation in Estonia 
began to improve already in 1993, partly as the 
result of 80-90% foreign investment.  Estonia’s 
heaviest foreign investors are Sweden and Finland, 
214  Feldman 1999: 21-22  
215  Smith 2002: xiv
216  Smith 2002: xv
217  Pettai 2003: 5
218  Freeland 2005: 33
219  Freeland 2005: 97
220  Freeland 2005: 82
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and Finland became Estonia’s largest trading 
partner.  Significant exports in 1994 included: 
foodstuffs, textiles, machinery, equipment, timber, 
and furniture.  Real estate, retail and wholesale 
trade rose in economic importance. 221 
‘The Eastern Neighbor’
In Estonia, conflicts with ‘the eastern neighbor,’ 
were ongoing, most visibly in the first few years 
of independence.   Russia accused Estonian 
of violating human rights by requiring Estonian 
language competency as a condition of citizenship. 
This led to international criticism and provoked 
the interest of organizations like the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI), although in the end Estonia’s policies were 
judged acceptable by various teams of Western 
observers.  Furthermore, in 1992, Russia 
stopped fuel exports to Estonia, provoking a fuel 
crisis that jeopardized Tallinn’s heating and public 
transport as well as vital services throughout the 
nation.  Finally, in 2001, when 14% of Estonia’s 
transit trade was with Russia, ‘the eastern 
neighbor’ banned the import of Southeast Asian 
goods through Estonia to protect the interests of 
Russian business.222
Post-Soviet Economic Development
By 1993, Estonia not only had the highest 
standard of living of any former Soviet Republic, 
but also a per capita income 40% greater than 
the former Soviet Union average.223 The inflation 
rate in 1992 was almost 1000%, but by 1995 
was reduced to 29%.224  The average monthly 
income per household member continued to 
increase by 39% in 2000-2004, from 2183 EEK 
to 3029 EEK ($176 to $245).225  By 2005, the 
monthly income per household member reached 
3578 EEK ($289), with the average gross 
monthly wage at 9259 EEK ($748).226  Wages 
in Tallinn are about 20% higher than in the rest 
of Estonia.227
221  Raukas 1996: 19
222  Jeffries 2004: 147, 173
223  Laar 2002: 51
224  Raukas 1996: 19
225  Conversions based on exchange rate of $1 : 12.386 EEK 
226  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
227  Personal communication, Oksann Ovtsinnik, PR and 
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Figure 121
Historic wooden row houses in 




“Freedom: 21 June 1940” in 
a sleight of hand worthy of the 






Estonia joined NATO and the EU in 2004, which 
“significantly strengthened Estonia’s security”228 
and economic development.  The three Baltic 
countries regained a  “clear and acknowledged 
place in the construction of Europe”.229 Estonia 
was the first former Soviet republic recommended 
for admittance to ‘fast track’ negotiations for EU 
membership.230 
Communism left the eight countries that joined 
the European Union in 2004 (the Accession 8, 
or A8) with a significant economic gap to close, 
and Estonia was eager to catch up.  Despite their 
combined population of 74 million, the A8 initially 
contributed only 5% to the EU’s overall GDP, 
and the cost of labor in the A8 was just 18% 
of the EU-15 average.231  Because of Estonia’s 
economic growth and stability, Tallinn has been a 
gateway for several foreign banks’ development 
campaigns in the Baltic.232  Estonia’s economic 
success can be attributed partly to its small size 
and favorable location for trade, according to 
one economist-historian team:
The easier it is to exchange and the more trade 
there is, the greater the degree of specialization 
is possible and, therefore, the more productive 
the citizens can be.  Complex exchange is 
virtually synonymous with a high level of economic 
development…. The mere fact of being located 
in a dense region makes economic activity more 
productive.233
Adaptation of New Technology
In Estonia, foreign investment and a willingness 
to embrace innovative technology contributed to 
the atmosphere of entrepreneurship.  In 1998, 
a Financial Times survey called Estonia “Europe’s 
purest free market economy” enjoying “the thrill 
of the laissez faire.”234  In 2006, Estonia’s GDP 
rocketed to $23.93 billion.235  The eagerness 
to bypass intermediate measures and move 
straight to the most innovative technologies has 
made Estonia one of the most wired countries 
in the world and contributed to a boom of new 
228  http://www.vm.ee/eng/nato/kat_359/1006.html
229  Pettai 2003: 1
230  Smith 2002: xi
231  http://www.fedee.com/accession1.shtml
232  Tallinn City Enterprise Board 2004: 5
233  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 11-16
234  Financial Times 1998, cited in Feldman 1999: 239
235  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia
Figures 123a-c
The ‘Red Terror’ left behind 
many mass graves; the Soviet 
Army murdered 2400 prisoners 
before surrendering territory to 






While retreating from Tallinn in 
1941, Soviets destroyed military 













IT businesses; for instance, Estonia recently 
received international attention for Skype, the 
Internet phone service now based in Tallinn.  A 
mobile parking system was developed locally 
to allow drivers to pay for parking with cellular 
phones.236  The first electronic local elections have 
been held.  Many Estonians who had never held 
a checking account moved straight to internet 
banking; 98% of Estonia’s bank transactions are 
now performed electronically.237  
Pension Plan Reform
Pensioners formed the only society sector in 
Estonia that was hard-hit by economic reform 
(see Figures 162a-d).  According to the Financial 
Times Moscow bureau chief,
This was the generation that had made huge 
personal sacrifices to build the Soviet Union. 
Now, in its twilight years, it was suffering the 
double indignity of a decline in an already modest 
standard of living and a loss of the spiritual 
compensations of living in a great power.238 
A Ukrainian-Estonian elaborated,
Older people might long for the social benefits of 
the Soviet state, but they all understand that it 
is better for the younger generation now.  They 
are not nostalgic.239
Estonia was required, by the European 
Commission’s 2000 Agenda, to reform its 
pension program.240 
Land Reform
Land reform in the early 1990s was designed to 
restore land to its former (pre-WWII) owners or 
subsequent tenants.  Until 1993, non-residents 
were allowed to rent land under 33-, 66-, or 
99-year leases, but not to purchase it.241  The 
confusion over privatization and land restitution 
took several years to untangle, and in some cases 
resulted in bitter feuds among inheritors.242  In 
236  Tallinn City Enterprise Board 2004: 5
237  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
238  Freeland 2005: 212
239  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
240  Gelazis 2003: 50
241  Jeffries 2004: 168
242  Personal communication, Volli
Figure 125
Twin locomotives at the 
Occupation Museum symbolize 
alternating Soviet and German 
occupations from 1940-1991.  
Figures 126a-b
The Occupation Museum was 
built through a private donation 
from an Estonian who sought 
political asylum abroad in the 
1940s. The uncomfortably low 
entrance arch and a row of 
suitcases represent oppression 
and lost population.
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many, perhaps even most, cases, the rightful 
property owner had been long dead, deported, 
or exiled.  With several claimants vying for the 
same property, the whole transformation of land 
ownership was befuddling.   Even if the rightful 
owners (or their descendents) could be located, 
in some cases residents had made significant 
improvements or even added new buildings after 
Soviet expropriation.  In cases where the return 
of a parcel was not practical, the government 
offered an equivalent property instead.  As of 
2005, 47.8% of Tallinn’s territory remained “un-
reformed state-owned land.”243  As one scholar 
commented: 
There is little benefit in trying to grasp the 
post-socialist transformations through the old 
dualisms of private/public, market/hierarchy 
or capitalism/socialism because the emerging 
institutions and organizational arrangements 
blur those dichotomies.244
Only 9.1% of Tallinn is municipally owned.245 
Independence and the free market have changed 
how planning works “completely and truly, in all 
areas,” according to the Head of the City Planning 
Office.  By retaining so little of Tallinn’s territory 
as municipal land,246 city planning became a 
matter of private property.  Tallinn didn’t hold 
back much public property during privatization, 
and later ran into trouble trying to reconcile 
multiple stakeholders in drafting the 2000 
masterplan.  According to the Head of the City 
Planning Office,
The issue of private vs. public property is a very 
political question, in Tallinn.247  
As in the rest of Eastern Europe, 50 years of Soviet 
occupation initially gave “all forms of planning a 
bad name.”248  In the first years of independence, 
rapid political flux and economic concerns took 
precedence over long-term planning.
243  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
244  Feldman 1999: 255
245  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
246  Tallinn: Facts and Figures  2005
247  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
248  Levy 2000: 326
Figures 127







Nazi Germans liquidated their 
prison camps before retreating 
from Estonia in 1944.  Germans 







Post-Soviet Sources and Influences of 
Power within Tallinn
Most of the dust of political and economic 
turmoil settled in Estonia in the first decade 
after independence.  Growing but nebulous 
class distinctions contributed to the emergence 
of a new ruling elite, estimated as including 
about 1000 members.249  (In new Russia, in 
contrast, the economy was dominated by an 
oligarchy of only a handful of members.250  In 
addition, many émigrés returned from abroad 
to make contributions to the restored republic, 
spearheading Estonia’s ‘Return to Europe’ in 
academia, government and business.  
Sensitivity to Corruption
Russia was less able to efface central planning’s 
twin economic and political legacies.  Russia 
continues to be plagued by “a nonmarket 
distribution of labor and capital”,251 and President 
Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election was transparently 
manipulated.  While Yeltsin’s “steely lieutenants…. 
thought the new Russia too fragile for Western 
morals and manners”,252 sensitivity to corruption 
remained high in Estonia.  According to an 
employee of the foreign relations office,
 
There is less corruption in Estonia than in Russia 
because the country is smaller; everyone knows 
everyone else.253
One example of zero tolerance is drunk driving by 
politicians, an offense for which public servants 
are not only thrown out of office, but also expelled 
from their party.  Another Tallinn politician was 
expelled for letting a family member use a 
government apartment.  The rapid-fire frequency 
of votes of no confidence, however, faded from 
the political sphere early in the post-Soviet period. 
Confidence and political stabilization led to the 
dominance of the Center Party, and, in Tallinn, the 
election of the youngest mayor in the European 
Union (Jüri Ratas, age 27).  Young people were 
often successful in post-Soviet political and 
249  Feldman 1999
250  Freeland 2005: 103
251  Hill & Gaddy 2003: 1
252  Freeland 2005: 207
253  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 






Due to the scale of their 
concentration camp operations, 
Nazis declared Estonia “Judenfri” 
in 1944.  
Figure 129
This German plane, a Junkers 
Ju 88C-6 nightfighter, was used 
in defense of Tallinn during the 
Soviet air raid.  For many years, 



















economic spheres, because they “had come 
of age late enough to be almost unscarred by 
the Soviet experience”254 and were generally 
perceived to have less potential for corruption 
(see sidebar).255 Estonia’s former Prime Minister 
Mart Laar was 32 when he took office.
Inter-Ethnic Politics
The Center Party’s success was based, in part, 
on its platform emphasizing the need for inter-
ethnic cooperation.  The involvement of the 
Russian minority in ruling Central Party politics 
was a marked change from shock therapy’s 
dependence on the marginalization of the 
Russian vote.  Stateless persons are allowed to 
vote in local elections; Russian names appear 
on the ballot in all parties (although candidates 
are required by law to be proficient in Estonian). 
As a result, ethnically based parties and protest 
campaigns by aggrieved minorities are fading.
In Estonia’s Parliamentary democracy, town-
planning decisions remained subject to the 
influence of local government, district councils, 
and the City Council (see Figure 163).  Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court also plays a role in upholding 
planning law, which is regulated by the Law of 
Planning and Construction.  Conflicts between 
developers and the city’s masterplan are mediated 
by district councils, in which neighborhood 
residents play an increasingly important role. 
Since 2004, the goals of the European Union 
have also permeated Estonia’s public planning 
policy.
EU Membership
While Estonia was somewhat hesitant to join the 
EU, popular referendum narrowly decided that 
the security of membership in a larger population 
(of 350 million256) outweighed the cost of any 
reductions in autonomy.  Furthermore, Estonia 
will be entitled to the support of EU structural 
funds until its GDP reaches 75% of the EU-25 
average.257  A condition of EU support is policy 
254  Freeland 2005: 236
255  Quoted in Freeland 2005: 140
256  Sandercock: 144




“I cannot say that I am 
an absolutely honest 
man, an example for 
everyone.  Nor can any 
person who survived 
in this country before 
1985, or who built great 
things after 1985.  We 
all have things which we 
would not like to tell our 
children.” 
Figure 130
When Soviets bombed Tallinn 
from around 2 to 4 AM on the 
morning March 10th, they were 
careful to spare all centers of 
industry.  The weigh-house in 











integration, which has potentially significant 
implications for Tallinn town planning.  Accession 
requires compliance with EU standards, and 
therefore increased spending on “infrastructure 
and environmental quality.”258
Specifically, the EU’s European Commission 
considers sustainable development “a key 
dimension of solidarity, which is one of the core 
values of European integration.”259  There are a 
number of groups in Europe that actively promote 
sustainable development (see sidebar).260  In 
its Strategy for Sustainable Development, the 
European Commission emphasized four policy 
areas: “climate change, transport, public health, 
and natural resources.”261  Citing the need to 
address the increase in transport associated 
with GDP growth, the Commission stated that:
A sustainable transport policy should tackle 
rising volumes of traffic and levels of congestion, 
noise and pollution and encourage the use 
of environment-friendly modes of transport 
as well as the full internalisation of social and 
environmental costs.262
Emphasizing the difference between ‘user pays’ 
and ‘polluter pays,’ the EC coined a catchphrase 
for internalizing costs: ‘Getting prices right’263 (see 
sidebar).  The EC emphasized structuring town 
planning through the availability and connectivity 
of public transport.  
Post-Soviet Form and Meaning of the 
Physical City
Contrary to EC goals, new construction in Tallinn’s 
satellite suburbs, including Pirita and Nõmme, 
has been drastic in recent years (see Figure 164). 
Protected natural areas at the city’s borders 
have prevented much lateral expansion,264 but 
development has been rapid within the city limits. 
Neighborhood mini-malls, each featuring a super-
sized grocery, a smattering of accompanying 
258  Kennen & Meade 2003: 5
259  Göke Frerichs, President of the Economic and Social Committee, 
   quoted by European Commission 2002: 99
260  Beatley 2000
261  European Commission 2002: 12
262  European Commission 2002: 13
263  European Commission 2002: 88
264  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
European Commission: 
“‘Getting prices right’ so 
that they better reflect 
true costs to society of 
different activities would 
give everybody the right 
incentive to integrate the 
effects their behaviour 
has on others into their 
everyday decisions about 
which goods and services 
to make or buy.  It is 
therefore one of the most 
important tools available to 
policy makers.”263  
Groups in Europe 
promoting sustainable 
development:
Sustainable Cities and 
Towns Campaign, 
International Council 







The Council of European 
Municipalities and 
Regions (CEMR),
The United Towns 
Organization (UTO), and 
the Commission de Villes
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businesses and an expansive parking lot, have 
proved successful.  The proliferation of car-
driven commerce raises the proportion of 
‘value-free landscapes’ and steals away some 
of the uniqueness (and boundaries) of Tallinn’s 
eight component districts.  Parts of the road 
to Nõmme, for instance, look as if they could 
be anywhere in Scandinavia: with gleaming new 
shopping malls, Lexus and Toyota car dealerships, 
and the modern roadside generic-ness of an Ikea 
parking lot (minus the tram stop).  
New construction in Tallinn very much emphasizes 
glass, even in the most unnecessary places, for 
instance, as a veneer over an older, restored 
building (see Figure 165).  Having had LeCorbu 
stuffed down their throats once, Estonians seem 
to be craving high-rises without concrete.  Eager 
to emulate Scandinavian aesthetics, Tallinners 
now favor modern architecture over Soviet 
monumentalism, which is not surprising since 
Scandinavian investment drives much of new 
construction.  The blue-green sparkle of the new 
cluster of skyscrapers adjacent to Old Town (see 
Figures 166a-b) forms a sharp contrast to the 
stark concrete of the Soviet heyday.  The rooflines 
of smaller buildings also present a before-after 
dichotomy, featuring either traditional steep 
geometry or prairie style flatness, but seldom 
anything in between (see Figure 167).   
Rapid Growth
Under the assumption that the downtown area 
would house an increasing amount of office and 
retail space (up to 1.5 square meters per person), 
Tallinn’s 2000 town plan specifically directed 
new residential growth to Pirita, Lasnamäe and 
Haabersti.  While some redevelopment has 
happened in Tallinn’s downtown, that epicenter of 
Estonian economic action (see Figure 168), the 
majority of new construction occurs in satellite 
suburbs.  Pirita is a rapidly sprawling mass of 
single-family homes; the other areas targeted for 
expansion, Lasnamäe and Haabersti, are less 
popular.  Separated from places of work, these two 
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Figures 131a-b
Before and after: the southern 
end of Harju Street in Old Town 











Scavengers combed the 
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by huge high-rise housing developments (see 
Figures 169-170).
Lasnamäe is one relic of Soviet central planning 
that is overwhelming in scale, and houses almost 
a quarter of Tallinn’s population.  While a few 
of the regimented high-rise apartment buildings 
have been renovated, for the most part buildings 
languish in various states of bleak disrepair. 
An increasing number of the apartments are 
now vacant: with virtually no workplaces, few 
schools, and the barest minimum of services 
and shopping, most residents try to move out. 
Lasnamäe houses more Russians than Estonians, 
but that would be hard to deduce from casual 
inspection; there is very little human activity to be 
seen.  Recently, Finns have started to purchase 
apartments (especially in newer buildings with 
a view of the sea) to serve as a second home 
during their visits to Tallinn.
One of Tallinn’s most difficult post-Soviet legacies 
has been the misallocation of housing.  Tallinn has 
expanded, despite a stable population, because 
its now wealthier residents want (and can afford) 
single-family homes.  After 50 years of cramped 
living, the collective desire for privacy is almost 
over-powering, especially when combined with 
easier bank loans.  During the Soviet occupation, 
young people often shared an apartment with 
their parents indefinitely; now this generation is 
setting up households of their own en masse.  A 
small army of starter homes for new couples, for 
instance, has been constructed at the city’s edge 
outside Haabersti, in a pattern of development 
that recalls the post-WWII period in the US.  
Transportation Problems
The post-Soviet economic boom has resulted in 
a much higher disposable income for Estonians, 
and for Tallinners in particular.  In the first years 
of independence, Estonians rushed to replace 
the boxy Soviet-produced cars that dominated 
roads in the 1980s (see Figures 171a-b) with 
comparatively luxuriant models, such as the 
top-selling Peugot, Toyota and Volkswagen.265 In 
2004, 32.1% of Estonians owned a car.










Bombing during WWII damaged 


























While in 2004 new companies own 89% of 
new cars in Estonia,266 the higher rate of car 
ownership, combined with the exodus to single-
family homes in the suburbs, has increased traffic 
congestion.  Estonian commuters are guilty of 
not only traveling alone in their cars, but, as one 
Tallinner expressed it, “Leaving only 5 minutes to 
get to work.”267  Thus, Tallinn faces considerable 
problems of urban sprawl and traffic jams -- even 
in the absence of population growth (see Figure 
172).  As one American expatriate expressed it, 
Estonians are:
rushing headlong into western-style automobile 
dominated culture, almost as if they want to 
suffer LA-style gridlock as soon as possible.268  
Swedes have coined a term for the spreading 
and unnecessary reliance on automobiles: bilism. 
Tallinn’s plans to improve auto congestion are 
likely to attract even more traffic to widened 
roads (see Figures 173a-b).  Congestion is an 
immediate sustainable development concern in 
the larger EU context, as central planning has left 
accession countries with higher carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP than the pre-2004 EU 
Member States.269
The extreme concentration of Estonia’s economic 
activity within and around Tallinn, however, 
provides Harju County with the potential to pursue 
improvements in public transport.  Existing transit 
systems include tram, trolley (electric bus) and 
ordinary bus lines servicing many areas of the 
city (see Figure 174), but changes in commuting 
patterns in recent years have left important gaps 
in transportation coverage.  New construction 
in Pirita, for instance, has increased commuter 
pressure on the single arterial road leading to the 
city (see Figure 68-b).  Pirita is only peripherally 
connected to the city center and is served by city 
buses, but not by trams.  New construction is 
not likely to achieve sufficient density to support 
extended rail transport. 
In general, Tallinn’s private development shows 
the problematic tendency to collect in strips 
266  Statistikaamet 2004: 134
267  Personal communication, Karin
268  http://talesmag.com/rprweb/the_rprs/europe/estonia.shtml
269  European Commission 2002: 60
Figure 134
Bombing in March of 1944 was 










Before retreating, the German 
army rendered useless any 
equipment that could benefit the 
Soviets.  Military maneuvers like 
this one have been the source of 







Tallinn’s fires were visible from a 






When the German army 
retreated from Tallinn, many 
Estonian civilians chose to 
emigrate under military escort 







along major arterial roads.  What used to be 
summer homes just west of Tallinn’s Haabersti 
district have, in recent years, been converted for 
year-round use.  Commuters brave formidable 
traffic and distances as far as 40 km270 in order 
to enjoy the perks of rural living, in a paradoxical 
situation that is comparable to US rural residential 
development.
Tallinn resembles Swedish cities in the high 
proportion of apartments (usually privately 
owned) to single family housing: roughly 83% and 
17%, respectively.271  However, Swedish cities 
are more deliberate in their expansion patterns, 
allowing new construction only at a density that 
preserves green space and can support new 
rail transport and neighborhood businesses. 
Tallinn has so far lacked the self-discipline to 
structure its growth around extensions in public 
transportation or ‘green wedges’ of open space. 
Transit that connects to green space, a recurring 
theme in European town planning, is also not 
always adequately considered in the course of 
Tallinn’s open space improvements.  The new, 3-
million EEK ($242,000) beach added at Katariina 
Kai in Põhja-Tallinn, for instance, is only marginally 
served by the city’s bus network (see Figure 
175).  Tallinn’s new boom of construction makes 
it more important than ever that city resources 
be allocated with sensitivity and discretion.
Tallinn’s 2000 Plan
Facing these planning problems, Tallinn’s City 
Council approved a 2000 City Plan on 11 January 
2001.  The 2000 Plan was designed to meet the 
long-term development goals of greater Harju 
county.  The Plan assumed little or no population 
growth, based on the low (and still falling) birth 
rate and increasingly elderly population.  With 
population growth a non-issue, the Plan’s two 
main goals were:
to accelerate the inflow of investments
to improve the living environment of children and 
young people, 
270  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
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Estonian soldiers held the front 







 the quality of housing, and 
 the appearance of the city272
It is interesting to note that the economy 
merits first mention and as much emphasis 
as all other planning considerations combined. 
This is symptomatic of Tallinn’s shortsighted 
focus on economic restructuring, which in city 
planning seems to comprise a kind of collective 
irresponsibility. 
Private Development
The effects of a laissez-faire attitude on planning 
can be demonstrated by the story of the 
development project Merirahu near Haabersti. 
Merirahu is nestled in an enviable location, on 
the shore of Kopli Bay, next to two highly popular 
green-space areas, Õismäe and Rocca al Mare 
(see Figures 176-177).  The houses under 
construction in Merirahu display the wealth and 
expansive windows typical of new construction 
in Tallinn.  The neighborhood’s lollipop cul-de-
sacs, however, seem out of place against the 
nostalgic thatch-roof architecture of the adjacent 
Vabaõhumuuseum (Open Air Museum, see 
Front Cover).  Merirahu has been a source of 
civic contention since construction in the gated 
community resumed, after a 10-year delay, 
due to the bankruptcy of the original financier. 
Because the Kopli beachfront is susceptible to 
erosion and Merirahu blocks off public access 
to the shoreline, oubts linger, as to whether 
construction should have been allowed so close 
to the beach at all.
272  Tallinna Üldplaneering 2000: 67
Figure 139
Population losses from 1939-
1945 were staggering in 
Estonia; however, in the absence 
of any census data from 1939-
1959, wartime loss is difficult 
to chart.  Soviet-era immigration 
obscured population losses in 
Tallinn (red line).
Figure 140
Soviet-era torture devices remain 
on exhibit at the KGB prison 
museum in Tartu. 























The acclaimed role of the 2000 Plan is to 
shape private development.  Regulations control 
private development, a state of affairs that the 
city considers to be in private property owners’ 
best interests.273  In several cases, because of 
the privatization of property, the city has been 
forced to purchase land in order to preserve 
it for parks or other public use.  For instance, 
privatization has put the city in a bind at the 
Botanical Gardens, where the descendants of 
the parks’ founder Konstantin Päts resent the 
public nature of what they would like to consider 
their private property.274  The city has even had 
to compensate private property owners in order 
to widen roads.
The 2000 Plan was intended to be flexible, but 
this could be a limitation: 
The Plan is not legally binding for private persons 
but is the basis for detailed planning… The 
Plan is very general in nature, reserving the 
possibility to react quickly and flexibly to changes 
in society.275
The risk remains that the 2000 Plan’s flexibility 
leaves the city vulnerable to reactive market 
forces, which push single-family housing with a 
single-mindedness reminiscent of post-WWII 
suburban development in the US.  The echo from 
the 1950s is less surprising, perhaps, when 
one considers that WWII only recently ended for 
Estonians, with the final withdrawal of occupation 
forces in1994.  The American love affair with 
cul-de-sacs grew out of a post-WWII housing 
shortage coupled with the pressure of a cohort 
eager to produce a baby boom.  Essentially, the 
lack of immediacy of war is what separates 
American cities from European ones.  In contrast, 
Estonian suburbanization is unrelated to the 
immediate mass-production of offspring; yet the 
second primary goal of the 2000 Plan was to 
improve living conditions for children and young 
people.
273  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
274  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
275  Tallinna Üldplaneering 2000: 67
Figures 141a-b
At the former KGB headquarters 
in Tallinn, a plaque reads: “Here 
was situated the headquarters 
of the Soviet occupation power’s 
repressive organ.  From here 




Secondary goals touted by the 2000 Plan were: 
the need to balance the distribution of social 
infrastructure, diversifying residential structure, 
lightening auto traffic, and improving public 
transport. The inter-relatedness of these goals 
to the desire to improve living conditions for 
children and young people can be illustrated by 
the problematic shortage of daycare, which is 
privately funded.
In Tallinn, there are 500 families on the daycare 
waiting list, which translates to a 3-year wait 
(even for the mayor’s newborn daughter).  Most 
daycare centers are small and household-based; 
although, with the successful introduction of a 
larger-scale daycare in Pirita, that trend may 
change (see Figure 178).  Even when daycare 
does become available, it may mean -- like much 
of life in Tallinn -- driving across town. 
With the separate school and social networks 
of Estonian and Russian families, young Russian-
speakers complain they “don’t get a chance 
to practice Estonian.”276  One way to improve 
living conditions for young people would be to 
draw Estonian and Russian networks into more 
overlapping circles.  To some extent, the city 
has started to do this with the addition of skate 
parks and other recreational facilities (see Figure 
179-180).  The city’s fondness for dropping new 
playground features into mysterious places (see 
Figures 181a-c) symbolizes the city’s desire for 
an equitable distribution of resources.  However 
well-meaning, the city might consider more cost-
effective improvements that better address 
Tallinn’s multi-ethnic youth.
As part of the call to diversify residential structure, 
the 2000 Plan suggested that summer cottage 
homes in popular suburbs be replaced with 
more compact reconstruction.  This is similar to 
Swedish and Finnish infill suburban development 
in community garden areas and low-density 
residential areas.  In Finland, for instance, 
extensive and continual redevelopment led one 
visitor to nickname Helsinki “the city with no 
history.”277 
276  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
277  Personal communication, Finnish citizen Jukka Karihtala
Figure 142
Metsavend Albert Kosenkranius 




The walls of Paks Margareeta 
are 6.5 meters thick in places.  
Originally a gun tower, but 
used as a prison during Soviet 
occupation, Paks Margareeta 
now serves a maritime museum. 
Its outward appearance has not 














The Plan also called for the protection of historic 
wooden suburbs.  The 19th century wooden 
suburbs west of Old Town fetch high rents, due 
to their central location.  Restoration of some 
buildings in the Põhja-Tallinn district is underway, 
but the neighborhood remains susceptible to 
fire (see Figures 182a-b).  There are about 145 
vacant, burnt-out units interspersed with inhabited 
row houses here and in the Kopli district, where 
homeless squatters often inadvertently set off 
new fires.278
The wooden row houses in Kopli were built for 
factory workers almost 100 years ago, but are 
now mostly boarded up and burnt out.   Factories 
have closed down.  Some of Tallinn’s worst crime 
happens in Kopli.  Broken windows, gaping 
doors, and open dumping contrast sharply with 
expansive ‘million-dollar views’ of Tallinn’s bay. 
According to a city employee from the Public 
Relations department,
Those houses always belonged to the factories, 
until property restitution.  The owners became 
the people living in them, and those people 
were seized by compulsion.  The factories are 
all closed down, but these people have to stay… 
There are tens of thousands of people living in 
Kopli and the Paljassaare area, and no jobs… 
It’s an example of how property privatization has 
led to larger social problems.279 
The situation is similar in other post-Soviet cities. 
According to post-Soviet urban researchers:
large industrial sites that were, during the 
socialist period, supposed to demonstrate 
economic strength declined in importance under 
the changed economic circumstances and are 
becoming increasingly derelict.280
Kopli, one of the poorest neighborhoods in 
Tallinn, occupies coveted waterfront land.  The 
city is currently negotiating a proposal to allow 
new construction in the area, provided that 
the developer will take on the renovation of the 
wooden row houses.
278  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
279  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
280  Axenov, Brade & Bondarchuk in press 2006: www.ifl-leipzig.
   com/410.0.html
Figure 144
The Estonian national flag flies 
proudly atop the tower Pikk 
Herman; it even materialized 
there on occasion during Soviet 
occupation.  While built under 
medieval foreign rule, Pikk 
Herman has come to symbolize 
Estonian independence.
Figure 145
Stalin has been relegated to the 
basement of the Occupation 
Museum, along with a handful of 
other Soviet monuments.  Most 
statues of Stalin were removed 
during the thaw in Soviet policy 
after his death in 1953. 
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Renovating Soviet-Era Housing
Planning for the renovation of neighborhoods is 
difficult.  Property reform made most apartments 
the private property of their tenants. It is not 
uncommon to see completely renovated properties 
next to completely abandoned ones (see Figures 
183a-d).  Unclear property ownership can prevent 
restoration, as can residents who are unable or 
unwilling to organize.  In order for a building to 
be renovated, owner-residents must first form a 
cooperative association, and then find a way to 
finance renovations.  
Residents of the late 1960s district of 
Mustamäe, for instance, used a combination 
of private funds and bank loans to finance 
renovations, ambitiously hoping to transform 
their Soviet-era neighborhood “to the most 
prestigious multi-functional modern district of 
Tallinn.”281 Renovations (at a cost of $141,000 
- $179,000 per building) included changes to 
plumbing, insulation, external walls, windows, 
and district heating system.  Technical problems 
accompanied the organization and financing of 
the project.  According to the Chairman of the 
Tallinn-Mustamäe District Council,
… small incomes and rent arrears hinder the 
use of credit funds which are available to private 
owners.  Social segregation… also appears as 
a serious problem because the different ethnic 
groups cannot easily arrive at a consensus 
for the renovation of their common housing 
buildings.282 
281  Tärno 1998
282  Tärno 1998
Figure 146
Sovietization reduced the 
percentage of Estonians in 








































Lasnamäe dominates Tallinn’s 
horizon from many points in the 
city.  
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Even in the US, many high-rises have an expected 
lifespan of only 50 years.  The rapid decay of 
Soviet structures built as late as the 1980s 
(e.g., Linnahall) brings into question whether 
demolition or refurbishment is the best choice 
for Soviet-era housing developments.  Two design 
competitions for Lasnamäe have considered this 
question in Tallinn.  A 1998 cooperation between 
Finnish and Estonian universities and ministries 
produced the neo-urbanist project, “Improvement 
of the Lasnamäe Residential District – Windows 
to the Future.”  The winning entry of the 2003 
European 7 international competition proposed 
“a daring new spatial order for all of Lasnamäe.”283 
Unfortunately, these projects aren’t likely to 
inform municipal policy in the near future, given 
the city’s shortsighted tendency to rely on 
individual property owners to initiate change.
Protecting Cultural Assets
The 2000 Plan’s desire to improve the appearance 
of the city is interwoven with the city’s economic 
force: tourism. Tallinn’s Old Town is a bustling 
place where you know you ought to hang on 
to your wallet (see Figures 184-187).  The 
disparity between Old Town’s tourist attractions 
and surrounding neighborhoods was succinctly 
summarized by one tourist, who asked in a back 
alley of the center city, “How do I get to Old Town 
– to the pretty part?”
The City Planning Office touts the effects of 
tourism as being entirely positive.  Not only does 
tourism bring the city money, the Head of the 
City Planning Office Igor Volkov said, but there 
are an increasing number of “what we call quality 
tourists, those staying one night or more.  It’s 
cultural tourism.  The only real negative effect 
is that Old Town is completely full of tourists, 
making it crowded for our own people.”284
The 2000 Plan recognized the importance 
of preserving cultural and historic assets that 
make Tallinn such a successful tourist attraction. 
The city claims fewer cars are allowed in Old 
Town than ever before, but since more Old 
Town residents own cars that number is likely 
283  www.ehituskunst.ee/ en/12/4142/tonu_laigu_fruits_o
284  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
Figure 148
Lasnamäe is typical of Soviet-
era housing development: its 
buildings are hopelessly out of 
scale with its minor street grid.  
Figures 149a-b
Lasnamäe is bleak, but Tallinners 
accept its presence as matter 
of fact. 
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to increase.  Historic preservation is controlled 
at both national and local levels (by the 
Muinsuskaitseamet (Historic Preservation Office) 
and Kultuurväärtusamet (Cultural Worth Office), 
respectively).  District councils also enforce what 
buildings and structures must be preserved, and 
ensure that new construction does not detract 
from historic surroundings. 
Furthermore, an archeological excavation is 
required for each new ground-breaking in the 
center city area.  If excavation reveals findings 
of significant historic or cultural importance, 
construction must be stopped (see Figure 
188).  The city made a preemptive strike for 
preservation along Harju Street, prohibiting 
development over ruins from bombing during 
World War II.  Construction was stopped for 10 
years, during which time the presence of the 
ruins was explained to tourist passerby by a 
small, inconspicuous and rapidly rusting plaque. 
The poignancy of collective memory faded, 
however, and Tallinners began to feel the ruins 
had been exposed for long enough.  As plans 
for construction once again rushed to the fore, 
the city intervened a second time, this time by 
purchasing the property outright.  The city drew 
fire for the great expense it incurred, but then 
hit upon a compromise.  In June 2006, the city 
began covering the ruins back up again to use 
Figure 150
1945 plan emphasizes street 










A former military checkpoint 
marks Tallinn’s limit west of the 
Haabersti district.
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the area as a park (see Figure 189).  According 
to a representative of the PR office,
Not building in the area is a luxury, but a new 
prestigious park in Old Town is something that 
all citizens can appreciate.285
Promoting Investment
In another move calculated to both improve the 
appearance of the city and promote investment, 
the Plan proposed to relocate industrial shipping 
from the central city.  Although the city’s view of 
port and rail transport might err in considering 
such traffic disruptive, broadening and diversifying 
the tourist zone could be beneficial. Within the 
next 6-7 years, city planners hope to move a 
portion of passenger ferry transport to what is 
now the industrial-shipping dock in Põhja-Tallinn. 
Presumably, channeling a portion of the city’s 
tourist traffic through this area (see Figure 190) 
could support new businesses in this area and 
help replace lost industrial jobs.
The 2000 Plan also targeted infill development of 
abandoned military and industrial sites, without 
explicitly addressing the mechanisms for financing 
remediation for  brownfields (i.e., abandoned or 
under-used industrial or commercial sites that 
are contaminated, or perceived to be so).  With 
the known history of contamination by Soviet 
military and industry, environmental concerns 
need to be more explicitly addressed.
Abandoned factories in Põhja-Tallinn attest to 
the de-emphasis of industry in Tallinn’s economy. 
Across Estonia there is a trend toward eliminating 
as many physical traces of Soviet rule as possible, 
as historic artifacts reflecting Communist 
rather than Estonian culture are not generally 
appreciated.  The perception of contaminated 
land and industrial use as a Soviet after-product 
explains the eagerness to redevelop brownfield 
sites (see Figures 191a-b).  City planners remain 
stymied by what to do with the industrial rail-yard 
in Haabersti, for instance, which introduces 
potentially dangerous quantities of chemicals 
and fuels close to Tallinn’s population center (see 
Figures 192-194).
285  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
Figure 152
Commuters and visitors to 
Pirita’s shore largely ignore the 
Marjamägi Memorial, which 
commemorates Soviet soldiers 
who died in wars with Estonia. 
Figure 153
The Soviet military paid 










Like abandoned industrial sites, demilitarized 
areas raise some concerns about possible 
contamination.  Since the Soviet military mostly 
coastal open space areas, however, planners 
have worked to put these places back on the 
map of public space.   This is in keeping with 
the final secondary goal of the 2000 Plan, the 
preservation and connection of green space.
One former military area is in Põhja-Tallinn, 
adjacent to several defunct industrial sites, and 
has been targeted for green space and for blue 
space.  In Tallinn, parts of the demilitarized 
Paljassaare have proved ecologically rich and of 
particular interest to ornithologists (see Figure 
195).  The area has been designated as a bird 
preservation area.  (Tallinn’s other natural area 
is the Pirita River habitat preservation area.) 
With few open views of water available from 
the center of the city, the newly built public 
beach at Katariina Kai is a potentially important 
contribution to Tallinn’s park system. 
Preserving Greenspace
Recently, a proposal was accepted to connect 
Pirita’s shoreline park with Kadriorg, Lillepipark 
and green space further east to create a 
national park within the city.  Tallinn’s Lahemaa 
Rahvuspark would be similar in scale to 
Stockholm’s National Urban Park (NUP), which 
connects 27 km2 of greenspace through Ulriksdal-
Haga-Brunnsviken-Djurgården.286  Finland has 
similar NUPs in Hämeenlinna/Tavastehus and 
Pori/Björneborg,287 and another proposed for 
Helsinki (Helsinkkipuisto).288
As many of the large-scale Communist collective 
farms have fallen out of agricultural use, the 
percentage of forest land-cover in Estonia has 
increased.  Abandoned agricultural lands can 
result in reduced biodiversity, however, with 
the succession of weedy forest species, and in 
reduced “environmental and amenity value.”289 The 
Keskkonnaamet (Environment Office) is ultimately 
responsible for deciding what natural areas can 
and can’t be developed.  The Keskkonnaamet 
brings environmental considerations into the 
286  Schantz 2006: 159
287  Schantz 2006: 159
288  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
289  European Commission 2002: 68
Figures 154a-c
Protecting Pirita’s shoreline is 
recognized as one good thing the 
Soviets did for Tallinn.
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city’s masterplan, deciding when environmental 
assessments are necessary and identifying 
areas of particular ecological importance.290 The 
deputy mayor in charge of parks also influences 
which parks get renovated, and how.
In a sense, the preservation of green space has 
been one of the more easily implemented aspects 
of the 2000 masterplan.   As a result of Soviet 
occupation, Tallinn’s pre-WWII park structure 
was essentially frozen in time: when property was 
privatized, areas that had been public in 1940 
automatically became city property once more.  
Emphasizing the preservation of coastal areas 
and parks, the 2000 Plan suggested that areas 
of ‘environmental conflict’ within the city also 
needed to be duly considered.  However, the Plan 
targeted many potentially sensitive wetland areas 
for development (see Figure 196).  With about 
one quarter of Estonia covered by wetlands and 
half by forest, this problem may have seemed 
almost unavoidable – as well as typical of the 
European condition.  According to the European 
Commission,
a large percentage of all nature conservation 
sites in Europe can be considered at risk from 
new infrastructure development.291
Improving Transportation
The City Planning Office’s primary concern at 
present is transportation.  In order to lighten 
auto traffic and improve public transport, the 
2000 Plan called for existing bus and streetcar 
networks to be augmented by new streetcar lines 
and bicycle routes.  However, it is unclear when 
these improvements will be built.  More bicyclists 
brave the scenic highway route along the coast 
west of Tallinn than city streets and bike paths, 
despite the promise of new bike trails like the 
one being constructed along Lõuka Street linking 
Paldiski Mantee to the Vabaõhumuuseum.  This is 
partly because Tallinn’s bike paths often coincide 
with major automobile routes, leading to conflicts 
of interest (see Figure 197).  Pedestrians enjoy 
more rights than they do in some European 
streets, with perhaps one in five Estonian 
290  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
291  European Commission 2002: 67
Figure 155
The Teletorn punctuates views 
from many places in the city, 
and dominates the skyline of the 
Botanic Gardens.
Figure 156
Soviet planners underestimated 
the power of song when they 
built the 1960 festival grounds.  
The song festival grounds drew 
a fifth of Estonia’s population to a 
pivotal nationalist demonstration 
in 1988, and ultimately 
helped precipitate ‘the Singing 






drivers remembering to stop for pedestrians at 
crosswalks.  Nevertheless, negotiating traffic, 
even on foot, can be problematic. 
The city needs 3 million EEK ($242,000) 
to begin implementing planned expansions 
of public transit.292  The incredible rate of 
tourism seems like an obvious funding source 
for transportation infrastructure improvement, 
as tourists themselves would stand to benefit 
immediately.  However, at present, money from 
tourism only benefits the city indirectly.  Of the 
3 million tourists who visit Tallinn each year, 1.4 
million stayed at least one night in the city, and 
the average spending per tourist was 250 Euros 
($319),293 mostly on hotels, bars, casinos, and 
restaurants. 
However, there remains no city or national tax 
or entrance fee that is extracted from tourists 
directly, even though the massive amount of 
tourism is bound to impact the city’s historic 
assets over time. Improving transportation 
infrastructure in Tallinn would benefit both 
residents and tourists.294  When I asked the Head 
of the City Planning Office if he had considered 
an increased sales tax or an entrance fee to 
fund public transit, his response was, “That’s 
not a city planning problem. The Ehituseamet 
(Construction Office) deals with tourism.”295
Because the hub of Tallinn’s industry was sited 
in a convenient location for the Russian tsars, all 
of Tallinn’s heavy transportation, both trucks and 
trains, get squeezed through the isthmus of the 
center city (see Figures 198a-c).  “It’s almost 
impossible to strengthen the transportation 
infrastructure in this area: Lake Ülemiste is in the 
way,” the Head of the City Planning Office pointed 
out.  Industrial shipping can’t be moved closer 
to the city’s drinking water reservoir because of 
environmental concerns, and private property 
owners south of the lake are determined to block 
a new railroad, in a perfect example of NIMBY-ism. 
(NIMBY stands for Not In My Back Yard.)  While 
that rail line is drawn on the city masterplan, in 
practice the city will have to purchase the land 
and the dispute will probably take years.
292  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
293  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
294  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
295  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning   
   Office
Figures 157a-c
Linnahall, built near the 
passenger ferry terminal in the 
1980s, is already in need of 
significant renovations.
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Right-of-way corridors that have been left 
undeveloped, by definition, run through natural 
areas.  The Head of the City Planning Office 
explained that Nõmme’s corridor cuts through: 
where people want to ski.  The city can’t do 
anything about it.  It doesn’t matter where you 
want to build roads, there are always protests. 
The cultural value attached to undeveloped, rural 
areas is significant, although sometimes not 
evoked until the first construction equipment 
appears on site.  For instance, when a road 
improvement crew began work near Rapla, a 
neighbor came tumbling out of her house to stop 
it.  The old woman protested that construction 
would disturb a pre-Christian sacrificial stone 
that apparently other locals had forgotten about. 
Authorities supported the pensioner’s account, 
and the crew modified construction plans in order 
not to disturb an object of such archaeological 
and cultural significance.296  This account 
demonstrates the importance of consulting with 
local residents well in advance of transportation 
improvement projects.
The national government does not help Tallinn 
fund its city transportation improvements. 
Similarly, funds from the EU are earmarked for 
more transportation at the regional level: “EU 
funding sources need to decide whether roads 
end in Tallinn or whether they end in the state.”297 
Money has already been privately invested in 
Paljassaare’s redevelopment, which investors 
will want back if they can’t build.  According to 
the Head of the City Planning Office Igor Volkov:
“Transit lines will have to be expanded, and 
the railroad will have to be moved… it should 
be the responsibility of the investors, to move 
people.  They should have to pay for the 
road and transit improvements that make 
redevelopment possible…. That’s how they do it 
in Finland, Germany, and Holland.  Developers 
must compensate the city for the new buses, 
tramlines, parks and roads that will be required 
by the people who live there.”
Estonia is “a small country, with small problems,”298 
but also a country with limited financial resources. 
“For the city, it can be hard to get money together,” 
296  Personal communication, Ain Haas
297  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
298  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 




















At the public demonstration on 
23 August 1987, the bearers 
of the blue, black and white flag 
went unpunished – much to 
everyone’s surprise.
Figure 159
On the monument representing 
the Baltic Chain at the Teletorn, 
one of the figures is missing 
a leg.  Inadvertently, the 
monument also testifies to 
the economic instability of the 
early 1990s, when metal theft, 
particularly of copper and wiring, 
was rampant.
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Volkov explained.  By January 2007, the city will 
purchase 7 new trolley-buses and 20 ordinary 
buses,299 but the city needs about three times its 
current budget (4,500,000 EEK, $363,000) to 
make substantial transportation improvements. 
When asked which initiatives of the 2000 plan 
had been funded, the Head of the City Planning 
Office said, “There are so many to go, but at 
least the foundation is in place.”
Post-Soviet Public Policy and Urban 
Development
“A city’s masterplan is never a finished piece of 
paper.”
   -- Igor Volkov300  
On 19 May 2005, a new Regional Development 
Strategy for the greater Tallinn area came into 
effect.  A refinement of the 2000 city masterplan, 
the 2005 Strategy addresses some unresolved 
questions in finer detail.  The Strategy included 
new restrictions to control the height of buildings, 
more detailed plans for Paljassaare Reserve and 
Kakumäe Port, and sought to address parking and 
transportation problems.  “The 2005 Strategy 
is just a continuation, a collection of documents 
which make the 2000 Plan more precise.”301 
New ‘community’ boundaries also break the city’s 
eight districts into more manageable pieces.302 
Tallinn’s 2005 Strategy
The main purpose of the 2005 Strategy was 
to guarantee “sustainable development for 
each region” through 2015.303  Identified goals 
included keeping the population of Harju County 
below 41% of Estonia’s total population; keeping 
Northern Estonia’s contribution to the national 
GDP less than 70%; maintaining an employment 
rate304 of at least 45% in all counties; and 
equalizing incomes so that the lowest living 
299  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
300  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
301  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning 
   Office
302  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
303  Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 17
304  defined as the employment of individuals ages 15-74
Figure 160
Estonia lost several thousand 
km2 of territory (red) to Russia 
in 1991 as a result of Stalin’s 
modification of 1944 borders.   
Two northeastern Estonian 
towns, Narva and Sillamäe, 
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standard305 in any county is at least 61% of the 
highest county’s living standard.306  
As indicators of social cohesion and economic 
growth, these goals reflect some of the European 
Union’s measures of sustainable development. 
However, Estonia’s employment rate in 2004 was 
56.8%: already in excess of the 45% goal,307 yet 
falling far short of the European Commission’s 
recommended 70% by 2010 and 75% by 
2020.308   Similarly, in 2004 Harju County held 
38.6% of the nation’s population and contributed 
slightly more than half of the nation’s GDP – i.e., 
well under the 2015 limits.  
As for social cohesion, Harju County’s average 
monthly income was 17% higher than the 
national average in 2004 (at 3558 EEK / 
$287). 309 Across Estonia, the wealthiest 20% 
of the population earned 6 times as much as 
the poorest 20%.310   This has implications 
for viability of rural life in Estonia, where the 
agricultural infrastructure, if typical of other 
accession states, “has suffered from many years 
of under-investment.”311 In Estonia, the poverty 
level was defined as a monthly income below 
2161 EEK ($174) in 2004.312
Focusing on these concerns, the Regional 
Development Strategy offers no additional 
provisions for long-term environmental protection. 
The European Commission recom-mended that 
local initiatives form integrated development 
strategies “for urban and environmentally 
sensitive areas.”313  It seems that, in face of 
burgeoning post-Soviet economic growth, Estonia 
has over-emphasized economic considerations in 
the sustainable development goals, which would 
reflect a bygone attitude in the rest of Europe. 
According to the European Commission,
sustainable development used to be dismissed 
as a “luxury” that should not be bought at the 
expense of economic growth.314
305  measured as average household income divided by the number 
   of household members
306  Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 17
307  Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 17
308  European Commission 2002: 41
309  Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 11
310  Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 19
311  European Commission 2002: 82
312  Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 19
313  European Commission 2002: 38
314  European Commission 2002
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Because of Tallinn’s 
administrative structure, urban 
planning is influenced by the 
municipal government, district 
councils, and the City Council.
Figure 164












Sustainable development requires “good 
governance and active public participation”.315 
However, Estonians during the Soviet occupation 
learned not to draw attention to themselves in 
the public arena.  Many of the apartments in 
Tallinn date back to an era when an overheard 
conversation could spell arrest and deportation; 
consequently, apartment doors often feature 
padded insulation or an air space to deaden 
noise.  During the Soviet occupation, according 
to the Financial Times Moscow bureau chief,
social interaction was governed by a Soviet 
perversion of the Golden Rule: inform on your 
neighbor because he is certain to inform on 
you…   The Soviet Union had been a culture of 
uravnilovka, literally leveling out, a term for the 
party’s policy of making sure no individual light 
shone too brightly against the backdrop of the 
collective.316
With padded doors as an every day reminder of 
the dangers of sticking out in a crowd, it has 
taken time for public participation to redevelop 
in Estonia.  Public participation has continued to 
grow, as a democratic process,317 particularly 
at the city district level and in the form of 
neighborhood associations.  In neighboring 
Russia, the “lack of civil society” has been the 
“most poisonous [Soviet] inheritance.”318
Urban Redevelopment
A high rate of public ownership of land can 
contribute to strong city control over the 
development process, as in Helsinki, where one 
half of the land is owned by the city.319  “Helsinki 
has it easier because the Swedish monarchy gave 
the city its public land as a present,” said City 
Landscape Architect Tiina Tallinn.320  According 
to one sociologist, 
Among the post socialist countries, Estonia is 
the only one with a really close connection with 
the Nordic countries, and this is likely to make 
local planning in Estonia different from the rest 
of Eastern Europe.  As a paradoxical twist to 
the Scandinavian flavor, the Nordic style social 
315  European Commission 2002: 54
316  Freeland 2005: 17 & 149
317  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
318  Freeland 2005: 17
319  Levy 2000: 313-314
320  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
Figure 165
A glass veneer binds old 
construction.
Figures 166a-b
Boomtown’s new downtown is 
under construction in glass.
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democracy is much criticized in political and 
business circles at present.321
Urban redevelopment in Tallinn has so far been 
supported mostly by Scandinavian investment. 
Redevelopment is financed by a spectrum of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), in which the 
city pays for planning and contributes a share to 
larger projects.  The city also finances some new 
parks through public-private partnerships.  Jüriöö 
Park, for instance, was initiated by a 1,000,000 
EEK ($80,736) investment by a private developer, 
who made a municipal gift of the land across 
from his new hotel on the condition that it 
remains a park.  The site turned out to have 
historic significance as a battleground from the 
1918-1920 Estonian War of Independence.  The 
city allocated 10,000,000 EEK ($807,363) to 
develop the park accordingly, and now the site 
serves as a kind of counterpoint to the 1918 
Soviet memorial at Marjamägi (see Figures 199-
200).322
Greenspace Expansion
Lasnamäe, for example, has a shortage of 
useable green space despite the trampled 
areas left between buildings.  In fact, the only 
community green space of note is near Sikupilli, 
which until last year served as an informal 
dumping ground for old tires and other trash. 
The area was preserved from development 
by an ordinance protecting sightlines to a 
neighborhood lighthouse.  A recent clean-up has 
been successful, and while Lasnamäe residents 
already brave the polluted waters for swimming, 
the area has been slated for a more extensive 
clean-up and redesign (see Figures 201-202).  A 
proposal is on the table to finance the project 
through a public-private partnership that would 
allow some new construction at the proposed 
Pae Park’s edges, in exchange for financing the 
costs of green space clean-up.
In another public-private partnership, the city 
solved the problem of how to fund 100,000 
EEK ($8,073) renovations for Linnahall through 
an unusual agreement.  A private developer will 
renovate Linnahall out-of-pocket, beginning in 
321  Blom 1996, cited in Feldman 1999: 238
322  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
Figure 167
In a post-Soviet architectural 
dichotomy, rooflines are either 
very steep or very flat.
Figure 168
Offices and retail space spread 
rapidly near Tallinn’s port, 
cornering the best views of the 
harbor from their windows.
Figure 169
Like Lasnamäe, which looms on 
the horizon above, Haabersti 
is another bleak testimonial to 
Soviet housing.
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January or February of 2007, in exchange for 
the rights to develop the shoreline in front of it, 
50 years from now.323
While the city’s masterplan dictates which natural 
areas are not suitable for development, the city 
usually must purchase these lands in order to 
create public parks.  New park construction 
is an open, public process; the city collects 
construction bids and then enforces development 
according to the masterplan.  The city considers 
four aspects when planning parks development 
and restoration: ecological / natural value, 
cultural value, stakeholder interests, and social 
factors.  A fifth concern, economic viability, “really 
controls and combines the other aspects.” 324
Proposed development along the Pirita River 
corridor, for instance, caught the city’s attention 
due to the ecological importance of the area. 
The river corridor has since been designated as 
a nature conservation park.  For the most part, 
though, the city’s green space focus in the post-
Soviet era has been on park restoration in the last 
five years.  Working with existing public spaces, 
the city is developing an interconnected park 
system and expanding its bicycle trail network. 
Two greenways are proposed through Lasnamäe 
to increase access to Tondiraba Park.  
Another municipal parks project involves the 
former military base at Aegna Island, less 
than 10 minutes from the mainland at Viimsi 
by motorboat.  While Aegna Island has already 
been designated a national preserve, the city 
has recently stepped in.  Aegna Island already 
accommodates a number of children’s summer 
camps, and the city is renovating a building to 
serve as a community center (see Figures 203-
205) to allow all of Tallinn’s schoolchildren to visit 
the island reserve in classroom groups. 
Post-Soviet Population Change and 
Ethnic Relations 
In 2002, the number of ethnic Estonians in 
Estonia remained lower than in 1939, and the 
life expectancy at birth remained no higher than 
323  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
324  Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
Figures 170a-b
Some buildings in Haabersti have 
been renovated in keeping with 
Scandinavian aesthetics: the 
use of bright colors is typical of 
apartments in Sweden (below).
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in 1957.325  Population losses from WWII and 
Soviet immigration left Estonians in 2004 at 
risk for disappearing altogether if fertility did not 
increase, according to the Statistics Office.326  
Population Replacement
In 1996, Estonia’s infant mortality rate was 
twice that of Scandinavia, and the average life 
expectancy was still decreasing.327  The life 
expectancy in Estonia hovered 10 years lower 
than the European average (see sidebar).328 
While Estonia’s birth rate from 1975-1980 
averaged 2.1 children per woman, the figure 
required for a stable population, by 2003 the 
birth rate fell to 1.2.329  Across the EU, falling 
birth rates were attributed to social and cultural 
change, and transitions were particularly rapid 
in Estonia.
Tallinn and other Estonian cities experienced the 
biggest change in fertility rates, leading to town 
planners’ assumptions of little or no population 
growth.  Slow generational replacement may 
have led to “higher well-being” for individuals,330 
but the decline in fertility jeopardized population 
replacement.  According to Estonia’s Statistics 
Office: 
The following three or four years will show 
whether the fall in fertility reflects an actual 
change in behavioural patterns or the effect 
of timing, i.e., fertility aging.  Whatever the 
reasons, the trends have led to formation of a 
demographic wave, which will peak at the end 
of the 2010s, bringing about problems in all 
spheres of society…. It is up to the cohorts of 
the 1970s and younger to decide how serious of 
a blow the past decades have been to population 
replacement.331
The Gender Gap
Lower birthrates could be related to increasing 
involvement (especially of women) in higher 
education.  Employment is highly correlated 
325  Laar 2002: 37
326  Statistikaamet 2004: 16-17
327  Raukas 1996: 22
328  Freeland 2005: 16
329  http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/pop_
   cou_233.pdf
330  Statistikaamet 2004: 13
331  Statistikaamet 2004: 15
Figures 171a-b
The Ladas, Zaporozhetses and 
Moskvitches that dominated 
Estonian roads before the early 
1990s contrast sharply with the 
imported cars prevalent today.
The post-Soviet life 
expectancy was even 
lower in Russia than 
in Estonia in 1994:
“the average male 
life expectancy had 
shrunk to 58 years, 
lower than anywhere 
else on the globe 
apart from sub-
Saharan Africa.”263  
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Figure 172
Traffic comes to a standstill 
on Gonsiori Street during 
rushhour.  For a few blocks, 
cars make slower progress than 
pedestrians -- each afternoon.
with education in Estonia, where less than 6% 
of the unemployed had higher than secondary 
education.332    Over 30% of Estonian 20-
somethings had obtained some ‘tertiary’ 
education in 2001, a rate significantly exceeded 
only by Finland, Sweden, and Latvia.333  
Women in particular are likely to find increased 
education to their advantage, as the wage 
differential decreases in occupations with a 
higher proportion of highly educated women (see 
Figure 206).  One of the human-rights breaches 
identified by the Agenda 2000 of the European 
Commission was an “insufficient implementation 
of gender anti-discrimination laws.”334  The wage 
difference is most extreme for unskilled laborers, 
where females earn 40% less than their male 
counterparts.335  According to Estonia’s Statistics 
Office,
Women seem to see higher education as a 
possibility for securing their participation in 
the labour force and diminishing differences at 
workplace and in pay that result from hidden 
gender discrimination.336
Ethnic Minorities
Ethnic minorities also appear to be taking 
advantage of the higher educational system. 
Ethnic Estonians have a slightly lower education 
level than the national average, as Russians, 
Ukrainians, Jews, Germans, and many minorities 
are more highly educated.  Finns, Byelorussians 
and Lithuanians, however, have relatively low 
levels of education.337
Only 53.7% of the population of Tallinn was 
ethnically Estonian in 2005,338 and in 2002 
about 19% of the Estonian population remained 
non-citizens.339 Even in 2004, 35% of the 
population remained first- or second-generation 
immigrant.340  This proportion is remarkably high, 
when compared to other European countries.
332  Statistikaamet 2004: 23
333  Statistikaamet 2004: 22.  The increased interest in education 
   may be a result of employers’ distrust of the newly shortened 
   (3-year) baccalaureate programs.
334  Gelazis 2003: 65
335  Statistikaamet 2004: 23
336  Statistikaamet 2004: 23
337  Statistikaamet 2004: 23
338  Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
339  Jeffries 2004: 135
340  Statistikaamet 2004: 16
Figures 173a-b
Expanding roads, such as 
Tartu Mantee, to alleviate 
commuter congestion may have 
the opposite of the desired 
effect, but at least tramlines 
will be moved to the side of the 
expanded road. 
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The large number of ethnic immigrants in Estonia, 
left behind by the withdrawal of the Soviet 
state, has the potential to help stabilize the 
population’s size and tax base and compensate 
for Estonians’ low birth rate and aging population. 
The post-Soviet condition in Estonia is unusual in 
that the Soviet source of ‘colonists’ essentially 
admitted the illegality of its actions when the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was rescinded in 
1991.  Immigrants in Estonia found themselves 
on somewhat uncertain terms.  The potential for 
violent inter-ethnic conflict was, for the most part, 
bypassed by Estonia’s relatively gentle transition 
to independence and ongoing wariness of ‘the 
eastern neighbor.’  Estonia’s policy towards 
Soviet-era settlers, however, was a major point of 
controversy during post-communist development. 
According to Estonia’s Statistics Office, this
illustrates the underlying tension between 
the desire for membership of Euro-Atlantic 
institutions and the project of restoring a 
sovereign nation-state.341
Even though Soviet-era immigrants wanted to 
continue the use of Russian in schools, business 
and government, legislative changes in the 
1990s persuaded many post-WWII settlers 
to learn the Estonian language and take on 
a mixed “Slavic-Esto identity.”342 Applicants 
for citizenship were required to prove basic 
Estonian language competency.  Similar policies 
were adopted in Latvia and Lithuania.  All three 
Baltic countries granted automatic citizenship 
to pre-occupation residents and their direct 
descendants, but set forth more stringent 
requirements for naturalization.343  During its 
accession negotiations with the European Union, 
Estonia was criticized for not adopting a more 
accommodating policy for ethnic minorities. 
According to one specialist,
The biggest question mark over Estonia’s future 
development relates not to internal affairs but to 
the external situation, most notably the country’s 
problematic relations with Russia.  Domestic 
policy towards the Russian-speaking settler 
population, for instance, rests largely on the 
contention that the ‘Eastern Neighbour’ poses 
an active threat to Estonian independence.344
341  Smith 2002: xiv 
342  Clemens 2003: 24
343  http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HSW-03.htm
344  Smith 2002: xv
Figure 174
A map of Tallinn’s proposed 
and existing rail transportation 
betrays Pirita’s auto and bus 
dependence.
Figure 175
The former military site at 
Katariina Kai in Põhja-Tallinn 
(*, above) has been recently 
converted to a public beach.  
Although the site offers 
sweeping views of the town’s 
harbor and Old Town, it is 




















To obtain citizenship, applicants were required to 
pass an exam on Estonian laws and constitution, 
in Estonian; which only 90,000 of a possible 
500,000 non-citizens did between 1992-
1997.345  Only Soviet-era immigrants who could 
prove they had supported Estonia’s independence 
movement between 1989-1991 were given 
automatic citizenship.346  Language competency 
exams and the prohibition of dual citizenship drew 
international attention and criticism.  Language 
had been such a sore point during years of 
Soviet occupation that policy-makers remained 
obstinate in the language requirements for 
citizenship.  Estonia’s Integration Foundation 
drew fire for “focusing primarily on the language 
aspect,” to the detriment of other concerns like 
education and employment.  
The Baltic States were able to defend their 
citizenship requirements based on the ‘effective 
link principle,’ which acknowledges the need 
for some kind of link (often of birth, domicile, 
or residence) between the state and would-
be citizen.  The effective link principle allows 
successor states to deny citizenship to individuals 
who supported the previous state politically or 
militarily.  According to Nida Gelazis, a scholar of 
Eastern European studies:
This principle banished any attempts to criticise 
Baltic citizenship legislation on the grounds that 
former Soviet army, state or KGB personnel 
were prohibited from gaining citizenship… Given 
the history of Russian aggression in the Baltic 
States, Estonia and Latvia may be justified in 
demanding that ethnic Russians not only break 
their political ties to Russia, but also demonstrate 
a commitment to their adoptive countries.347
The linguistic requirement was intended to 
identify Russian-speakers willing to make this 
commitment, and to differentiate them from 
immigrants and military who came to Estonia as 
the ‘Soviet West,’ because:  
Many of the second-generation immigrants do 
not seem to be better integrated into the society 
of their new homeland, compared with their 
parents.348
345  Jeffries 2004: 133
346  Gelazis 2003: 53
347  Gelazis 2003: 55
348  Statistikaamet 2004: 16
Figure 176
The gated community of 












Houses in the Merirahu 
development are typical of new 
construction and stubbornly 
Scandinavian in their proportions 
and materials.
95
In 2000, Estonia’s parliament instituted a 
new 2000-2007 program for integration to 
strengthen social harmony and promote better 
understanding of minority cultures.349   As of 
June 2005, 139,000 people remained stateless 
in Estonia – 10% of the population.  Most of 
these have declined offers of citizenship from the 
Russian Federation, preferring the uncertainty 
of statelessness to possible expulsion to Russia. 
Most stateless individuals found it difficult to obtain 
the free Estonian language instruction needed to 
pass the citizenship exam.350  According to the 
Council of Europe Information Office,
In Estonia, the number of stateless people 
who have obtained Estonian citizenship has 
been steadily increasing, but Estonia has not 
developed a consistent policy aimed at bringing 
the Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking 
communities together.351
In 2004, the Law on Citizenship was amended 
to make it easier for children under 15 and 
people with disabilities to secure citizenship.352 
Russian elementary schools began to provide 
basic language education in Estonian and by 
high-school minority children were expected 
to follow classes taught exclusively in Estonian. 
Educational reform has mandated that, by 2008, 
60% of subjects after 10th grade will be taught 
in Estonian at all state schools.  A compulsory 
language exam in secondary schools now satisfies 
the requirements for citizenship, making it easy 
for Russian youth to obtain citizenship.
Through the expanded pre-accession program 
PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for 
Restructuring their Economies) and other 
initiatives since, the EU reimbursed language 
course fees for older Russian-speakers seeking 
to learn Estonian, although these classes remain 
over-booked.  Universities even offer language-
immersion programs, in which Russian-speakers 
can study in their mother tongue for the first 
two years and then, in their third year, learn 
Estonian.353  Estonia’s Integration Foundation 
was founded to help organizations write grants 
for EU funding, and mediates language training.




353  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
Figure 178
The new daycare center 
Naba (Navel) has been hugely 
successful, and rivals in scale 
a new middle-school situated 
across the street.
Figures 179a-b
The skate park at Politseiaed 
draws hordes of teenagers 
during long summer evenings 
but sits empty in the mornings.
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Figure 180
A ropes challenge course 
has been added at the new 
recreation center within Nõmme-
Mustamäe Landscape Reserve.
Clauses were included in the 2004 Criminal Code 
and Law on Employment Contracts prohibiting 
“incitement to hatred and discrimination” and 
employment discrimination based on race or 
ethnicity.354  Ethnic Estonians have repeatedly 
emphasized that migrant Russians are welcome 
to stay in Estonia, provided that they learn to 
speak Estonian.  The knowledge of the official 
language is, after-all, a condition of higher 
employment.  According to a city employee,
Russian-speakers have the same job prospects 
as Estonians, except for language.  It’s not 
uncommon to see someone who’s very well 
educated in Russian have to take a menial 
job...  Estonian and English are really essential 
for a successful career.  You have to know the 
state language....  The knowledge of language 
is a tribute you pay to the country that is your 
homeland.355
Non-citizens are permitted to participate in 
local elections.  However, as one Estonian put it, 
“Russians seem content to stick to their own.”356 
A young Ukrainian-Estonian explained,
Some young Russians have inherited the same 
condescending attitude towards Estonians that 
their parents had.  That attitude won’t be able 
to persist in light of economic progress.  Estonia 
is a cozy, safe and economically stable place to 
live.  If you ask Russian-speakers how they feel 
about living in Estonia, they might tell you that 
they miss their own culture.  But if you ask them 
if they want to go back to Mother Russia, they 
say, ‘No, are we crazy?’ 357
The situation in post-Soviet Estonia raises the 
unique question, of how to assimilate a minority 
that was on its way to becoming a majority. 
Theoretically, an ethnic minority’s sense of 
belonging should be based on a shared political 
community; an evolving national identity should 
promote ideas of democracy, political community 
and citizenship.358  During the Soviet occupation, 
Russian-speakers had been, by and large, content 
with the status quo; in general, it is the ethnic 
minority, or ‘other,’ that resists and seeks change 
354  www.coe.ee/eng/?op=news&NID=55
355  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
356  Personal communication, Estonian citizen Urve Ratas.
357  Personal communication, Oksana Ovtsinnik, PR and  
   International Relations 
358  Sandercock 2003: 100
Figures 181a-c
A playground in Kopli is used less 
than one in Politseiaed Park.
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in balance.359  Doubts about long-term population 
stability and Estonia’s Soviet history make ethnic 
relations a touchy subject, but Tallinn’s history 
as an ethnically complex merchant city suggests 
it will be equipped to assimilate the long-term 
presence of minorities.  One sociologist pointed 
out:
Over a decade since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, we should remember that there is 
nothing new about national minorities presenting 
a sensitive issue for relatively young states in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  A cursory glance 
at inter-war history reminds us both that the 
matter is well-established and that the region 
has responded to it with creativity.360
Migrant Swedes and Finns set a long-standing 
historical precedent as proponents of Estonian 
independence, and some Russian-speakers 
supported independence and transitions in the 
early post-Soviet period.  
The Finnish Influence
Today, the streets of Tallinn are as polyglot as 
they must have been when the city was part 
of the Hanseatic League.  In Old Town, Finnish, 
Swedish, German, Danish and Norwegian are 
nearly as common as Estonian and Russian, 
and there is even an occasional smattering of 
Japanese.  Young Estonians often choose not to 
learn Russian in high school, focusing instead 
on English and Finnish as more economically 
applicable in their everyday lives.361  
The everyday influence of Finland in Tallinn is 
increasing steadily.  Each year, more than 1.5 
million Finnish tourists visit Tallinn, and 60 
passenger connections, including ferry and air 
travel, link Estonia to Finland each day.362  Finnish 
tourists are uniquely “cheap shoppers,”363 and 
come to Tallinn to buy a wide range products and 
services.  Estonians and Finns both sometimes 
call Tallinn a suburb of Helsinki.  Doctor visits, 
prescription glasses, cosmetics, and alcohol are 
much cheaper in Estonia than in Finland.  The 
low ferry fare from Helsinki  (about 20 Euros, or 
359  Sandercock 2003: 98
360  Housden 2004: 231
361  Personal communication, Karin
362  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
363  Personal communication, Oksana Ovtsinnik, PR and 
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Figures 182a--b
In the destitute neighborhood of 
Kopli, property privatization has 
left owner-residents “seized by 
compulsion.”
Figure 183a
Wooden houses along Jakobsoni 
Street were built in the 1910, 
to the chagrin of city planners of 
the day.
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$25) and newly relaxed regulations concerning 
the import of Estonian alcohol guarantee a 
continuing Finnish presence in the center city. 
The alcohol tax in Finland is high enough that 
many Finns choose to purchase liquor and beer 
in Estonia, where cheaper brands of beer can 
be had for less than a dollar a bottle.  Laws 
concerning the public consumption of alcohol are 
either lax or non-existent, and many tourists can 
be seen wandering in parks or streets with a 
vodka cooler or gin ‘long drink’ in hand.  The sight 
of a trunk-load of alcohol on the return ferry to 
Helsinki has also become quite common.  While 
Finns are prohibited from importing alcohol 
for resale, the concerns of border guards can 
easily be alleviated by an explanation involving 
an upcoming party or wedding.  The often 
overly relaxed and carousing behavior of Finnish 
tourists in Tallinn’s streets has led to the slightly 
pejorative nickname of ‘reindeer.’364
Estonian as an Official Language
While Finnish pervades Old Town, Russian and 
Estonian blend into one another in the rest of 
the city’s streets.  With their closely related 
languages, Finns and Estonians can more or less 
understand one another.  However, Russians 
and Estonians don’t even share an alphabet. 
The public disappearance of Cyrillic was almost 
immediate in the early post-Soviet period, and 
likely required sudden adjustments on the part 
of Russian minorities.  Street signs, for instance, 
are now almost exclusively written in Estonian; 
the only visible bilingual exceptions seem to be 
made for street names that are didactic in nature 
(see Figure 207).  
Estonian, with its murmuring vowels, is not the 
kind of language a person learns through casual 
contact, as inter-ethnic marriages attest.   (One 
American woman, who has been married to 
an Estonian since 1969 and has two bilingual 
daughters, still can’t say, “Pass the milk.”)
Publicly, as well as officially, the language is Estonian, 
but in practice the two polarities of language 
twist in and around each other.  Employees are 
364  Personal communication, Finnish citizen Jukka Karihtala
Figures 183b-d
Renovated townhouses face 
abandoned property on 
Jakobsoni Street.  
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expected to have sufficient grasp of Estonian to 
be able to conduct everyday business in the state 
language; in practice, however, neighborhoods 
are so separated that a person who speaks only 
Russian can probably get by in a menial job with a 
minimal understanding of Estonian.  It seems the 
particular domain of older shopkeepers to insist 
on using Russian for their business interactions 
– even in the face of persistent Estonian dialogue. 
Some older Russians remain unable (or unwilling) 
to speak Estonian.  The effect of revised 
educational policies over the last 15 years has 
been a minority youth that’s fluent in Estonian, 
but still sometimes reluctant to speak it.   The 
situation mirrors conditions during the Soviet 
occupation: with some elders unable to speak 
the official language, and some youth refusing 
to.  As Russians joke, bitterly, about the 1993 
‘Aliens Act’:
‘We are creatures from Mars.’  Russians don’t 
like to be called aliens.  It’s an unfortunate 
translation.365
One City, Two Towns
Ethnicity may not be visibly manifest, as race is in 
the US, but the Soviet policy of separate suburbs 
for new immigrants has resulted in “one city, 
two towns.”366  A once preferential policy has 
left minorities at a disadvantage today: socially 
excluded and distanced from the economic 
opportunities and business networks prevalent 
in Tallinn’s city center.
Progress towards multiculturalism occurs over 
multiple generations.  Becoming multicultural 
is a long-term process, and requires the 
implementation of a bureaucratic framework for 
citizenship legislation, new ways of living together, 
and new forms of spatial and social belonging.367 
The historically bloody relationship between 
Estonia and Russia, however, is likely to require 
sensitive handling for some time.  Research 
indicates the repressive measures of the 
Soviet occupation will likely carry psychological 
consequences not only for survivors, but also their 
children and grandchildren as well -- disappearing 
only in 2030-2040.368  
365  Personal communication, Oksana Ovtsinnik
366  Personal communication, Madis Pihlak
367  Sandercock 2003: 136
368  Noor 2005: 59
Figure 184
Tourism is a major economic 
enterprise in Tallinn.
Figure 185
A string of casinos lures in 
passengers on their way to and 
from the ferry terminals.
Figure 186
A street sign on Pikk Jalg (Long 
Leg) reminds tourists not to be 
caught off-guard by the scenery.
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Fortunately, Russian-speakers who chose to 
remain in Estonia probably shared Estonia’s 
intention to ‘return to Europe,’ even if only 
economically.  Some Soviet-era immigrants had 
a social or cultural tie to place, after living in 
Estonia for 50 years.  In Estonia hopes remain 
high that integration could be achieved in the 
next 10 years.  An employee of the city Public 
Relations Office explained,
All it takes is one generation….  Estonia’s biggest 
trump is its stability.  It’s not a matter of buying 
affection, but Russian-speakers will realize this is 
their home.  They may claim that Russia is their 
heart and culture but, anymore, they understand 
Estonia better than Mother Russia…. Russians 
who live in Estonia are different from other 
Russians.  The prospects for integration are not 
that poor.369
A corollary could be drawn between the situation 
in Tallinn today and in American cities in the late 
1800s.  A rapid turnover of power between Irish 
immigrants and earlier European colonists led to 
ethnic scuffling for a generation or two, especially 
in New York, Boston, and Chicago.  Today, the 
fierce ethnic Irish identity manifests most publicly 
as a vague affinity for St. Patrick’s Day, and in 
pinching miscreants who fail to respect the 
holiday by wearing green.
The multiculturalism of European cities has 
increased with the EU’s more permeable 
national borders.  The result has been a 
struggle of nations to maintain their identity, and 
a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments is some EU 
countries.  The rising problem of xenophobia in 
some countries clashes with historic traditions 
of tolerance toward political refugees.  In 
Sweden, for instance, planners admit that one 
shortcoming of the excellent public rail systems, 
such as in Göteborg, is the isolation of ethnic 
minorities and new immigrants in satellite towns 
connected to Swedish town and cultural centers 
only loosely.  As in other countries, lower-income 
immigrants “tend to cluster in cheap housing, 
often on outlying suburban estates.”370  The self-
sufficiency of Swedish suburban developments 
means that many new immigrant communities 
interact with ethnic Swedes very little.  
369  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
    International Relations
370  European Commission 2002: 57
Figure 187
Not all of Old Town has been 
‘Disney-fied.’  While similar 
buildings house restaurants 
and shops capitalizing on the 
district’s medieval history, this 
building on Toompea awaits 
renovation.
Figure 188
Archaeological excavations (blue 
dots) have covered much of Old 
Town.
Figure 189
Harju Street was bombed, along 
with much of the city, in 1944 
by Soviet bombers targeting the 
Nazi German garrison (compare 
to Figures 131-132).  After 10 
years, the excavated ruins are 












A parallel situation exists today in Tallinn as an 
inheritance of Soviet central planning.  Separation 
does not facilitate understanding: some Swedes 
perceive a dilution of social services associated 
with the acceptance of political refugees, and 
young Russian-speakers lament the lack of 
opportunities to practice Estonian. 
Sensitive International Relations
Few countries have embraced an ideology of 
multiculturalism. The best examples -- Australia, 
Canada, Singapore, and Malaysia -- hold political 
philosophies that contrast distinctly with the loss 
of cultural identity implied by the US ‘melting 
pot.’371  Estonia’s cultural ties to Scandinavia make 
tolerance and acceptance of ethnic minorities a 
logical matter of state policy.  Indeed, Tallinn’s 
municipal government seems determined to 
respect the diaspora of ‘the eastern neighbor,’ 
perhaps because of the ongoing potential for 
international conflict. Similar to the first period 
of independence, maintaining relationships with 
Russia is vital.  One European Studies scholar 
explained:
As a great power, Russia considers itself .… 
entitled to certain spheres of interest, among 
which it counts also the Baltic States.  This 
position is completely unacceptable for the 
Balts – a fact that has created a deep cleavage 
between Russia and the Baltic States.372
According to a political scientist, because of the 
Russian Federation’s 
heightened sensitivity to Russian exclusion from 
EU institutions.… the unresolved questions of 
inter-ethnic relations and national identity could 
hit the surface in ugly ways, especially when 
economic rough patches are encountered. 373
Even more alarming is Russia’s tendency, even up 
to the present (2006) of denying “the aggression 
against the Baltic states and the existence of 
occupation.”374  This post-Soviet policy is a stark 
contrast to Germany’s attempts to compensate 
victims of the Holocaust.
In accordance with the continuing delicacy of 
relationships between Estonia and Russia, Tallinn’s 
371  Sandercock 2003: 101 
372  Tiilikainen 2003: 17
373  Breslauer 2003: 29 & 31
374  Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 89
Figure 190
Rail connects directly to Tallinn’s 
passenger port, inviting public 
transportation development.
Figures 191a-b
Soviet industry and military 
have left an uncertain legacy 
of potential pollution in Tallinn.   
This site was abandoned, 
probably by the Soviet military, at 
Viimsi pier.
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city planning needs to prioritize ways of bringing 
Russian and Estonian enclaves into common 
spheres of interaction.  Fostering a sense of 
inter-ethnic cooperation is vital to preventing a 
minor ethnic scuffle from getting out of hand. 
According to a former employee of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union,
[Russian] policy is likely to snap at an 
unpredictable moment, perhaps with little 
apparent provocation.375
Promoting Multiculturalism in Tallinn
The stranger, the outsider, the traveler, the 
trader, the refugee, the slave, yes, even the 
invading enemy, have had a special part in urban 
development at every stage.
   -- Lewis Mumford376
The framework of a city’s planning can reveal 
cultural biases acting as a form of majority rule, 
for instance by making implicit assumptions 
about what kind of spaces are appropriate for 
worship or recreation.  Leaving ethnic mixing to 
housing and public spaces can be problematic; in 
order to promote multiculturalism, a city needs 
more active spaces that require and facilitate 
interaction between groups.  To accelerate 
naturalization, potential mixing spaces might be 
associated with: workplaces, schools, childcare 
centers, clubs, youth centers, and colleges.377 
However, open space plays a vital role in securing 
the right of ethnic minorities to difference, and 
to the city.  According to urban and regional 
planning theorist Leonie Sandercock: 
 
The right to difference means recognizing the 
legitimacy and specific needs of minority or 
subaltern cultures.  The right to the city is the 
right to presence, to occupy public space, and 
to participate as an equal in public affairs.378
375  Nikolai Sokov, quoted in Breslaer 2003: 34
376  The City in History (1961), quoted in  Sandercock 2003: 109
377  Sandercock 2003: 94
378  Sandercock 2003: 103
Figure 192
Planners have struggled with the 
location of the industrial rail-yard 
in Tallinn since 1913.
Figure 193








Near Tallinn’s center city and 
Linnahall, abandoned industry 
does not deter new residential 




An aerial photo from 2005 shows the newly designated 
reserve of Paljassaare (•), which was formerly used as a 
military area.  The close proximity of largely abandoned 
industry and recent municipal investment at Katariina Kai (*) 
suggest that some industrial relics could be incorporated into 








Tallinn’s 2000 plan leaves 
several ecologically sensitive 
areas vulnerable to development. 
Ecological zones are marked 
in green hatch; larger woods 
in green and prospective 



























Ethnicity and Open Space
Open space plays an important role in promoting 
urban multiculturalism as well as a public arena 
for conflict.  In Tallinn, where ethnic minorities 
are often non-citizens, ethnic tensions play out 
in public spaces.  The litany of forbidden items 
at Kadrioru Stadium is an impressive pictorial 
testimonial to the latent potential for conflict 
(see Figure 208).
One source of contention between ethnic groups 
is ‘Victory Day,’ the May 9th Soviet holiday 
commemorating the victory of the Soviet army 
over the Nazi Germans.  The anniversary is a 
touchy subject for Estonians, as it coincided with 
the beginning of 50 years of Soviet occupation. In 
fact, May 9th is marked on the Estonian calendar 
simply as ‘Europe Day.’  
In the spring of 2006, the city announced 
its intention to relocate the Soviet Soldier 
Monument from Tõnismägi, which is a memorial 
to Soviet soldiers who died in World War II. 
The monument was not removed earlier, as it 
remains unclear whether unknown soldiers are 
buried at the site.379  Russian-speakers associate 
the statue with Victory Day, and Estonians see it 
as a symbol of the Occupation: even though the 
caption has been changed to read “For those 
fallen in Word War II.”  Local Russians place 
flowers at the monument to remember lost 
loved ones.380  By no accident, the Occupation 
Museum is located across the street from the 
Soviet Soldier monument.
On 9 May 2006, along with the expected EU 
flags, a few Russian provocateurs brought Soviet 
flags to the annual Victory Day celebration at the 
Soviet Soldier Monument.  Estonians, not to be 
out-done, staged a counter-demonstration with 
national flags, but were blocked by police for not 
securing the proper permits to demonstrate.  
Soon after, the Soviet Soldier was defaced 
in the night with blue paint.   Ethnic Russians, 
completely unable to understand Estonian 
sensitivity, launched a counter demonstration of 
379  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
380  http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee
Figure 197
Tallinn’s proposed bicycle path 
system increases access to both 
public parks and private green 
space, and includes, where 
possible, views of blue space.  
However, the network of paths 
under construction (red) and 
projected (blue / purple) fails to 










Kopli and Paljassaare remain 
the focus of Tallinn’s shipping 
industry, causing shipping traffic 
to bottleneck in the center city’s 
isthmus.
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their own.  On 27 May 2006, Russians covered 
the monument commemorating Estonia’s 
independence in front of the municipal government 
office with red and white carnations, the Russian 
national flower (see Figures 209-210).  This led 
to an aggressively boisterous counter-counter 
faction of Estonians carrying national flags.  The 
Russian group had registered for a permit at 11 
am, and Estonians had a permit for the same 
place at noon; however, the police caught on 
and kept the two groups apart.  While tension 
during the demonstration was thick, no outright 
violence ensued.  
Since then, the city has been careful to provide 
surveillance protecting the Soviet Soldier 
Monument from further defacement.  However, 
the media have played an unfortunate role in 
escalating the conflict, the most visible display of 
ethnic tension since the 1990s.  As a Ukrainian-
Estonian related:
Journalists are doing nothing to pacify the 
people… When journalists interview, they seem 
to pick the angriest, least well-educated person. 
In their 5 minutes of glory, these people say the 
stupidest things.  One drunk Russian said that if 
the city knocks down the statue, ‘We’ll give you 
another Chechnya.’  I’m not at all for censorship, 
but I am for common sense. 381
The antagonism between red and blue played out 
on a quieter but more personal level a few years 
ago, in Keila-Joa National Park, west of Tallinn. 
Keila-Joa features two suspension bridges, where 
newlywed couples traditionally secure locks 
engraved with their names (see Figures 211a-c). 
As a symbol of the permanence of their wedding 
vows, couples then throw the key to their lock into 
the Keila River.  This custom is a long-standing 
one, and some of the locks are quite old.  A few 
years ago, however, when one couple went to 
revisit the park on their anniversary, they found 
their lock completely gone.  A friend related their 
story:
Once they had gotten over the initial shock, they 
discovered that all of the locks with Estonian 
names had been cut off, but none of the Russian 
ones.382  
Not to be deterred, Estonian couples since 2004 
381  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and 
   International Relations
382  Personal communication, Karin
Figure 199
Jüriöö Park was founded as a 
10:1 public-private partnership, 
and serves as an example of 
how private seed money can 
precipitate municipal funds.
Figure 201
The future site of Pae Park was 
preserved from development 
in Lasnamäe because of an 
ordinance protecting views of 
this lighthouse.  Park improve-
ments will continue into 2007.
Figure 200
The private investor’s hotel 
can be seen at right of the 
monument in Jüriöö Park.
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have returned with locks in such numbers as to 
overwhelm the Russian ones, which nevertheless 
remain unmolested.  Estonian marriage locks 
have also appeared on a less secluded bridge in 
the new Pirita River Corridor Park, where they 
will presumably be less susceptible to vandalism.
Vandalism is a recurring theme in Tallinn’s parks. 
Last year, for instance, 50 shrubs at Viruvärava 
Mägi Park were stolen out of the ground the 
night after they were installed.  The city can only 
afford to fix up two or three parks each year, 
and renovations do not always go smoothly.  The 
city’s tendency to spend money on less steal-
able flashing colored lights, water features and 
grandiose statuary (see Figure 212) betrays 
the heat of new wealth, but draws people of all 
ethnicities into parks nevertheless (see Figures 
213a-b).  Park renovations in recent years have 
included fountains added at Kungla Park, lights 
along Haabersti’s Stroomirand shore, and a 
new rose garden within Kadriorg.  Tallinn’s city 
government could further integration with a few 
changes to its program for public open space.  
Recommendations for Parks
Create small-scale places to promote 
interaction among ethnic groups.
Tallinn’s parks should bring people together 
and provide places to practice language skills, 
especially for young people.   One way that 
Swedes achieve this is with enclosed, more or 
less naturalistic areas within housing complexes, 
where young people can roam and interact within 
a safe space.  Pocket parks in Nõmme, with their 
established trees, invite increased neighborhood 
social activities.  Existing popular parks like 
Kadriorg could be retrofitted to promote more 
interaction among strangers.
The Tallinn Botanic Gardens currently suffers 
from a lack of a sense of ‘refuge’ – with an 
inventory-based approach to plants, the Gardens’ 
scattered exhibit of bushes does not invite visitors 
to linger or interact (see Figures 214a-c).  The 
mayor’s call for new benches is a step in the right 
Figure 202
According to the former Minister 
of the Environment Rein Ratas, 
Pae Park will be left more 
naturalistic than many of Tallinn’s 
open spaces.
Figure 203a-b
This building will become the 
center of operations for school 
programs on Aegna Island.
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direction, but a more comprehensive gathering 
space is in order.  Parts of the Kadriorg grounds 
could be enhanced to encourage interaction at a 
larger than family-based level.
Create special parks for special activities.  
Since different ethnic groups already interact well 
in workplaces, more small plazas and parks in 
the center city could lure office workers outside 
on their lunch breaks (see Figures 215a-c).  
A number of other user groups are already inter-
ethnic.  Creating spaces that appeal to these 
groups is one way to stretch social boundaries. 
Dog walkers are one example of such a group. 
The under-used dog park at Politseiaed should 
be a lesson in what does not work: too small 
of a space, too artificially treated, guarantees 
canine and human boredom (see Figure 216). 
Less formal dog parks, however, could bring 
neighbors together.  Places that make unpopular 
parks (see Figures 217-218) could be an instant 
hit with special users or enthusiasts of particular 
sports. 
Bring patterns from the rural landscape into 
the city.  
Using traditional fences in urban spaces is one 
way to emphasize layers of culture in open space. 
Local traditions are more meaningful than, for 
instance, European coppicing (see Figures 219-
220).  This approach would provide reassurance 
to Estonians that their traditions still matter in 
multi-ethnic communities.  Midsummer fires for 
Jaanipäev are another rural landscape tradition 
that has been adopted in the city (see Figures 
221a-b). 
Offer more places to linger and interact in 
Tallinn’s parks.  
William Whyte’s research on urban plazas 
suggests the easiest way to get people to stop in 
a public space is to provide places to sit.  Food 
and activity can also serve as ‘triangulations.’ 
Figures 204a-b
Aegna Island features a thick 
pine forest with open understory, 
which is typical of the Estonian 
countryside.  
108
The number of users at the Tallinn Botanic 
Gardens on a Sunday afternoon implies that 
the park has the potential to support a more 
formalized gathering space.  Benches that are 
conversationally grouped (see Figures 222a-b) 
encourage spontaneous interactions among 
neighbors.
Where there are people, provide places that 
promote interaction.  
Existing points of random contact, like bus stops 
and plazas, could be enhanced to invite social 
interaction and comment (see Figures 223-226). 
The overemphasis of monuments (see Figure 
227) is a displacement of priorities.  While new 
monuments have been installed near Merineitsi 
Kuju, Viru Hotel, Snell Pond, and in Mustamäe,383 
what the city needs to do is create larger spaces 
that transcend ethnic and historic boundaries.
Help (notoriously reserved) Estonians learn 
to talk to strangers.   
Community events like Old Town Days provide 
extreme situations that cannot escape comment. 
Spreading remarkable events like the Rat Race 
(see Figures 228-229) around the city could 
be another way to promote interaction among 
strangers.
Recommendations for Neighborhoods
Help communities form more active 
neighborhood groups.  
The city could accelerate housing restoration by 
encouraging the formation of active neighborhood 
groups.  Even a coat of fresh paint can make a 
difference to a worn-down building; bright colors 
help set one house off from another (see Figures 
170a-b). The Lasnamäe streetscape is so 
monotonous that painting the bridges crossing 
Lagna Road and labeling them was considered a 
major way-finding improvement.  
383  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
Figures 205a-d
While scenic today, Aegna 
Island was formerly a Soviet 
military base --- raising again 
the question of environmental 
contamination and exposure.
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Community groups like Habitat for Humanity in 
the US have been quite successful in improving 
the quality of housing in low income communities. 
With more than 104,000 residents in Lasnamäe, 
the potential for pooling resources of labor is 
significant.
Introduce creative, concrete solutions to 
revitalize Soviet-era housing.  
Without innovative solutions to the problems of 
Soviet-built housing, the housing vacancy rate is 
likely to broach a tipping point.  While everything 
cannot be fixed at once, the involvement of 
community members at a larger than individual 
property scale is crucial.  According to an Atlantic 
Monthly article,
A national [US] study found that the ‘tipping point’ 
in a neighborhood occurred when just three to 
six percent of the structures were abandoned. 
Vacant lots and empty buildings are more than 
just symptoms of blight --- they are also causes 
of it.  Central cities of metro areas that have 
aggressively expanded their borders face these 
problems too…384
As residents tend to relocate to Tallinn’s single-
family suburbs, the city needs to consider 
assuming ownership of long-abandoned 
properties to prevent the spread of blight.  Such 
an approach is in place in US cities like Indianapolis; 
Indianapolis auctions off properties in low-income 
neighborhoods where owners have defaulted on 
taxes.  At ‘tax sales,’ a vacant lot can occasionally 
be purchased for a few hundred dollars.385  A 
similar program for abandoned properties in 
Tallinn would draw the attention of Scandinavian 
investors very quickly.  Alternatively, the city could 
acquire abandoned properties systematically in 
order to promote a higher degree of control over 
city planning (as in Scandinavian cities).
384  Witold Rybczynski, “Downsizing Cities: To Make Cities Work 
   Better, Make Them Smaller,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 276, #4, 
   Oct 1995.  Quoted in Hill & Gaddy 2003: 162
385  Personal communication, Shane Strodtman and Tricia Mera, 
   Indianapolis tax sale veterans and owners of two formerly 
   abandoned lots -- and a $12,500 house.
Figure 206
Women in Estonia pursue higher 
education to improve the equity 
of their employment.  While 
opportunities have improved for 
women since independence, 
women’s wages still fall short by 
EU standards.
Figure 207
The few bilingual street-signs 
that remain in Tallinn appear to 
serve an educational purpose: 
“J. Pärna, Estonian author.”
Figure 208
Kadrioru Stadium pictographs 
forbid a small arsenal of means 
of expressing conflict.
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Facilitate social interaction in Soviet-era 
housing open space.   
The city should spearhead efforts to revitalize 
existing open spaces in Soviet-era housing 
developments.  Already struggling to finance 
renovations, individual apartment owners are not 
likely to take on the redesign of communal space 
in any significant way.  The city’s district councils, 
or even smaller community administrations, could 
help neighbors work together to improve the 
appearance of the spaces around their homes. 
Allotment gardens within large housing block 
areas could provide the means for residents to 
personalize their immediate community space. 
Most immigrants housed in high-rise Soviet 
developments are distanced by LeCorbu’s ideal 
of the ‘city in the green’ from both city and green. 
Promoting a greater sense of community in 
these neighborhoods is the first step to creating 
a sense of belonging, and a sense of where to 
belong, for Russian-speakers in Tallinn. 
Recommendations for Traffic
Work to reverse the trend of migration to 
the outer city.  
As US cities learned the hard way after the 
‘White Flight’ of the 1960s, crumbling inner city 
neighborhoods are more difficult to resurrect 
than they are to abandon.  If Tallinn is exhibiting 
post-WWII symptoms belatedly, as a result of 
Soviet occupation, the center city ring of historic 
wooden housing is vulnerable to increasing 
problems.   Older neighborhoods like Kopli are 
likely to remain undesirable without drastic 
intervention by the city to reverse urban sprawl. 
Center city living needs to be made more desirable, 
in the long-term, than a new single-family house 
in the suburbs.  The tools the city can use to 
control growth will also help create new, vibrant, 
and ethnically mixed communities.   
Figure 209
The Soviet Soldier statue at 
Tõnismägi was defaced with 
blue paint after some Russians 
brought Soviet flags to the 
annual Victory Day celebration 
on 9 May 2006. 
Figure 210
In later May 2006 ,Russian 
speakers retaliated by covering 
the monument commemorating 
Estonian independence with the 
Russian state flower.
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Prioritize immediate improvements in public 
transit.  
The most important step to making the older 
neighborhoods more desirable to residents is to 
provide better public transit.  The best way to 
encourage the autonomy, ethnic integration, and 
quality of life for Tallinn’s youth is to give young 
people ‘keys to the city’, in the form of easy, fast 
access between the city center and satellite 
districts.  With the current crush of traffic at 
the center isthmus, the city is making a huge 
mistake to widen auto roads.  To curb bilism and 
promote sustainable urban growth, the city should 
work instead to make public transit cheaper and 
faster than commuting by car.386   This means, 
first of all, separating tram and bus routes from 
regular traffic (see Figures 230-231); otherwise, 
no commuter stuck in traffic will watch a tram 
pass and feel jealous. 
This approach has been successful in Chicago. 
The Elevated Rail (the EL) enjoys freedom of 
movement around the Chicago Loop, where 
cars get stuck for hours.  Judging from the 
crowdedness of city buses during rush-hour in 
Tallinn, many trolleybus and bus lines could be 
switched over to trams.  Buses, generally and 
perhaps rightfully perceived as slower and more 
lumbering means of transit, should be limited 
to areas with insufficient density to support 
rail. Tallinn needs to de-emphasize private 
automobiles to promote the well-being of its 
larger community.  
Help tourists explore more of the city.  
At present, it is difficult for casual visitors to the 
city to feel confident using public transit.  One 
visiting historian from Canada, for instance, 
quickly gave up trying to decipher the tram route 
system: “It was easier to walk.”  With about half 
of Tallinn’s tourists only visiting the city for the day, 
improving the legibility of public transit is crucial.
If tramlines connected Tallinn’s center to its 
most precious green spaces (e.g., the Botanic 
Gardens and the new Lahemaa Rahvuspark 
in Pirita), Scandinavian investors would follow. 
386  Whyte: 1958
Figures 211a-c
At Keila-Joa Park, post-1994 
marriage locks decorate the 
bridges crossing Keila River.
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Figure 212
A proposal to erect an oversize 
statue of Kalevipoeg in Tallinn’s 
harbor would mark Estonian 
territory.
What Tallinn lacks today, in comparison to other 
Scandinavian cities, is efficient public transit.  
Skip ahead to more ‘enlightened’ transit 
solutions.  
Much like Estonians skipped straight to Internet 
banking, the transportation crisis provides 
Tallinners the opportunity to bypass the mistakes 
of bilism that have ravaged the US.  The sheer 
density of Soviet-era housing has, if nothing else, 
the ability to support efficient public transportation. 
The need to relocate industrial shipping could 
very also spur positive community change.
Give bike lanes more breathing room from 
traffic and parked cars.   
Protecting bicyclists from smog could promote 
bicycle commuting.  Larger, more separated 
bike paths could also prevent ‘dooring,’ the 
unfortunate result of a car door opening into the 
direct path of bicyclist.387 Since most places of 
work remain in the center city, a widened, ‘green 
fingers’ pattern would benefit all of Tallinn’s 
residents.  Left unplowed in the winter, the same 
network of off-road paths could accommodate 
the city’s skiers. 
Don’t count paths along major arterial roads 
as greenways.  
Despite the attractive swaths of green in planning 
documents, the best greenways are those that 
separate users from the hustle and bustle of 
auto traffic. Most of Tallinn’s bike paths could be 
termed brownways, as they put bicyclists into 
regular conflict with automobiles (see Figures 
232-233).  
Greenways, in order to facilitate community 
interaction, need to be widened and connected 
by a second network of paths for exclusively non-
motorized traffic.  The existing road right-of-ways 
through natural areas like Harku Reba make an 
obvious first point of attack.  The same right-of-
ways that the city laments as undevelopable for 
387  Hurst 2004: 112-115
Figures 213a-b
Politseiaed Park before the 
addition of fountains, which now 










auto traffic make perfect bike, pedestrian, and 
ski connections within the city. 
 
Let pedestrians win over cars in everyday 
conflicts.  
Pedestrians’ natural paths could be better 
considered.  The city provides under- and over-
passes at some intersections, but many places 
lack safe pedestrian connections (see Figures 
234-235).  Underground pedestrian crosswalks 
such as Viru Keskus and Vabaduse Väljak can be 
difficult for users with limited mobility to access 
(see Figures 236-237).  Parks, in particular, 
seem often to lack safe pedestrian crossings. 
Pedestrians need better connections between 
the center city and Old Town (see Figures 238-
239).  At present, for instance, one intersection 
at Politseiaed Park requires pedestrians to 
negotiate three traffic lights in order to enter 
the park (see Figure 240).  Politseiaed Park is 
very popular, yet several of the intersections at 
its borders lack safe (or even striped) pedestrian 
crossings.   Requiring drivers to stop for a 
pedestrian on a crosswalk could change the 
status quo overnight.
Get prices right for car-commuters.  
Contrary to Saarinen’s utopian vision of expansive 
avenues with no traffic, in today’s world, to 
create an asphalt space is to fill it with a car. 
Along with opening up Tallinn’s road grid to more 
small connections and alternate routes, the 
city should leverage its control over the price of 
downtown parking to promote and finance public 
transportation.  This is in keeping with the EU’s 
goal of ‘Getting prices right.’   Surface parking lots 
should not be considered the highest and best 
use of land in the city center, where high cost 
and a limited number of parking spaces could 
drive public transport improvements.  A higher 
fuel tax also would not adversely affect tourism, 
and could be used to implement immediate 
infrastructure improvements. 
Figures 214a-c
Botanic Gardens needs more 
spaces that promote social 
interaction.  More community 
events, a café with outdoor 
seating, and more benches near 
the shelter of  large trees would 
invite visitors to linger.
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Restrict the rights of cars in and around Old 
Town.  
The tourist appeal of Old Town is its timelessness, 
but there is nothing like the squealing wheels 
of a resident commuter to dispel the medieval 
effect.  While the external form of Old Town 
remains unchanged (see Figures 241a-b), at a 
finer resolution, the raised fortress of Toompea 
is an outpost in an increasingly car-dominated 
city culture (see Figure 242).  The city aims to 
increase the supply of parking near Old Town to 
demand,388 but it would be better to improve 
alternative ways of getting downtown.  Pedestrian 
routes around Old Town could make better use of 
the preserved greenbelt (and former promenade), 
even if that means reorganizing traffic. 
Recommendations for Green 
(and Blue) Space
Find new ways to protect green space.  
The city cannot afford to buy outright all properties 
that it would like to conserve.  The transfer of 
development rights is one land use tool that the city 
might use to manage green space, particularly in 
cases where current residents would like to stay 
on their land but protect it for future generations 
(e.g., the Päts family at the Botanic Gardens). 
Another option to consider would be implementing 
a policy similar to Sweden’s allemansrätt, which 
specifies that everyone has the right to camp or 
hike in larger green spaces, provided that they 
cause no damage and respect a certain radius 
of distance from private residences.
Protect small pieces of nature in small ways. 
Old trees are objects of cultural value.  The critical 
root zone for a tree is more than 1.5 times the 
diameter of its canopy.  Paving up to the trunk 
of an old tree is a sure way to kill it slowly, and 
388  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
Figures 215a-c
The green island in Rävala Street 
could make a good office park; 
there are many office buildings 
along both sides of the street.  
At present, there are not 
enough places to sit, and paths 
are too wide and lead nowhere.
Figure 216
The dog park at Politseiaed is 
too small and too artificial to be 
successful.  
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in such a way that it may not be obvious that 
development was the cause (see Figures 243-
245).  The city should expand its ordinances 
protecting historic trees to reflect the need to 
protect an area larger than the ‘drip line.’ 
Rethink turf grass.  
Pedestrians make their own paths, and sometimes 
these should be respected.  At Politseiaed, 
pedestrians make it painfully clear that the paths 
are misplaced at the park’s corners (see Figure 
246).  Lawn should be reserved for places that 
get walked on a little, and not used at corners 
that are continually cut.  Turf should also not be 
attempted in places that never get walked on, 
like roundabout medians, where spots of flower 
color and ornamental grasses could brighten 
traffic (see Figure 247).
Improve public access to blue space.  
A shortcoming of Saarinen’s plan, which persists 
today, is inadequate treatment of the area 
between Old Town and the harbor.  Linnahall 
obstructs views to the harbor and could be 
better blended into the landscape (see Figures 
248-251).  In the rush to destroy Soviet marks 
on the city, the area adjacent to the passenger 
ferry terminal was cleared in the 1990s.  The 
property awaits development proposals without 
a clear planning vision (see Figures 252-253).
Much of the center city’s harbor space is, literally, 
fenced off by border control (see Figures 254-
257), and the Pirita shoreline park is susceptible 
to the disruptions of traffic.  The best views of 
the sea are from private high-rises.   The city 
plans to widen the waterfront, particularly near 
the passenger ferry terminal Reisisadam and 
Miinisadam.389  The city should also work to 
incorporate ‘million-dollar views’ into its public 
spaces.  Tramlines should extend to the most 
scenic public areas, similar to Göteborg’s 20-
minute tram ride from the center of the Swedish 
city to the archipelago of islands at Saltholmen 
(see Figures 258-259).   The new emphasis on 
incorporating Aegna Island into elementary school 
389  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
Figures 217a-b
An empty green space on 
Türnpu Street could make a dog 
park.  Neighborhood kids prefer 
to play closer to their building, 
even by the dumpsters, where 
there is less noise from traffic. 
A noise-reducing fence or hedge 
along the loudest street and 
an open fence along the other 
borders would make this an ideal 
dog run.  
Figure 218
Dog walkers are now already 
virtually the only users of this 
pocket park.
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curriculum invites a rail connection through Pirita 
and Viimsi suburbs, and more formalized ferry 
access to the island.
Evaluate the need for brownfield remediation 
more explicitly.
Many of the former Soviet military and industry 
sites are contaminated brownfields. Putting 
people in contact with these places is not always 
the best option.  Even sites that look natural may 
harbor potentially hazardous contaminants (see 
Figure 260).  Without knowing the extent of fuel 
dumping and other environmental damages from 
retreating armies, the burden of investigation 
rests to some extent on the city.
Come to terms with lost populations without 
aggravating ethnic tension.   
International organizations continue to criticize 
Estonia for not examining the full extent of the 
Holocaust that occurred under Nazi German 
occupation.  Memorial markers at Kalevi Liiva 
and Klooga are a good start, but places of 
lost populations need to be more prominently 
acknowledged.
 
Close to 100,000 Estonians emigrated during 
WWII and never returned, but there is no indica-
tion of this at Tallinn’s passenger ferry terminal. 
Similarly, the mass deportations to Siberia via 
rail in 1941 and 1949 are not referenced in any 
way at the railroad station.  Tallinn’s veiled history 
of war and occupation needs to be acknowledged 
in places throughout the city, and not just as an 
exhibit in the Occupation Museum. 
Conclusion 
Tallinn’s post-Soviet planning must be viewed in a 
larger context of rapid development, continuous 
change, and historic influence.  Seven centuries 
of foreign occupation (by Denmark, Sweden, the 
Figure 219
The urban landscape can 
incorporate traditional Estonian 
elements as well as general 
European ones.
Figures 220a-b
Coppicing in Tallinn often 




Jaanipäev fires are a rural 
tradition that has transferred 
over to the city. Fires at 
Haabersti and Lasnamäe drew 
crowds in June 2006.
Figures 222a-b
A conversational standoff in 
Toompark contrasts with a more 
social space in Politseiaed Park.
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Teutonic Order, Germany, and Russia) have left a 
series of physical traces on the city.  
The Old Town center of Toompea used to be an 
island and a Danish fortress in the 1200s, and 
Old Town developed as a Baltic German outpost. 
Kristiine was drained by the Swedish monarchy; 
its street grid and canals date to the 17th century. 
Nõmme was built as a summer resort when Tallinn 
was a popular holiday destination in the 1850s. 
Tsars left a Baroque stamp on the neighborhood 
of Kadriorg and established Tallinn’s rail system 
and centers of industry.   The haphazard 
proliferation of workers’ housing in Põhja Tallinn 
in the early 1900s led the city to commission 
Eliel Saarinen to produce a masterplan for the 
city center.  Many wooden neighborhoods burned 
after Soviets bombed the center city in March 
1944, and Soviets built massive housing districts 
in Lasnamäe, Mustamäe, and Haabersti.
Surrounded by this conglomeration of influences, 
Tallinn’s Old Town has become a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site due to its preserved medieval 
street layout.  Old Town draws millions of tourists 
to Tallinn each year, and tourism is a powerful 
economic force in the city.
Tallinners since the early 1900s have embraced 
the center city medieval district as their own, 
although it was historically an occupation outpost. 
The medieval defense tower Pikk Hermann has 
become a symbol of Estonian independence. 
The physical traces of Soviet occupation, however, 
are likely to remain unpopular for at least another 
generation, as WWII had brutal effects in Estonia 
and caused a loss of one quarter of the nation’s 
population.  Integrating the abandoned industrial 
and military remains of Soviet occupation into 
the public landscape could speed the healing 
process, as well as create new spaces to help 
mix communities.
Estonia is a small country with a strong sense 
of national identity.  The Metsavennad guerrilla 
movement and stubborn popular adherence to 
cultural traditions helped Estonia keep its identity 
through Soviet occupations.  In the last 15 years, 
Estonia’s strong identity has helped it assert 
independence and ‘return to Europe.’  Now that 
Figures 223a-b
Near the Estonia Opera and 
Theater (*), along the axial park 
at Teatri Väljak (Theater Square), 
pedestrians would naturally 
prefer to walk along the edge of 
the lawn.
Figure 224
The bus stops are on the outside 
edges of the street.
Figure 225
In front of Saarinen’s Opera 
House, a row of bushes keeps 
bus stop users out of the park.
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Figure 223
A better use of the park at Teatri Väljak would move all three 
bus stops to an expanded square at the north end of the 
park, where a small parking lot is now (orange).  Moving the 
existing telephone booth and kiosk from across the street 
would also bring people into the park, as would improved 







Estonia is part of NATO and the EU, and feeling 
more secure, it can afford to turn more attention 
to its internal affairs.  
In post-Soviet Estonia, 10% of the population 
has been left stateless; most non-citizens live 
in Tallinn.  Relations with Russia remain delicate, 
and Estonia’s next step is to assimilate its ethnic 
minorities effectively.  Promoting multiculturalism 
and integrating minorities will help integrate 
Estonia into the EU: “European cities generally 
exhibit a much higher level of mixing and 
integration of functions.”390  The structure of 
parks and public space in Tallinn can help promote 
integration, particularly among young people.
In a city with little population growth but rapid 
economic development, the structure of urban 
redevelopment is vital.  Tallinn should consider 
sustainable city planning and ethnic integration as 
two further steps toward erasing the “corrosive 
legacy of the Soviet past.”391
390  Beatley 2000: 41




Estonians try to reclaim Linnahall 
with a huge statue of Kalevipoeg, 
but the city needs more 
than monuments to promote 
multiculturalism.
Figure 228
For half a week out of each year, 
Tallinn’s Old Town Days draw a 
diverse suite of entertainments 
to the center city, including a 






















The Rat Race builds company 
camaraderie while gently 
mocking the fast pace 
and cellular dependency of 
contemporary business. 
Year Population Tallinn Population Data References
1372 4000 Tarand 1980: 26
1538 5400 Pullat 1998: 68
1561 8000 Pullat 1998: 68
1688 10000 Pullat 1998: 87
1696 15000 Pullat 1998: 89
1708 9801 Pullat 1998: 109
1710 1962 Pullat 1998: 110
1718 4000 Pullat 1998: 88
1754 6521 Pullat 1998: 110
1763 5638 Pullat 1998: 110
1772 5569 Pullat 1998: 110
1782 10653 Pullat 1998: 112
1820 12892 Inferred from Pullat 1998: 114
1856 20000 Pullat 1998: 118
1858 20680 Pullat 1998: 112
1871 29162 Murras-Hallas 2005: 50
1897 58810 Murras-Hallas 2005: 50
1900 70000 Murras-Hallas 2005: 11
1911 100000 Murras-Hallas 2005: 11
1912 104452 Pullat 1988: 147
1913 116108 Pullat 1998: 127 / Murras-Hallas 2005: 51
1915 133000 Murras-Hallas 2005: 50
1917 150000 Inferred from Pullat 1998: 127
1918 160000 Pullat 1998: 140
1919 93667 Inferred from Pullat 1998: 141
1938 144794 Pullat 1998: 147
1959 279853 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
1970 362536 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
1979 428537 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
1989 478974 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
2000 400781 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
2001 399685 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
2002 398434 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
2003 397150 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
2004 401821 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
Year Population Estonian Population Data References
1725 220000 www.estonica.org/eng/lugu.html?kateg=43& menyy_id=96&alam
1750 335000 www.estonica.org/eng/lugu.html?kateg=43& menyy_id=96&alam
1922 1,107,059 http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/
1934 1126413 http://www.meis.ee/eng/
1939 1133917 Rahi-Tamm 2005: 28
1945 850000 Rahi-Tamm 2005: 37
1989 1565662 http://www.meis.ee/eng/
1994 1500000 Jeffries 2004: 131
1997 1,462,130 http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/
2000 1370052 http://www.meis.ee/eng/
2001 1370000 Jeffries 2004: 131
2005 1,347,000 Tallinn: Facts and Figures
Appendix: 
Population and Ethnicity Data
Figures 230a-b
Tallinn’s crowded buses crawl 
through traffic like every other 
vehicle.
Figure 231
Separating tramlines from traffic 
jams along a parallel network of 





workers Bourgeois Nobility Reference
1850 500 Pullat 1998: 124
1871 500 Pullat 1998: 129
1879 1004 900 1626 Pullat 1998: 128
1897 4000 Pullat 1998: 128
1900 8000 2235 Pullat 1998: 129, 124
1901 10000 5400 Pullat 1998: 124
1913 16300 Pullat 1998: 128
1914 18600 41500 Pullat 1998: 128
1917 30000 Pullat 1998: 128-129
1920 7470 7500 Pullat 1998: 139
1939 24557 Pullat 1998: 139
Tallinn Ethnicity Data Sources
Year
1500 Pullat 1998: 68
42.59% Estonian
27.78% Russian









1871 Murras-Hallas 2005: 51
51.80% Estonian
1913 Murras-Hallas 2005: 51
71.60% Estonian









1997 Jeffries 2004: 135
50.00% Estonian






Greenways often bring users into 
brown spaces.  This awkward 
crossing near the passenger 
ferry terminal is considered part 
of a bike path.
Figures 233a-b
Accidental green spaces, like 
this one along Tartu Mantee, 
could be used to separate 
greenways from cars.  There 
is already a pedestrian bridge 
over the highway here (Figures 
235a-b).
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Estonia Ethnicity Data Sources






















1945 Raukas 1996: 19
94.00% Estonian
1979 Raukas 1996: 19
64.00% Estonian
1984 Raukas 1996: 19
61.50% Estonian






























Car vs. Pedestrian.  Even 
when crosswalks are marked, 
pedestrians may find it hard to 
get drivers’ attention.
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Pedestrian and bike connections to Kaarli Boulevard’s median, for instance, could 
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more places to sit, and pedestrian crossings (brown stripes) could be legitimized 
and made safer for people who are unwilling or unable to use the underground 
tunnel (red circles).  The poorly defined surface lots at Vabaduse Väljak (purple, top 
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Figure 255
Residents make the most of 
what blue space they can get.
Figures 256a-b
Intrepid bathers and a fisherman 
brave industrial waters at what 
was once known as Kalarand, or 
Fish Beach. This shore should 




effectively block off 
much access to 
water in Tallinn.
Useful Websites:
Estonia’s security policy, NATO, 06/06:
http://www.vm.ee/eng/nato/kat_359/1006.
 html
Ethnic integration in Estonia, 05/06:
http://www.coe.ee/eng/?op=news&NID=55
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/






  www.ezilon.com/ map_of_europe.htm
  http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:
   Tallinn_location.png
www.rre-sfe.ee/ ee/ee_ajalugu.htm
Figures, contemporary Tallinn, 06/06:
www.dickemauern.de/ tallinn_sm/grtallinn.htm
  www.nicholashopkins.co.uk/ estonia.htm
www.respublica.ee/ ?id=1818




   Estonia#Birth_rate
  http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_
   profiles/pop_cou_233.pdf
  http://talesmag.com/rprweb/the_rprs/europe/
   estonia.shtml









Views like these of the Tallinn 
harbor should be accessible by 
public transport.
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Soviet Soldier Monument. 06/06:
  http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee/fpage/explore/
   attractions/soviet, 
Saarinen’s Plan for Tallinn, 06/06:   
  http://www.library.cornell.edu/Reps/DOCS/
   saarinen.htm
  http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/tallinn-
   making-it-new/?page=3




The archipelago of islands at 
Saltholmen is a 20-minute tram 
ride from the Swedish city of 
Göteborg.  Tram passengers can 
even transfer their ticket to ride 
public ferries out to individual 
islands. 
Figure 260
Informal recreational use of a 
former industrial site might not 
be safe. 
